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Abstract: This thesis advances a distinctive new ontology of objects and dimensions - 
dimensionism, for short. Dimensions are understood, roughly, as respects of comparability. 
Dimensions are not properties; if a property is a way that an object is, then a dimension is a respect 
in which an object can be some way or other.  
The discussion is in seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the dimensionist ontology, and offers an 
initial defence. Chapter 7 provides, in overview, an account of the ‘metametaphysical’ outlook that 
informs the thesis, drawing on work by Ted Sider, Hasok Chang, and Jonathan Lowe. Chapters 2 to 
6 deal with applications of dimensionism to a selection of debates. 
Chapter 2 argues that dimensionism offers the best ontology of determinable-determinate structure. 
I argue, too, that dimensionism is not far off the background metaphysical view of W.E. Johnson 
himself.  
Chapter 3 offers a dimensionist treatment of the problem of universals that has much in common - 
so one might think - with resemblance nominalism (Chapter 6 will insist on some big differences).  
Chapter 4 argues that dimensionism provides the best account of instantiation structure. Here fact 
ontologies are the main rival to beat. 
Chapter 5 argues that dimensionism can offer a good account of nomic governance. In particular, 
the proposed account is not vulnerable to Stephen Mumford’s ‘Central Dilemma’, and improves on 
the accounts of Armstrong and Lowe. 
Chapter 6 considers dimensionism alongside rival accounts of property possession - resemblance 
nominalism, trope theory, modes, universals, and locationism - and argues that the proposed 
ontology competes well. 
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the explanatory resources offered by a category of 
dimensions, and more broadly, to argue that respect structure deserves a central place in ontological 
and metaphysical enquiry.  
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Introduction 
This thesis advances a new and distinctive fundamental ontology: dimensionism. My aim 
overall will be to elucidate, defend, and recommend dimensionism as the best ontology to 
adopt in relation to issues pertaining to the metaphysics of properties. Along the way, I will 
argue that dimensionism is distinctive not only because it differs substantially from its 
contemporary rivals, but also because of its fresh contributions on a range of core 
metaphysical topics. In doing so, I will be carving out a subsidiary conclusion as a fallback 
position: dimensionism is, if not clearly best, at the very least a challenging and 
worthwhile competitor among more familiar alternatives. 
At the core of the ontology that I am proposing are two fundamental categories - objects 
and dimensions - and a formal relationship of determination between them. Since Chapter 
1 will get straight down to a detailed exposition of the core ontology, I will keep my 
remarks here brief. Dimensions, as I will understand them, are not properties - ways of 
being, to use Lowe’s (2006) expression - but respects in which things are those ways (this 
is not, however, to reify ways, or properties).  Dimensions are roughly comparable to 
Johnson’s highest determinables. It is under dimensions that relationships of comparability 
- of resemblance and difference - find the space to obtain. Moreover, I will say that objects 
determine dimensions. This is not to say that objects fix or ground dimensions, but just that 
they fall under them: objects are various ways in the respects that dimensions are.  
Relationships of determination are explanatorily rich. On the one hand, they allow us to 
associate objects with determination profiles, the sets of dimensions that they determine. 
On the other, they allow us to give metaphysical explanations based on the factored 
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structure of determination relationships. Determination relationships are factored in this 
sense: objects determine dimensions in a twofold way. Objects determine dimensions both 
at all - as a brick does by essentially having a mass - and also somehow - as the same brick 
does by having a specific mass, say, 2kg.  
These are, in summary, the core ontological resources upon which dimensionism draws to 
do explanatory work. My task in this thesis will be to show that good explanatory work can 
be done on this basis.  
I consider it a strength of my proposed view, that its ontological resources are not 
structurally occult: determination and resemblance relationships are more familiar to both 
common sense and scientific practice,  and to that degree less mysterious, than 1
relationships of instantiation, characterisation, participation, compresence, and the like. In 
particular, they are plausibly the structures that underlie measurement, and - according to 
Johnson (1921) and, arguably, a growing body of contemporary literature (see Gärdenfors 
2000, 2014, Magidor 2013, and also Funkhouser 2006, 2014) - also predication. They are 
structures that we use - structures that we run into in practice. Of course, no ontology 
should hope to demystify everything. But there is a great difference between treating a 
feature of reality as primitive - such as quality or change - and positing primitive mysteries 
to explain it. I will be doing plenty of the former, but - I hope - little of the latter.  
Dimensionism earns its keep in two intersecting theoretical spaces. In the first, its rivals are 
other fundamental ontologies - other schemes of fundamental ontological categories. In the 
 This is no hint toward the outlook of scientific metaphysics defended in Ladyman and Ross 1
(2007); indeed, my view is quite the opposite. See Chapter 7 for details. 
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second, its rivals are other metaphysical treatments of properties, property possession, and 
the problem of universals. These are old debates, even by the standards of metaphysics, 
and one might wonder for this reason at my impertinence in presuming to say something 
distinctive and new. Let me field three related worries here. The first is that my claim to 
novelty merely betrays a narrowness of historical focus. The second is that my claim to 
novelty merely betrays a narrowness of tradition. The third is an ‘exasperated stare’ 
objection: there has been quite enough written about the metaphysics of properties already, 
so dimensionism’s claim to mere novelty, even if true, underjustifies my writing about it at 
such length.  
My response to the first two worries is: fair enough. A discussion of parallels to my 
dimensionist proposal from other historical periods, or other philosophical traditions, 
would be an excellent thing to pursue in further work (indeed, one aim of this thesis is to 
enable such further discussions to take place). But those discussions are simply not my 
focus in this thesis. My aim here is to present and defend dimensionism as a novel, viable, 
and appealing position in the contemporary metaphysics of properties in the analytic 
tradition.  
My response to the third worry is: (please) read on. I hope to show, in the course of 
discussion, that dimensionism’s claim is not to mere novelty of a paper-pushing sort, 
consisting of small tweaks to established views. While dimensionism is by no means 
isolated in the contemporary literature, it is quite radically different from the established 
range of available views. My remarks above have hopefully given an indication of how 
things will go, on this point; we will see more of it as the thesis progresses. Moreover, I 
will be arguing that dimensionism is not only new and distinctive, but new and distinctive 
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in a well motivated way. Its motivation centres upon the observation that reality exhibits a 
respect structure: the property structure of the world appears to be arrayed in a certain 
distinctive way that demands explanation. Among the central features of respect structure 
is the appearance that properties - determinate properties - admit of grouping into exclusion 
classes, such as the classes of (co-specific) colours, or masses, or colours, or shapes.  
Respect structure has standardly been discussed in terms of Johnson’s (1921, Ch.11) 
notions of determinable and determinate,  and it has been widely assumed that respect 2
structures can be accounted for in terms of a prior account of property structure. These 
assumptions - that respect structure can be made tractable in terms of determinable-
determinate structure, and that property structure is explanatorily prior to respect structure - 
are core components of what might plausibly be labelled the standard paradigm 
concerning respect structure. What makes dimensionism distinctive is, to a large degree, 
the way in which it turns this standard paradigm on its head. What makes its distinctiveness 
well-motivated is that - as I will be arguing - it is right to do so.  
The contributions that this thesis aims to make may be grouped into three kinds: 
ontological, metaphysical, and metametaphysical. The ontological component of my thesis 
centres on the clarification and defence of the dimensionist ontological scheme itself. The 
metaphysical component - which takes up the bulk of my discussion, insofar as the three 
components can be considered separately - centres on the application of that ontological 
scheme. In particular, I will focus in detail on dimensionist metaphysical treatments of 
determinable-determinate structures, the problem of universals, instantiation and 
 The notions of determinable and determinate are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. It is normal to 2
introduce the distinction by means of examples: red is determinate relative to colour, and 
determinable relative to crimson. 
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predication structures, nomic governance, and property possession: I aim to recommend 
dimensionism over its rivals in each case.  
The metametaphysical component of the thesis will be exhibited in use throughout most of 
my discussion, and will be laid out explicitly in the final chapter. It comprises a systematic 
framework for understanding the nature, ends, and means of ontological and metaphysical 
enquiry, which will provide the setting for my discussion throughout this thesis. That 
framework is, at bottom, one which treats metaphysics as a project of realist enquiry into 
the structures and ontological forms that reality has and contains. The notions of structure 
and form that I have in mind here are drawn, respectively, from the work of Ted Sider and 
Jonathan Lowe. I will say more about how these notions are related as the thesis 
progresses. The central link is that I view the Lowean notion of ontological form as a local 
correlate of the Siderean notion of structure, standing to it as essence stands to necessity: 
an entity’s ontological form is its contribution to the structure of the world. The overall 
framework that I defend will combine these Lowean and Siderean components with certain 
resources drawn from Hasok Chang’s pragmatically motivated account of scientific 
practice and progress. The resulting view will, however, be unambiguously realist in its 
commitments.  
Before providing a chapter overview, let me make two general points about the coming 
discussions.  
The first concerns my choice of examples. I have used a range of examples, some of which 
- such as mass and charge - are plausibly fundamental, from a physical point of view, while 
others - such as colour - are not. Not much is intended to hang on this: the proposed 
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structures are structures that obtain - I claim - across various strata of physical scale and 
fundamentality. Nevertheless, one might think that more physically fundamental examples, 
such as an electron and its charge, are in some sense more genuine examples than mid-
sized cases such as an apple and its colour, a minim and its timbre, or a shoe and its smell. 
The problem here seems to be a general one, that befalls various ontologies of properties in 
the same way: it is, in Lewisian terms, the question of naturalness. While acknowledging 
this as an issue requiring some treatment on a final analysis, I will set it aside for the 
purposes of this thesis. This is because I suspect that the Lewisian question of naturalness 
presents a general choice point for any ontological theory, and consequently, that the core 
proposals of dimensionism can be set out and discussed without working some particular 
treatment of Lewisian naturalness through my whole discussion.  3
The second general point concerns a pair of notions: that of a feature, and that of a 
conferral ontology. Consider Lowe’s (2012a) claim that his neo-Aristotelian ontology is 
neither a constitutent ontology, nor a relational ontology. The claim amounts to this: 
modes, in Lowe’s ontology, are not to be understood as qualitative constituents of objects 
that confer qualities upon the objects that they characterise. They should not, either, be 
understood as entities related to objects in such a way as to confer qualities upon them. To 
understand Lowe’s modes aright, we must reject the idea that objects are quality-less 
entities - bare particulars - that need ways of being conferred upon them. Modes do not 
confer ways of being upon objects, either as constituents or as relata: they simply are those 
ways.  
 If anything, dimensionism stands especially well here, since it can avail itself of explanatory 3
resources connected with the idea, central to the discussion of Funkhouser (2006, 2014), that 
certain dimensions may vary along others. 
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One way to articulate Lowe’s view here is as a rejection of conferral ontologies in relation 
to the feature of quality. To reject a conferral ontology concerning some feature of reality is 
to reject the idea that reality contains entities that are bereft of that feature, and in need of 
further entities to confer the relevant feature upon them. Bradley’s regress illustrates this 
point - or at least a component of it - in relation to universals and particulars: if an external 
relation of instantiation is supposed to explain how universals confer qualities upon 
particulars, then it simply is not up to the job. But the point goes beyond the explanatory 
failure of external relations: as I argue in Chapter 6, the very notion of conferral at play in 
such cases is obscure.  
The rejection of conferral ontologies may extend to features other than quality. (I am not 
claiming, necessarily, that we should reject conferral ontologies in general, but only that it 
is useful to be clear about those features about which we do reject such ontologies). One 
example is Mumford’s (2004, 2005) rejection of conferral ontologies of animation  or 4
change. I will be joining Mumford in this rejection in Chapter 5.  Throughout this thesis, I 5
will treat quality and animation as two features about which we should reject conferral 
ontologies, of both relational and constituent sorts.  6
 I am using this term in Mumford’s sense: no connotation of animism is intended. 4
 The rejection of conferral for animation leaves room for me to hold, as I will argue, that animation 5
- which is an unconferred feature - is nonetheless governed by laws, or by something similar to 
laws. 
 I thus differ from Lowe over the explanation of qualitative change. On Lowe’s view (see his 6
2006), such change is explained in terms of changes in the existence and nonexistence of modes. 
On my view, it is explained directly in terms of changes in what I am calling relationships of 
determination-somehow. I am not claiming here, however, that Lowe’s conferral account of change 
(that the existence of different modes at different times confers qualitative change upon objects) is 
incoherent. 
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It remains to offer a map of the rest of this thesis. Introduction and Conclusion aside, my 
discussion will be split into seven chapters. These seven chapters admit of the following 
natural grouping: Chapter 1, Chapters 2-6, and Chapter 7. Chapter 1 is concerned primarily 
with exposition: it supplies and defends an overview of dimensionism. Chapter 7 is 
concerned primarily with a presentation and defence of the aforementioned 
metametaphysical framework. Chapters 2 to 6 discuss the application of dimensionism to a 
selection of metaphysical topics: determinables and determinates (Chapter 2), the problem 
of universals (Chapter 3), instantiation and predication (Chapter 4), nomic governance 
(Chapter 5), and property possession (Chapter 6). In more detail: 
Chapter 1 provides a full picture, in overview, of the core dimensionist ontology. I will 
clarify my conceptions of the categories of objects and dimensions, and I will introduce 
and discuss my claim that the determination relationship has a factored structure (a further 
discussion of this theme will appear in Chapter 5, and elsewhere). I will discuss how 
dimensionism deals with categorial uniqueness, and the role that determination profiles 
play in the ontology. Finally, I will indicate the role that Platonism will play in my 
dimensionist proposal, in connection with the account of governance to be given in 
Chapter 5. With this exposition in place, Chapter 1 closes by considering some motivations 
for each of dimensionism’s fundamental categories: I consider some general motivations 
for the category of objects, and three lines of argument for dimensions drawn from 
considerations about respect structure, chance, and the principle of single value. 
Chapter 2 begins my survey of dimensionism's applications, by discussing its application 
to determinable-determinate structure. I will argue that dimensionism offers the best 
metaphysical account of determinable-determinate structure. In the process, I will briefly 
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argue that dimensionism is not too far from the background metaphysical view that 
Johnson himself held when he introduced the distinction between determinable and 
determinate adjectives in his (1921). The account that I give, if true, will overturn several 
widespread (if not universal) assumptions in the literature on determinables. It will turn 
out, for example, that determinable-determinate hierarchies are not ontologically uniform, 
and that determinables - at least maximal determinables - are ontologically prior to their 
associated determinates.  
Chapter 3 supplies a dimensionist treatment of the problem of universals. The claim of 
Chapter 2, that determinable-determinate hierarchies are ontologically disunified, generates 
some complications for the task of lining up my dimensionist ontology with familiar ways 
of setting up the problem of univerals. Naturally, Chapter 3 opens by discussing these 
issues. I then present my account of universals. The core of the proposal is an abstraction 
principle PA - for property abstraction - fashioned after Frege’s abstraction principle for 
the introduction of number. Roughly and informally, the principle says that two objects 
have the same property in some respect just in case they perfectly resemble in that respect. 
The principle is offered as the basis for a nominalist treatment of determinate properties, as 
either nonexistent or derivative. I discuss the proper formulation and interpretation of PA, 
and show that the Julius Caesar problem, which (arguably) troubled Frege’s use of Hume’s 
Principle, does not trouble my use of PA. The principle PA is intended to account for 
maximal determinate properties; Chapter 3 closes by sketching a way to extend the 
principle to account for mid-level determinates.  
Chapter 4 focuses on instantiation structure. I argue that instantiation structures (and 
indeed, predication structures too) are ternary, determination structures. Dimensionism’s 
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main rival in Chapter 4 will be factalism  - various ontologies that treat facts as 7
ontologically fundamental. Accordingly, the chapter begins with a thematic survey of 
factalist ontologies, before proposing a general way to characterise factalism, understood 
as addressing instantiation structure as a focal explanandum. I then argue that, since 
instantiation has a ternary rather than binary structure, dimensionism should be preferred 
over factalism. Nevertheless, I argue, dimensionism can and ought to preserve several 
aspects of the factalist proposal - such as the rejection of a property-conferring conception 
of instantiation. I end by suggesting that dimensionism can be seen as the best expression 
of what factalism is aiming for. 
Chapter 5 details a dimensionist account of nomic governance. (To be clear, this is not a 
chapter about laws, but a chapter about governance in which the account of governance 
that I defend happens to be structurally similar to some familiar accounts of laws. I am, 
therefore, using ‘nomic’ to mean governance that is lawlike rather than governance by 
laws.) The chapter begins with a discussion and defence of my claim - which forms the 
basis of my account of governance - that determination relationships have a factored 
structure. I then present an account of governance by focusing on the challenge of 
Mumford’s (2004, 2005) ‘Central Dilemma’. I discuss the two horns of Mumford’s 
dilemma, in relation to Armstrong’s (1983) and Lowe’s (2002, 2006, 2013) accounts of 
laws, and argue that in both cases, it is the principle of instantiation that gives the Central 
Dilemma its bite. In light of this, I argue that dimensionism can give an account of 
governance that denies the principle of instantiation, and steers between the horns of 
Mumford’s dilemma.  
 Throughout this thesis, I have used ‘factalism’, following Turner (2016) rather than ‘factualism’. 7
But my use of ‘factalism’ is intended to be general: I do not mean, by it, to single out Turner’s view 
from other fact ontologies. 
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Chapter 6 rounds up my discussion of dimensionism’s applications by considering rival 
accounts of property possession. The emphasis here will be more on what Campbell (1990) 
has called the A-question, rather than the B-question that is the focus of Chapter 3 (the 
relationship between the two questions is discussed in Chapter 3). My focus in Chapter 6 
will be comparative: I argue that dimensionism should be preferred over, or at least fares 
no worse than, a range of rival accounts: resemblance nominalism, trope theories, neo-
Aristotelian modes, universals, and Cowling’s recent (2014) proposal, locationism. My aim 
here, in the available space, will not be to establish any of the conclusions that I push for, 
but rather, to show how they might be argued for at greater length. 
Chapter 7 steps back from the task of expounding and applying the proposed dimensionist 
ontology.  I focus, instead, on the metametaphysical framework - by which I mean the 
conception of the nature, ends, and means of metaphysical enquiry - that provides the 
setting for the discussions of Chapters 1 to 6. My focus in Chapter 7 will be constructive. I 
will not aim to engage thoroughly with the main positions in the contemporary 
metametaphysical debate: that is something that I hope to pursue another time. Instead, I 
focus on presenting the outlook that informs my discussion in this thesis. The outlook that I 
will defend - which I term immersive realism - brings together resources from the work of 
Ted Sider (2012), Jonathan Lowe (2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2012b), and Hasok Chang 
(various). The proposed position will draw on pragmatically motivated resources, but will 
remain entirely realist in its commitments. 
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I hope that these chapter summaries provide some sense of where the thesis will be going 
from here.  Each chapter will, in addition, begin with a brief paragraph of orientation to 
further clarify the point that has been reached in the overall line of argument.  
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Chapter 1 - Dimensionism 
0. Intro 
The present chapter introduces dimensionism, the ontological theory at the centre of this 
thesis. My discussion is set out in three stages. First, I will introduce the centrepiece of the 
ontology - the category of dimensions - and provide an intuitive grasp of the idea. Second, 
I will outline the ontology, dimensionism, in which that category will be set. Third, I 
discuss and defend the theory’s conceptions of its two fundamental categories - objects and 
dimensions - in more detail.  
Section 1 introduces the notion of a dimension as a respect of comparability. Section 2 
outlines the dimensionist ontological scheme. I will discuss the core ontology (2.1), 
ontological form (2.2), determination (2.3), categorial uniqueness (2.4), determination 
profiles (2.5), and Platonism (2.6). Section 3 offers supporting arguments for my proposed 
conceptions of objects (3.1) and dimensions (3.2).  
A point of clarification before we begin. Throughout the thesis, I will assume a broadly 
Lowean understanding of terms like ‘category’, ‘fundamental category’, ‘formal 
relationship’, and ‘ontological form’. I will assume an understanding of terms like 
‘structure’, ‘fundamental structure’, and ‘joints of reality’ that is primarily Siderean. I will 
also talk about explanatory relationships between ontology and structure. Since my focus is 
on the use of these notions, I will exposit them only to the extent that the context demands. 
Nevertheless, this raises a question: how do these Lowean, Siderean, and explanatory 
themes combine with each other into a single, integrated (meta)metaphysical picture? This 
question will be taken up in detail in Chapter 7, where I offer an account of the ends and 
means of metaphysical enquiry that I call immersive realism.  
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1. Dimensions: The Pre-Theoretical Idea 
The most distinctive element of dimensionism is the fundamental category of dimensions. 
The term ‘dimension’ is chosen for its relative lack of misleading connotations, though the 
idea for which it is  chosen could equally have been put in terms of respects. Indeed, I will 
sometimes use these terms interchangeably, though I will keep ‘dimension’, rather than 
‘respect’, as my preferred term. 
One can get an initial handle on what dimensions are, by considering the category of 
modes in the four-category ontology of Jonathan Lowe (2006).  On Lowe’s ontology, 8
modes are a fundamental category of non-substantial particulars: they are non-universal 
properties that characterise objects. They are, to use another expression, ways of being. In 
particular, since Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian ontology is neither ‘relational’ nor 
‘constituent’ (Lowe 2012a), modes are not entities that confer upon objects their ways of 
being, either by being constituents of, or by being appropriately related to, the objects 
whose modes they are. Modes do not confer ways of being; rather, they simply are those 
ways of being, conceived as particulars rather than universals.  
Sticking with this Lowean talk of ‘ways’, we may say that for an object to have a property 
is for it to be characterised by a mode: it is for the object to be some way. Being blue, being 
round, and being a gram in mass are all ways that an object might be.  
Now it seems plausible, on a first pass, to say that each way of being is a way of being in 
some respect. Thus, to be blue is to be a certain way in respect of colour, to be round is to 
 The priority here is expository and heuristic, not metaphysical. 8
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be a certain way in respect of shape, and to be a gram in mass is to be a certain way in 
respect of mass. We may say, then, that colour, shape, and mass are the respects in which 
things are their ways - blue, round, and a gram, respectively.  
Respects can be respects of sameness: two things may be blue, and thus the same in respect 
of colour. But they may also be respects of difference: a blue thing and a red thing are 
different ways in the same respect, namely colour. Indeed, things could hardly be different 
ways in different respects: it is the sameness of shared respects that makes things 
comparable at all. We may therefore talk of respects as respects of comparability. 
To say that these things are real features of the world - that ways of being are ways of 
being in certain respects, and that comparability presupposes sameness of respect - is to 
say, in a broadly realist way, that the world has a respect structure. It is, in Sider’s terms, to 
be a realist about a certain manner in which ways of being go together. Moreover, while the 
world’s respect structure is closely tied to its quality structure, the two are not the same: 
respects are not themselves ways of being, but are, rather, respects in which things are 
ways.  
This way of talking of respects differs from the merely relativising sense in which the 
expression ‘in respect of’ is sometimes used. Thus, two interpretations of a concerto may 
be similar in respect of the cadenza. These are not the respects that I mean: there is no 
ontologically significant sense in which a cadenza is the respect in which two 
interpretations are similar. More importantly, there is no sense in saying, if two 
interpretations of a concerto are similar in respect of the cadenza, and two pianists are 
similar in respect of their left hands, that there is something - being a respect - that 
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cadenzas and left hands have in common. To say that two interpretations are similar in 
respect of the cadenza is just to say that they have parts that are similar. Yet these parts 
must themselves be similar in certain respects. Provided these further respects are not parts 
again (the first four bars; the recap of the first subject, etc.), we will here be dealing with 
respects in my sense (tempo, dynamics, and so on).  
This relativising use of ‘in respect of’ is also present in metaphysics. One instance is 
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s principle D in his account of degrees of resemblance (see Chapter 6 
for discussion). In that context, for two objects to resemble in a respect is just for them to 
have some specific property in common (in Rodriguez-Pereyra’s ontology: for them to 
belong to an appropriate resemblance class). Again, these are not respects in my sense. To 
avoid these confusions, I will typically use the term ‘dimension’ rather than ‘respect’.  9
Dimensions, then, are respects. Throughout this thesis, I will use ‘dimension’ as an 
ontological term of art, and ‘respect’ as a non-fundamental surrogate.  I follow Lowe in 10
pushing an ontology that is neither relational, nor constituent. Dimensions are not entities 
that confer respects upon objects, or upon their ways of being, either by relation or by 
constituenthood. Rather, they simply are the respects in which objects are ways (whatever 
one’s metaphysics of ways: see Chapter 3).  
 Two further reasons for this preference are, first, that it is hard to come up with non-awkward 9
terminology to go with respect-talk, especially in respect of (!) the notion of determination, and 
second, that the notion of a dimension has certain connotations in theoretical domains - such as 
dimensional analysis - that I want to preserve. 
 In terms that I will clarify later in the thesis: I will take ‘dimension’ always to designate the 10
fundamental category that I am positing in an explanans role, while ‘respect’ will sometimes be 
used to designate an explanandum structure. 
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Talk of respects of ways of being might suggest a comparison with determinable-
determinate structure. For on one common understanding, instantiating a determinate is a 
way of instantiating a determinable under which the determinate falls. Indeed, I will argue 
in Chapter 2 that dimensions are closely tied to determinables and determinates: 
dimensions provide the ontological basis - the explanans - for which the determinable-
determinate distinction supplies an explanandum. A detailed defence of this claim can be 
found in the next chapter; for now, I note that dimensions cannot be straightforwardly 
located in a determinable-determinate scheme.  
To make this vivid, consider the example of colour. Suppose that a certain apple is 
crimson. If crimson is a way that the apple is, then colour is the respect in which it is that 
way. Similarly, it is standardly said that if crimson is a determinate quality of the apple, 
then colour is a determinable – indeed, highest determinable – quality that the apple has in 
virtue of its being crimson. Here, standard understandings of determinables will add that 
there are other, intermediate determinable qualities that the apple may have in virtue of its 
being crimson – for example, its being red. But there is no parallel in terms of respects: it is 
infelicitous, at the least, to say that the apple is crimson in respect of red(ness). The apple is 
crimson, and it is red: crimson and red are both ways, at varying levels of specificity, that 
the apple is in respect of colour.  
Another familiar discussion suggested by my notion of a dimension is Eric Funkhouser’s 
treatment of determinables (2006) and the structure of kinds (2014). In both cases, 
Funkhouser’s account makes crucial use of the notion of a dimension of variation. 
Funkhouser’s core example of this idea is colour. Colour is a determinable - indeed, a 
highest determinable - under which a range of determinate colours are subsumed. What 
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grounds their subsumption - what makes determinate colours multiple determinations 
rather than multiple realisations of colour, according to Funkhouser - is that they vary 
along a common set of dimensions (not in my sense here, but Funkhouser’s): hue, 
saturation, and brightness. As Funkhouser points out (2014:26), the property space for 
colour can be treated as a three-dimensional space, whose dimensions are hue, saturation, 
and brightness, and in which fully determinate colours may be represented as points, while 
mid-level colour determinables may be represented as proper subregions. In this sense, 
hue, saturation, and brightness are the dimensions of variation of the determinable kind 
colour.  11
Funkhouser’s dimensions of variation seem very close to dimensions as I conceive them. In 
particular, the notion of variation - the relationship between colour and the three 
dimensions along which it varies - is one that transfers very easily to the ontological 
picture that I will propose.  However, Funkhouser’s ontological picture is rather different 12
from my own. Funkhouser’s proposal is embedded in a metaphysical view that is realist 
about properties (2014:49); indeed, Funkhouser endorses realism about super-determinate 
properties (2014:73) understood as tropes. While Funkhouser holds that dimensions are 
mind-independent (2014:64), it is doubtful whether his trope ontology leaves room for the 
kind of Platonism about dimensions that I will defend (see section 2.6 in this chapter, and 
also Chapter 5). Moreover, while Funkhouser treats property spaces as mere theoretical 
constructs - a point that I will discuss below - his account puts property spaces and mere 
 Funkhouser: “Determination dimensions are simply those essential dimensions of a kind along 11
which instances of that kind can vary.” (2014:30) 
 On dimensionism, variation will be a formal relationship between dimensions. I take 12
dimensionism’s straightforward accommodation of this relationship to be a point in its favour. 
However, the majority of this thesis will be concerned with determination, the relationship between 
dimensions and objects. I will, therefore, not pursue this theme further. 
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predicate spaces ontologically on a par (2014:67). This suits Funkhouser’s purposes - 
giving an account of the logical structure of kinds - just fine. But as we will see, such a 
notion of a property space does not have an obvious place within my dimensionist 
ontology. In any case, the ontology that I will defend here is developed independently from 
Funkhouser’s view, and I will not further discuss its relation to that view, with one brief 
exception in Chapter 3 that I will mention presently. 
That brief exception is an exception to a more general theme in this thesis: my avoidance 
of the notion of a space. The term ‘dimension’ might be thought to connote the notion of a 
property space, and with it, an ontology that treats metaphysical problems by means of 
geometrical notions. Such approaches are presently on the increase (see e.g. Funkhouser 
2014, Cowling 2014, and Turner 2016).  It is a further point of appeal, for such 13
approaches, that they fall in well with recent discussions of geometrical models of 
representation and thought (see e.g. Gärdenfors 2000, 2014; Zenker and Gärdenfors 2015). 
My proposal in this thesis might be seen as a contribution to this growing area of interest. 
However, it differs from previous work in this area, in its avoidance of an absolute or 
substantivalist conception of property space (see Cowling 2014:676). I do not appeal either 
to the mathematician’s notion of a space as a set of points (in the case of a property space, 
this would amount to realism about determinate properties), or to Cowling’s more 
metaphysically full-blooded notion of a quality space in which objects can occupy points 
just as they occupy the more familiar space-time points. Instead, I will take a relational 
view of property space - in so far as I say anything about that notion at all - on which 
‘spatial’ relations are discussed in terms of resemblance (in my discussion of universals; 
 Cowling (2014:668) also mentions Stalnaker (1979), Van Fraassen (1967), and Hawthorne and 13
Sider (2002). 
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see Chapter 3), and functional constraints on resemblance (in my discussion of nomic 
governance; see Chapter 5). The exception to this, as I have mentioned, will be at the end 
of Chapter 3, where I leave room for such approaches to offer accounts of mid-level and 
mind-dependent determinate properties. It may be possible, then, to see my proposed 
ontology as a relational-geometric approach to the ontology of properties. For my part, 
however, I will avoid talking in this way. 
2. Dimensionism 
With the notion of a dimension in place, I turn to the wider proposed ontology, which I am 
terming dimensionism. As noted earlier, the ontology that I am advancing here is pursued 
from a broadly Lowean point of view. This is not to say that I share the fourfold 
ontological scheme favoured by Lowe (2006, 2013), but rather, that I intend to follow 
Lowe’s general approach to the treatment of ontology through the adumbration of a 
scheme of ontological categories and formal ontological relationships. To make my 
exposition of dimensionism entirely perspicuous, I will divide it into six themes: (1) the 
categorial scheme itself, (2) the notion of ontological form, (3) the formal relationship of 
determination, (4) categorial uniqueness, (5) ontological categories, and (6) Platonism.  
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2.1 The Categories 
Dimensionism is a two-category ontology.  I understand the notion of a category, and the 14
notion of a fundamental category, in a Lowean way. Ontological categories are kinds of 
being, marked out by the distinctive existence and identity criteria associated with their 
members. Ontological categories are kinds of being, but not themselves elements of 
being.  An entity belongs to a category not in virtue of its being related to a further thing - 15
a category - but rather, as a matter of its ontological form (I will say more about 
ontological form in the next subsection).  
I will say that one category is prior to another just in case the existence and identity 
conditions associated with the posterior category can be exhaustively given in terms of 
entities belonging to the category that is prior. For example, suppose that a trope bundle 
account of objects is correct. Then an object exists just in case some tropes exist 
compresently, and some objects are identical just in case they are constituted by the same 
compresent tropes.  Thus, object existence is exhaustively accounted for in terms of trope 16
existence, and object identity is exhaustively accounted for in terms of trope identity:  the 17
category of tropes is, in our example, prior to the category of objects. I will say that an 
 ‘Dimensionism’ is being used here as a term for the particular ontology that I am advancing, not 14
as a general term for any ontology that includes a category, or indeed even a fundamental category, 
of dimensions. 
 I will use ‘element of being’, ‘being’, and ‘entity’ interchangeably in this sense. 15
 On the nuclear theory of Simons (1994a), the nuclear tropes in a compresent bundle hang 16
together in a close, mutually dependent way. For illustrative purposes, we need not ask, therefore, 
what such a compresence relation amounts to. 
 This is, again, an illustrative simplification: I am assuming that bundles depend rigidly on each of 17
their member tropes, and ignoring the distinction between a nucleus and what Simons calls its 
‘peripheral cloud’. 
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ontological category is fundamental just in case it is a category to which no further 
category is prior.  
Dimensionism admits the following fundamental categories: objects and dimensions. 
Throughout this thesis, I will treat dimensionism as an ontology that admits only these 
fundamental categories. Thus, I am advancing an ontology whose inventory of 
fundamental categories purports to be complete. That is not to say, however, that this thesis 
claims to show that dimensionism’s inventory is complete: such a claim is, plainly, beyond 
its scope to demonstrate. What I will argue, instead, is that dimensionism’s fundamental 
categories provide persuasive accounts in a range of metaphysical applications (see the 
thesis introduction for an overview).  
Since objects and properties are fundamental categories on dimensionism, it is not 
possible, within my proposed ontology, to give non-circular definitions of objecthood and 
dimensionhood. However, it is possible to give non-definitional elucidations, or 
conceptions, of what objects and dimensions are. I have already offered such a conception 
in the case of dimensions. I now offer an elucidation of my conception of objects. This 
matters for two reasons: first, because despite its familiarity, the notion of an object - or a 
substantial particular, in Lowe’s terminology - is as much a metaphysician’s notion as that 
of a dimension, and second, because I must set up my conception of objects that makes it 
clear precisely what it is about them that will stand, in Chapter 3, as an explanandum in my 
discussion of the problem of universals.  
With these purposes in mind, I will offer a conception of objects that draws upon the least 
controversial assumptions possible. In particular, I will give a conception of objects that 
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draws only upon features of reality that any ontological theory ought - I suggest - to admit 
as explananda. I will present my conception of objects in four steps; once all four steps are 
presented, I will explain how they are combined to give a conception of objects.  18
Step 1: Consider two pre-theoretically familiar features of reality:  particularity and 19
quality.  I do not mean particulars and qualities, understood as entities that populate the 20
categories of an ontological theory. Rather, I mean simply those features of the world that 
are familiar prior to ontological theorising, even if they are also open to retroactive 
amendment in light of it: the features that stand in as the explananda to which the entities, 
particulars and qualities, relate as explanans. Particularity is, roughly, that explanandum 
feature of reality that enables sense to be made of asking which thing is F, or of saying not 
just that apple is red, but rather, that this apple is red.  Quality is, equally roughly, that 21
general feature of reality in virtue of which sense can be made of saying of something that 
it is F, or thus-and-so. This is all compatible with a great deal of further room for error in 
identifying the loci of particularity (objects, or tropes, and so on) and the ranges of quality 
that may be ascribed to things (self-identity, for example, may be something that can be 
ascribed to things without describing, in an intuitive sense, what they are like). But 
 These steps are not intended to be detailed arguments. This is not to say that they could not be 18
developed into detailed arguments. But in the present context, they simply play the role of 
defeasible considerations that provide the background for a conception of the category of objects. 
 I am using ‘reality’ in a broad, non-theoretical sense, in the kind of manner exemplified by Hasok 19
Chang (2012; for further discussion, see Chapter 7 in this thesis). I am using ‘feature’ in a similarly 
unsharpened sense. 
 I am running the present discussion on the basis of just these features. However, in Chapter 5, I 20
will take up a similar point in relation to dispositionality and animation. The present discussion, 
therefore, is not intended to make particularity and quality the only features relevant to my 
conception of objects. 
 The implicit idea here - that of a feature of reality’s structure enabling sense to be made of an 21
epistemic activity - is taken up explicitly in Chapter 7. 
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underlying the very possibility of being mistaken in these respects is a basic (if defeasible) 
commitment, in the explanandum role, of the world’s exhibited features of particularity 
and quality.   22
Step 2: Consider the way in which the features of particularity and quality occur in relation 
to each other. There is, in a sense that is pre-theoretically clear but hard to make entirely 
precise, a convergence between the two: particularity and quality occur together, and not 
apart.  Again, this commitment - this appearance in the explanandum role - is defeasible. 23
For example, on Cowling’s (2014) locationist account of property possession, the loci of 
particularity (objects) are quite separate from the loci of quality (property-space points). I 
will argue in Chapter 6 that this feature of Cowling’s view renders the locationist picture 
incoherent. However, the point for now is that it may be conceivable that particularity and 
quality should have separate loci in the world. Nevertheless, there appears to be some sense 
in which the two converge, where this convergence is, roughly, the feature of reality in 
virtue of which sense can be made of picking out some particular thing and saying of it that 
it is thus-and-so, or of picking out a feature and placing it just here rather than there (see 
Szekely 2015 on feature-placing). What I need here, in any case, is not that particularity 
and quality always go together, but rather, only that they sometimes do.  A certain kind of 24
Platonist about universals, for example, might hold that the forms are examples of quality 
occurring separately from particularity, but in that case it is enough for me that particularity 
and quality occur together when objects participate in forms.  
 In the explanandum role, these features have the status of appearances to be explained. This is 22
compatible with a fundamental metaphysical view on which reality consists only of say, relations 
without relata, or dispositions without categorical grounds. 
 Armstrong (1978a:113) expresses a similar point: “Universals are nothing without Particulars. 23
Particulars are nothing without universals.” 
 I will return to this point, and the commitment that I intend it to carry, in Section 3.1. 24
!32
Step 3: Step 1 picked out two features of the world: particularity and quality. Step 2 noted 
that they occur together, at least sometimes. Step 3 focuses on these occasions - the 
portions of reality - where the two features occur together: we may say that they are many 
rather than one. The reason for this is a principle known sometimes as determinate 
exclusion, or - as I will call it in Chapter 7, following Hasok Chang, the principle of single 
value.  Determinate exclusion says that the very same thing cannot possess two 25
determinates, of the same specificity, under the same determinable. Single value says that a 
single thing cannot have more than one value, of the same specificity, under the same 
magnitude.  It is, again, plausible to hold that reality at least appears to conform to these 26
principles, and moreover, that things do in fact have multiple determinates of the same 
specificity under the same determinables (the world is red here and blue there), and 
multiple values of the same specificity under the same magnitudes (the world is a gram 
here and three grams there). Hence, the world is a plurality, whose lower bound is 
determined, at least partially, by the principles of determinate exclusion and single value.  
Step 4: According to Step 3, the plurality of the world has a lower bound that is partially 
determined by determinate exclusion and single value. According to Step 4, the plurality of 
the world also has an upper bound. This is to say that while the world is a plurality, it does 
not admit of arbitrary or indefinitely many divisions into pluralities: there are right 
pluralities into which the world divides. While Step 3 was underwritten by a clear family of 
 These are not obviously the same thing: one principle concerns determinates under a 25
determinable, while the other concerns values of a magnitude. However, on the dimensionist 
ontology that I will be proposing, the category of dimensions supplies the ontological ground for 
both.
 I ignore the question of whether this principle holds universally. 26
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principles (roughly - as we will see in Chapter 4 - those underwritten by determination 
structures), I will leave it open here precisely what principle might underwrite the upper 
bound of the plurality of the world. On the view that I will propose later in this chapter, it is 
the dimensional profiles under which objects fall that play this role. However, this is not to 
say that dimensional profiles are the only determiners of the required upper bound.  The 27
point of Step 4 is simply that something determines such an upper bound.  
The conception of objects that I am proposing can be outlined by combining these four 
steps. Let us say that Step 1 and Step 2 jointly capture the claim, as I shall put it, that at 
least some parts of reality are thick: particularity and quality occur together.  Steps 3 and 28
4 jointly capture the claim that reality, which is thick, is a thick plurality, not a thick 
monolith. Step 3 provides a lower bound for that plurality; Step 4 provides an upper bound. 
Objects, as I conceive them, are the thick entities standing between these lower and upper 
bounds.  
This conception of objects is not a theory of objects. It is, rather, a rough conception of 
objects in the sense of being an adumbration of the notion of an object that is fitted for the 
kind of iterative, structural picture of metaphysical enquiry set out in Chapter 7. For this 
 Indeed, ontological categories are arguably closely tied to this role. This point is compatible with 27
a plurality of conceptions of ontological categories, if not with a pluralist conception of the notion 
of an ontological category. 
 I will, accordingly, say that reality is thin where particularity and quality occur apart - for 28
example, in the supposed cases of haecceities and the aforementioned variety of Platonism, 
respectively. I do not intend this thick/thin distinction to be specific to the features particularity and 
quality. To illustrate: suppose you think that, in the terms of Chapter 5, animation and dispositional 
profiles are features that objects simply have: I will say, then, that objects are thick with respect to 
those features too. My terms ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ are, obviously, intended to echo Armstrong’s 
distinction between thick and thin particulars. 
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reason, the picture of objects offered here is intended to be defeasible in its details: it is 
deliberately open, at many points, to further development and correction. However, since 
the focus of this thesis - and the more distinctive feature of dimensionism - is not its 
category of objects but rather that of dimensions, I will not pursue the discussion of objects 
further (with the exception of the connection to Chapter 3 mentioned above).   29
2.2 Ontological Form 
A central resource that dimensionism draws upon is the notion of ontological form. This is 
a resource taken from Lowe (see e.g. his 2006, Ch.3). One way to understand the notion of 
ontological form is to contrast it with content. On this view, matters of ontological content 
are matters of what there is - of what Heidegger (1962) called the ontic. One might, for 
example, hold that the quality structure of the world is explained by the existence of 
properties - understood, say, as universals or some sort. This would be to treat quality 
structure as an ontic matter - a matter of ontological content. By contrast, matters of 
ontological form are matters of how things stand - in Heidegger’s terms, rather confusingly, 
the ontological. For example, one might hold that distinctness is a matter of ontological 
form: for two things to be distinct is not a matter of the existence of some further relational 
entity - a distinctness relation between them, say.  To illustrate the distinction further: one 30
might posit haecceities - individuating entities - if one thinks that identity or whichness is a 
 In any case, the four steps, as presented above, are intended to be as uncontroversial as possible. 29
 In this case, there is a regress argument to show it: the distinctness relation would itself have to 30
be distinct from its relata, and so on. A similar point applies to instantiation with regard to 
Bradley’s regress. 
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matter of ontological content, while one might posit formal ontological relationships of 
identity if one thinks that it is not.  31
While the notion of ontological form is closely related to a roughly Siderean notion of 
structure - a theme that I will take up and explore in Chapter 7 - I will take Siderean 
structure to be, at least potentially, a broader notion than that of ontological form. For 
ontological form is always the ontological form of entities, either distributively or 
collectively.  Thus, every matter of ontological form is a matter of structure, but not every 32
matter of structure need - as far as the very notions of structure and form go - be a matter 
of ontological form.  
This connection with structure suggests a further way to characterise the distinction 
between ontological form and content. Consider again the examples given above. Suppose, 
for illustration, that the world’s quality structure is explained by - grounded in - the 
existence of properties. Let us suppose that properties in this case are tropes. Now, suppose 
that tropes bring with them a further feature to be explained: their relations (in a neutral 
sense of ‘relations’) of identity, distinctness, and individuality. We face a choice: are these 
further features a matter of ontological content, or of ontological form?  
 Formal ontological relationships - formal relationships for short - are relational features of reality 31
that are a matter of ontological form rather than ontological content: they are relationships that 
obtain in virtue of the ontological forms of their relata. I will follow Lowe’s convention, using 
‘relationship’ for formal relational features of the world, and ‘relation’ to stand for relational 
entities. 
 Logical connectives are an example of an element of Siderean structure with, plausibly, no 32
correlate in ontological form. 
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One might treat them as a matter of content, and posit further entities - such as the 
aforementioned haecceities - to explain the features in question. Or one might treat those 
features as a matter of form, and hold that no further entities are needed, in addition to the 
entities that are already posited - in this case, tropes - to account for the target features.  33
To do this is to build into one’s theory that the target features are not only a matter of 
ontological form, but specifically, a matter of the ontological form of tropes.  
This further characterisation of the form/content distinction is meant to improve on an 
attempt to make the distinction simply by contrasting form as a matter of how things are 
with content as a matter of what there is. For such an approach fails to do justice to the fact 
that ontological form is the ontological form of things, even though it is in some sense not a 
matter of what there is. We may say, then, as a general slogan, that an object’s ontological 
form - or rather, the ontological form of a certain kind of object - is its contribution to the 
structure of the world. (Likewise, the ontological form of some things will be their 
contribution to the structure of the world.) Ontological form, on my picture, stands as a 
localised correlate of structure, which is anchored in the natures of entities. The 
relationship between form and structure, on my view, is parallel to the relationship between 
essence and necessity.  
2.3 Determination  
One central application of the notion of ontological form in my proposed ontology - and a 
key resource of dimensionism - is the characteristic formal relationship obtaining between 
objects and dimensions, which I will call determination. I will say that objects determine 
 There might, as noted, be an argument to the effect that no further entities could explain the 33
target features anyway. This is so, for example, in the case of distinctness. But there is no guarantee 
that such an argument will always be available. 
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dimensions. By this, I mean simply that objects fall under dimensions - that they are 
certain ways in the relevant respect. Thus, to say that an object O determines a dimension 
D is just to say that O is some way (in a neutral sense of ‘way’) in respect of D. For an 
electron to determine charge is for it to have charge: it is for the electron to be charged. 
Similarly, for a hat to determine colour is just for it to be coloured. is The term 
‘determines’ here is not intended to express any kind of grounding or causing on the part of 
objects: objects do not determine dimensions in the sense of fixing them or bringing them 
about. I am not using ‘determines’ in the same sense in which it is said that the global 
mental facts are determined by the global physical facts.  
I will discuss determination in relation to relationships of ontological dependence in the 
next subsection. Here I will briefly note a feature of determination that will play a key role 
in much of this thesis: its factored structure. The core thought here is that determination is 
a formal relationship that is twofold. It has the following kind of duality: objects determine 
dimensions both at all and somehow. Consider, for example, a musical note (the example is 
from Wittgenstein): musical notes must have some pitch. That is to say, they must 
determine the dimension pitch at all. But it is not only to say this; it is also to say that a 
musical note must determine the dimension pitch in a particular way: it must have pitch, 
but it must also - by that token - have some pitch. Likewise, a material body that 
determines shape at all (by being shaped) must also determine shape somehow (by having 
a particular shape). I will say, then, that determination is a factored formal relationship, and 
that objects determine dimensions both at-all and somehow.  
This duality of the determination relationship is a theme that will bear explanatory weight 
at various points in this thesis. I will discuss it in detail in Chapter 5, where I discuss the 
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factoring of determination relationships and apply the idea to the topic of nomic 
governance. Since factoring is discussed in detail there, I will not discuss it further 
presently.  
One further point about factoring, however, does bear mentioning here. That is the 
connection between factored determination structures - in particular, the facet of 
determination that I am calling the relationship of determination-somehow - and 
relationships of resemblance. As I will discuss in section 3, while determination at-all 
ensures comparability, it does not ensure resemblance: objects may after all differ, as well 
as resemble, in some respect. It is thus not determination at-all, but relationships of 
determination somehow, that provide the right space for the situation of relationships of 
resemblance. These themes will be taken up later, in Chapters 3, 5, and 6. The message for 
now is this: resemblance relationships are anchored in internal relationships of 
determination-somehow. 
2.4 Categorial Uniqueness 
Since I am advancing an ontology in a Lowean mode, I must say something about how 
categorial uniqueness (Lowe 2006, 2011, 2013) is secured within the dimensionist scheme. 
It is a necessary condition on the adequacy of any system of ontological categories that it 
should give an account of categorial uniqueness: it should give an account of how the 
categories that it posits are individuated: of what settles which category is which.  
An account of categorial uniqueness should secure an ontological theory against Ramseyan 
permutation objections. It should supply an articulation of the distinctions between its 
categories that does not allow for the categories to be jumbled relative to the distinction. 
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Ramsey’s (1925) arguments against several articulations of the universal-particular 
distinction provide the archetype for this kind of permutation problem.  Take, for 34
example, the claim that universals and particulars can be distinguished by the following 
difference: particulars occupy the subject place in an indicative sentence, while universals 
occupy the predicate place. The claim is that the distinction between a particular (say, 
Socrates) and a universal (say, wisdom) is expressed in the respective subject- and 
predicate-placements of ‘Socrates’ and ‘wisdom’ in the statement Socrates is wise. Here the 
Ramseyan objector will point out that the grammatical roles of Socrates and wisdom may 
be reversed, as in the statement Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates. One will wish to 
say, if one believes in a particular/universal distinction at all, that in the second statement 
Socrates remains a particular, and wisdom remains a universal, despite the reversal of their 
subject-predicate roles. Thus: the subject-predicate distinction does not capture the 
particular-universal distinction: it does not secure categorial uniqueness for the categories 
particular and universal. 
One might worry, in the case of dimensionism, whether my talk of respects is entirely 
adequate to secure categorial uniqueness. One might worry, for example, that my claim - 
that dimensions are not ways that objects are but respects in which objects are those ways - 
might be susceptible to Ramseyan permutation. Such a permuted object/dimension 
distinction would say that objects are not ways that fall under dimensions, but respects of 
those ways. Thus, to offer an example: Socrates would not be a way that falls under the 
dimension posture (some examples of such ways would be sitting, standing, and lying 
down), but rather, a respect of those ways: for Socrates to be sitting would be for sitting to 
 See Lowe 2006 for a discussion of Fraser MacBride’s (2004) extension of the Ramseyan strategy 34
to Lowe’s four-category ontology. 
!40
fall under posture, specifically, in respect of Socrates. As before, we might say that the 
determination relationship is factored: sitting falls under posture both at all (to be sitting is 
always to be postured), and somehow (in our case: Socratically). Arguably, the oddity of 
talking in this way only serves to underline that we do have a conception of the object/
dimension distinction which respect talk, by itself, does not adequately capture.  
It will not do to fall back on the claim, here, that dimensions are the kinds of things that 
can be determined, whereas objects are not. For in the example above, the relationship of 
determination itself was reversed. This does not make it untrue that dimensions can be 
determined whereas objects cannot. But it does require that this statement be accounted for 
by locating some further source of asymmetry.  35
Following Lowe, I will suggest that the right source of asymmetry is ontological 
dependence. In particular, the formal ontological relationship of determination constitutes a 
 It is really asymmetry that is at issue here. One might defend certain ontological distinctions as 35
partitions, where a partition can be symmetric in the sense that there is no reason, in principle, that 
stands against its being reversed. However, such distinctions would hardly be useful for 
ontologically explanatory purposes. 
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certain relationship of ontological dependence, and it is the asymmetry of this constituted 
dependence relationship that secures categorial uniqueness.  36
With this preamble over, the account of categorial uniqueness itself is rather brief. On my 
proposed dimensionist ontology, objects are rigidly existentially dependent on the 
dimensions that they determine, while dimensions are not so dependent upon the objects 
that determine them. This view fits especially with the Platonist approach that I take to 
dimensions (as I will discuss in Section 2.6 of this chapter. The theme will reappear in 
Chapter 5, in my treatment of governance). However, it is compatible with an approach to 
dimensions that admits a principle of instantiation for them (a principle that only 
instantiated dimensions exist). For on such a conception of dimensions as immanent 
universals, one might still subscribe to the same relationship of rigid dependence of objects 
on dimensions, and a relationship of non-rigid dependence of dimensions upon objects.  
2.5 Determination Profiles 
Dimensionism, then, as I am presenting it, rests its treatment of categorial uniqueness upon 
a claim that objects depend rigidly on the dimensions that they determine. Underlying this 
 Lowe’s four-category ontology secures categorial uniqueness in a similar way. One might 36
wonder how fundamentally asymmetric formal relationships might constitute asymmetric 
dependence relationships, but this would be to misunderstand the claim: the dependence 
relationships are not asymmetrical extras resting upon an ontological basis of symmetric formal 
relationships; rather, they articulate those relationships insofar as they pertain to ontological 
dependence. This is to say that the relationship of constitution between the formal relationships in 
question (instantiation and characterisation for Lowe, and determination for me) and ontological 
dependence is not a relationship between entities but between components of the ontological form 
of entities. The category of an entity partially articulates its ontological form; likewise, the formal 
relationships partially articulate an entity’s category, and dependence relationships partially 
articulate those transcategorial relationships. The notion of (partial) articulation here is intended to 
echo Lowe’s (2008a, 2012b) notion of something’s being a part of the essence of an entity, and 
indeed, the relationship of an entity’s real definition to its essence. 
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claim is a theme that will run through the thesis, especially in Chapters 3, 4, and 5: the 
notion of a determination profile (or, as I will sometimes call it, a dimensional profile).  
The idea is a familiar one from Wittgenstein, Johnson, Prior, and Sommers, and is related 
to Magidor’s treatment of the infelicity of category mistakes. In each case, the point is put 
differently. Here is Wittgenstein, who draws on the notion of a space (1921/1974:7):  
2.013  Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but 
I cannot  imagine the thing without the space. 
2.0131 A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place.) 
 A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour; it is, so to speak, 
surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the sense of touch some degree of 
hardness, and so on. 
What Wittgenstein puts in terms of spaces, Johnson (1921) puts in terms of determinables: 
a substantive is associated with a set of (highest) determinables that are present with it from 
the start; predication does not involve the attachment of an adjective to a substantive, but 
rather, the sharpening of a determinable, that is already present with the substantive, to a 
determinate value. The idea is taken up by Prior (1949), who, in his commentary on 
Johnson, offers it explicitly as an explication of the notion of a category. Similarly, 
Sommers (1963) offers essentially the same account of the difference between ontological 
types and mere ordinary classes, though Sommers’ preferred tool is his notion of a 
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spanning predicate.  More recently, Magidor (2013) has offered a similar proposal in 37
terms of presuppositions.   38
The common element that is differently put across these accounts is the thought that for a 
given object, there is a range of predicates that the object stands to receive truly or falsely. 
In terms more explicitly ontological than logical, this is the thought that for a given object, 
there is a range of ways that that object stands to either be or not be in virtue of the kind of 
object that it is. Moreover, these are ways that the object stands not to be in a specific way. 
Consider, for example, a ripe tomato and the number three. Neither the tomato, nor the 
number, is green: green is a way that they both are not. But the tomato differs from the 
number in not-being-green by being some other colour - that is, by being another way in 
the same respect. By contrast, the number is not green because it is no way in respect of 
colour at all. I will call the set of respects (that is, dimensions) with which an object is 
related in this way - in such a way that though it needn’t be some specific way in that 
respect, it must be some way - the determination profile (or dimensional profile) of the 
object.  
I am not proposing that determination profiles stand in for ontological categories: if 
anything, that role is already taken up, on the Lowean view that I am following, by 
 Roughly, if F is an ordinary predicate, then the predicate |F| applies to an object a just in case 37
either Fa is true or ~Fa is true. Sommers identifies categories - ontological types - with classes of 
objects spanned by predicates like |F| - that is, objects to which either F(x) or ~F(x) is applicable.  
 Note, however, that the context of Magidor’s proposal is quite different: she is not out to give an 38
account of ontological categories, but to explain the infelicity of category mistakes. Nonetheless, 
her account of that phenomenon - roughly, that in category-mistake cases the introduction of a 
subject (say, Mozart) fails to raise a certain presupposition (that the category-mistaken predicate - 
‘is divisible by 2’, for example -  applies either truly or falsely to the subject) - bears an obvious 
resemblance to the views of Wittgenstein, Johnson, Prior, and Sommers. 
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existence and identity criteria, and buttressed by dependence relationships in the way 
already discussed. In truth, I am not keen on the idea that the notion of an ontological 
category should be rigidly demarcated: I think that there are various ways in which entities 
may be categorised that are ontologically perspicuous and explanatorily fruitful, and that it 
is to the underlying bases of these categories - what Peter Simons (2005/2014) has called 
ontological factors - that the question of demarcation properly applies.  What I am 39
proposing, rather, is simply that determination profiles are one such factor: they are one 
basis for categorising entities in an ontologically perspicuous way. In particular, I am 
proposing that it is the determination profiles of objects that supply the upper bound 
described at what I called Step 4 in Section 2.1 above: to carve the plurality of the world up 
beyond this upper bound would be to cut across the dimensional profiles that objects have.  
With this in mind, a further clarification is necessary regarding my notion of an object. I 
have not said anything, in my discussion of objects, about what the determination profiles 
of actual objects might be. If they are single dimensions, then my conception of objects 
will yield entities that are very much like regular tropes. If they are sets of dimensions that 
are internally mutually necessitating in a certain way, then it will yield objects that are very 
much like nuclear bundles on the trope theory proposed by Simons (1994a), though such 
objects will differ from Simons’ nuclei in not being bundles of more basic entities. 
Throughout the thesis, I will assume that the dimensional profiles of objects are not merely 
single dimensions (this will be an important point in Chapters 4 and 6).  
 I therefore disagree with Westerhoff (2005), who holds that one may properly ask what 39
demarcates ontological categories from ordinary ones. In other work, I have argued that this 
assumption on Westerhoff’s part puts the approaches to categories that he discusses - based on 
generality, substitutability, and identity criteria - into a spurious mutual competition, when they are 
properly understood in combination. 
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2.6 Platonism 
I said in Section 2.4 that objects depend rigidly on the dimensions that they determine. I 
also said that dimensions do not depend for their existence upon objects. I am, thus, 
adopting a broadly Platonist conception of dimensions. By ‘Platonism’ here I mean no 
more than the denial of a parallel of the principle of instantiation: it is not the case that only 
determined dimensions exist.   40
I have no knock-down argument against a conception of dimensions that does accept a 
principle of instantiation (that is, determination). Such a view would leave my treatment of 
categorial uniqueness intact, since determination would remain an asymmetric relationship: 
dimensions would depend non-rigidly on the objects that determine them. Thus, an 
Aristotelian conception of dimensions is something that I will presently reject, but not rule 
out: I will simply leave the possibility of developing such a view open, for further work. 
My grounds for Platonism will become apparent in Chapter 5, where I argue that 
dimensionism can offer a cogent account of (nomic) governance. There, the denial of a 
principle of instantiation is crucial to my account; moreover, it is the principle of 
instantiation that generates problems for other, similar accounts of laws (such as those of 
Armstrong and Lowe). If Platonism is denied, then my proposed account of governance 
will not work.  This does not entail that Platonism is true, but it does mean that an 41
 Thus, in particular, my kind of Platonism does not entail that dimensions are necessary beings. A 40
theist is quite free, for example, to hold that they are contingent, or at least dependent - only not 
dependent upon objects that determine them, but as (say) divine ideas. I will not pursue these 
themes further in this thesis. 
 The argument is similar to that of Tugby (2016). 41
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Aristotelian conception of dimensions incurs a cost that a Platonic conception does not; for 
this reason, it is a Platonic conception that I have chosen to pursue and develop.   42 43
Note, however, that my Platonism about dimensions is not as extravagant as it could be. 
For one thing, to deny that dimensions depend on their determiners is not to assert that 
every dimension that is merely conceivable actually exists. For example, one might think 
that conatus is a conceivable dimension - in the sense of being one that we can imagine to 
exist - but not one that is actual: dimensions are Platonic, not abundant. Moreover, 
Platonism about dimensions does not carry commitment to Platonism about determinate 
universals; indeed, we will see in later chapters that it allows us to do away with 
fundamental determinate properties altogether. Dimensionist Platonism, then, lacks the 
sheer numerical extravagance that more familiar Platonic conceptions of determinate 
universals arguably exhibit. 
 Ingram (2016a, 2016b) has recently defended a view - ‘thisness presentism’ - on which 42
haecceities are thisness-universals that depend for their existence on their instantiation at some time 
present or past, but which continue to exist after their bearers have ceased to exist themselves. If 
such a view works at all, then one might, speculatively, wonder whether it might supply an 
Aristotelian surrogate for Platonic explanatory resources. I express some brief doubts about this 
strategy in Chapter 5, and will not develop the point further.
 Here is a further, tentative argument for Platonism. On my view, dimensions are respects of 43
difference as well as respects of resemblance. Suppose that a principle of instantiation is true: 
dimensions exist only if they are determined. Suppose that one object, O, exists and determines a 
dimension D. O will determine D both at-all and somehow. But there will be a range of other ways 
- differing from the way in which O determines D - in which D may be determined (‘somehow’). In 
my view, this range is fixed by D itself. But whatever fixes the range in question, it seems that O’s 
determination of D cannot explain it. However, it is not clear then why D should depend upon O in 
the first place. 
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3. Some Motivations for Objects and Dimensions 
Our overview of my proposed dimensionist ontology is now complete. The rest of this 
chapter will present some motivations for that ontology. Section 3.1 will briefly offer some 
further clarification or the motivation for my conception of objects. Section 3.2 will present 
three arguments in support of dimensions. My arguments here are brief. They are not 
intended to establish that dimensionism is correct, but rather, to get the dimensionist 
proposal onto the table.  
3.1 Why Objects? 
One way to oppose an ontology of objects is by supporting an ontology of something else. 
Two candidate alternatives are facts and tropes. Dimensionism’s rivalry with these 
alternatives will be taken up later in the thesis, in Chapters 4 and 6 respectively. Here I will 
limit myself to two brief points that aim to clarify the motivation for my preferred 
conception of objects.  
First, my conception of objects as qualitatively thick particulars obviously has much in 
common with Armstrong’s notion of a thick particular. Indeed, my terminology is intended 
to reflect this. One central part of what it means to understand objects as thick is a rejection 
of the idea that objects are, in some default way, quality-less: it is to deny that objects are 
bare particulars. More precisely, in the framework adumbrated in Chapter 7, it is to claim 
that bare particulars do not occupy any fundamental explanans role in proper metaphysical 
theorising. The reason for this - as I have indicated in the Introduction, and will take up in 
Chapter 6 - is that I find conferral ontologies of quality to be problematic: it is unclear how 
bare particulars could ever have qualities conferred upon them by other entities, either as 
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relata of quality-conferring relations, or as quality-conferring constituents. Since this 
discussion is taken up elsewhere in the thesis, I will not enter into it here. 
I am, then, making a stronger commitment here than I made in Section 2.1 when I 
introduced my conception of objects. There, I said that particularity and quality occurred 
together sometimes, and that such thick portions of reality were the target of my conception 
of objects. Here, my defence of that conception of objects commits me to a stronger claim, 
that the thick portions of reality - those at which quality and particularity occur together 
rather than apart - are ontologically prior to the thin ones.  My conception of objects is 44
thus similar to that of Rodriguez-Pereyra in his exposition of resemblance nominalism.  45
A second point in favour of my conception of objects is that the fourfold conception 
offered in Section 2.1 is intended to be fairly uncontroversial. I have taken care to appeal 
only to principles that should be acceptable from the widest possible range of points of 
view. The idea here is to ensure that my conception of objects is no more controversial, as 
far as possible, than the claimed priority of qualitatively thick reality over qualitatively thin 
reality renders it. I concede that this is hardly a full argument for objects as I conceive 
them. However, it is a conception of objects that is shared by others in the debate (such as 
 This should not conflict with my claim that dimensions are a fundamental category of being. For 44
dimensions, as I conceive them, are not qualities - they are not ways of being, but respects of ways 
of being. 
 But my solution to the problem of universals is not as close to his as one might think: see 45
Chapters 3 and 6 for details. 
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Rodriguez-Pereyra), and moreover, it is not the most distinctive, focal feature of a 
dimensionist ontology.  46
3.2 Why Dimensions? 
The notion of a dimension is, unsurprisingly, dimensionism’s most distinctive feature. 
What reasons are there to believe in dimensions? It will be a central task of the rest of this 
thesis to supply answers to this question.  My case for dimensions will centre around eight 47
arguments. Of these, five will be take up in detail in the coming chapters. I will argue that 
dimensionism does good explanatory work in relation to determinables and determinates 
(Chapter 2), the problem of universals (Chapter 3), instantiation and predication structure 
(Chapter 4), and nomic governance (Chapter 5), and that it compares well against rival 
ontologies of property possession (Chapter 6).  
The remaining three lines of argument are taken up, more briefly, here. In Section 3.2.1, I 
argue that dimensions make provide the best grounds of respect structure. Section 3.2.2 
argues that dimensions stand to explain certain phenomena relating to potentialities and 
chance. Finally, Section 3.2.3 briefly notes that dimensions are the most reasonable ground 
for what Hasok Chang has called the principle of single value. The argument in Section 
3.2.1 will be presented at some length; the remaining arguments will be presented more 
summarily. 
 Some, such as Dasgupta (2009, 2017) and various adherents of ‘ontic structural realism’, would 46
of course reject objects as I have presented them here. Since my focus in this thesis is on the 
distinctive category of dimensions, it is simply beyond the scope of my discussion to engage in 
detail with those views. See Sider (forthcoming, Chapter 4) for a discussion of such views. 
 I will not draw a strict line between reasons for believing specifically in dimensions, and reasons 47
for believing in dimensionism as I am presenting it. My intention is to advance the whole ontology, 
with the defence the category of dimensions itself being merely a fallback position.
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The arguments in this section are not intended to establish that there are dimensions, or to 
be a full and detailed defence of dimensionism. This is, as much as anything, due to 
constraints on space - but it is also because some of the arguments are closely related to 
themes that will be discussed in detail in later chapters. The arguments of this section, then, 
are intended instead as plausibility arguments to show why dimensionism might be an 
appealing view.  48
3.2.1 Respect Structure 
The first line of argument that I will consider is drawn from respect structure. I will present 
this discussion in three parts. First, I claim that respect structure belongs properly in an 
explanandum role. Second, I offer a kind of one-over-many argument for dimensions in the 
corresponding explanans role. Third, I consider five rival explanans proposals for respect 
structure - exclusion, resemblance, partial identity, second-order properties, and subsets of 
powers - and briefly argue that they fail.  
I have claimed that respect structure is an appearance that any ontological theory ought to 
explain and preserve. One way to elucidate the notion of respect structure is to consider the 
groupings of ways of being to which they correspond. Consider the following ways of 
being: red, square, round, blue, triangular, green. We should wish to say that these 
properties go together in a certain way: red, blue, and green on the one hand, and square, 
round, and triangular on the other. Ways of being admit of grouping into respects - in this 
 In Chapter 7, I will tie all these arguments together by setting out an iterative, coherentist 48
framework for justification. 
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case colour and shape - and this appearance perseveres whatever one thinks is the grounds 
of their being so grouped.  
We may say, further, that objects that are various ways within a respect grouping have 
something in common - the respect in question - and moreover, that they may both 
resemble and differ in that respect. Furthermore, ways of being, at the same level of 
specificity within a respect grouping, exclude each other: something that is thus-and-so in a 
given respect cannot also be so-and-thus in the same respect.  Finally, we may add - to 49
anticipate a point in the discussion of Chapter 2 - that ways of being specify their respects 
non-conjunctively. Consider the property red and the respect colour, for example: the point 
is that to be red is not simply to be coloured and to possess some further property.  50
How is such respect structure to be explained? I say it is grounded in the existence of 
dimensions, which simply are respects of resemblance and difference. Dimensions explain 
the respect groupings of ways of being: as I will discuss in Chapter 3, determinate 
 These points are taken from Armstrong’s (1978b:116) characterisation of the distinctive features 49
of determinable-determinate structure, rather than respect structure in my sense. However, I will 
argue in Chapter 2 that dimensionism offers the best ontological ground of determinable-
determinate structure. Armstrong also mentions a further point: determinates under a determinable 
admit of resemblance orderings - for example, red is more similar to orange than either is to blue - 
whose limit is perfect resemblance or identity. I will postpone further discussion of this point until 
the end of Chapter 3, where I sketch one way in which dimensionism may treat it. However, these 
resemblance orderings will not be a central concern in the thesis. 
 This last point comes with an argument. Suppose that red and blue are mere conjunctive 50
specifications of colour. Let us suppose that red is the conjunction (colour & F), while blue is the 
conjunction (colour & G). Then there is no explanation in sight, of why a thing’s being red should 
exclude its being blue. It will not do to build exclusion in ‘by hand’, by identifying red with say, 
(colour & F & ~G) and blue with (colour & G & ~F) - I omit internal brackets for convenience - or 
to simply fall back on brute exclusion relationships between F and G: neither strategy promises any 
explanatory gain. 
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properties are derivative entities whose basis involves the resemblance of objects under the 
respects that they determine. Dimensions are something that objects can have in common: 
red things, blue things, and green things all determine the dimension colour in different 
ways. Dimensions also explain determinate exclusion: for an object to possess different 
determinates at the same level of specificity under some determinable would be for it to 
differ from itself in the particular way that it determines that dimension, as I am saying, 
‘somehow’. Finally, the factoring of determination relationships accounts for non-
conjunctive specification: determination is a single factored relationship, not a pair of 
relationships of the same nature (such as a pair of instantiation relationships).  
Armstrong has argued that determinables cannot be properties that are common to their 
determinates (or the bearers of their determinates), since “it is impossible that things be 
identical and different in the very same respect” (1978b:117). It is telling, here, that 
Armstrong’s example is red: a crimson thing and a scarlet thing differ precisely in respect 
of redness, and so redness cannot be a property that they have in common: it cannot be that 
they instantiate the very same universal, redness.  
Two points should be made about Armstrong’s argument. First, it is precisely respects 
under which it is possible for objects both to resemble and differ - at least, in my sense of 
‘respect’. If Armstrong is using ‘respect’ in the merely relativising sense mentioned in 
Section 1, then his conclusion is no surprise: complications of context and vagueness aside, 
it is indeed impossible that two objects should both agree and differ in whether they are 
red. But this is not my sense of ‘respect’. Yet - secondly - Armstrong may not quite have 
intended the point this way. He may have meant, instead, that redness is not something that 
two objects can have in common precisely by instantiating different colour universals, say, 
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crimson and scarlet. In this case, however, the fault is with Armstrong’s example: red is a 
determinable way of being - a way of being, albeit of a determinable, non-specific sort - 
but not a respect of ways of being. It is precisely in these respects that objects can both 
resemble - by being the same determinable ways - and differ, by being different 
determinate ways.  51
We may see, then, that dimensions - respects of resemblance and difference - are a kind of 
one-over-many. However, unlike the more familiar kind of one-over-many, universals, 
dimensions are tied as much with difference as resemblance. Indeed, Johnson (1921; see 
Prior 1949 and Armstrong 1978b:112) appears, on one reading, to take respect groupings 
(classes of co-specific determinates under a determinable) to be groupings of mutually 
excluding properties.  So dimensions are not the kind of one-over-many that can be 52
straightforwardly accounted for in terms of direct relationships of resemblance between 
objects. This makes dimensions a different kind of one-over-many from universals. While I 
will argue in Chapter 3 that ordinary universals are indeed best accounted for in terms of 
resemblance between objects, I will therefore not be inconsistent in arguing, here, that 
respects cannot be similarly accounted for.  
Considered as a kind of one-over-many, dimensions may be reached in several ways. We 
may argue, for example, that if one thing is red and another green, then each is some way 
in respect of colour, and hence, there is something - colour - in respect of which each thing 
 I put it this way for clarity in the present context. Strictly speaking, my claim is that it is the other 51
way round: objects share determinable ways of being by resembling in a certain way. I discuss this 
at the end of Chapter 3. 
 I am not saying that difference straightforwardly entails exclusion: it doesn’t. But co-specific 52
difference in a respect does.
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is some way. The point may also be put in terms of resemblance or difference. For 
example, we can argue that if one thing is red and another green, then they differ in some 
respect, and hence there is something - colour - in respect of which they differ. We might 
also argue that if one thing is scarlet and another crimson, then they both resemble and 
differ in respect of colour, so there is something - colour - in respect of which they both 
resemble and differ.  
In these cases, I do not claim that the conclusion - ‘there is something’ - follows logically 
with any more strength than that of an ‘easy’ ontological claim in the sense discussed by 
Thomasson (2015). Nevertheless, the existence of dimensions may be the best explanation 
for the structures that such ‘easy’ ontological inferences place into an explanandum role.  53
I turn now to consider five rival attempts to account for respect structure in terms of 
exclusion, resemblance, partial identity, second-order properties, and subsets of powers. 
These approaches are drawn from the literature on determinables and determinates. As I 
will argue in Chapter 2, determinable-determinate hierarchies are ontologically non-
uniform: since ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’ do not designate ontological categories, 
but merely two kinds of relative status between adjectives, adjectives at different strata in 
these hierarchies may - and indeed, do - have different ontological correlates. In particular 
(though roughly), I will argue that objects and dimensions are the ontological correlates of 
superdeterminates and superdeterminables, respectively. In arguing here that these rival 
 I am here detaching the notion of ‘easy’ inference from Thomasson’s further claim, that these 53
further explanatory questions have no place in ontology. Arguably, Thomasson’s own position 
should be committed to similar ‘external’ explanatory questions in relation to the notion of an 
application condition which occupies the engine room of her ‘easy’ metaontology. This point is in 
line with the general trajectory of argument in Lowe (1998, Ch.1), but it is beyond the scope of my 
discussion to pursue it further.
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approaches do not successfully account for respect structure, I am therefore not arguing 
that they are poor accounts of determinable-determinate relations at every level of a 
determinable-determinate hierarchy. For reasons of space, I will keep my discussion brief. 
First, consider the reading of Johnson mentioned above, according to which respect classes 
of properties are simply classes of properties that stand in mutual exclusion relationships. 
As Armstrong points out, that view leaves it unexplained why certain properties and not 
others should exclude each other. Indeed, we might add here that it seems possible to come 
up with classes of properties that are gerrymandered relative to respect structure, and 
which are not mutually excluding; the proposed view will tell us that those properties are 
gerrymandered relative to respect structure because they are not mutually excluding, not - 
as it ought - that they are mutually excluding because they are gerrymandered relative to 
respect structure. As Armstrong remarks (1978b:113), “Johnson’s ‘solution’, however, if 
that is what it is meant to be, is simply a statement of the problem.”   54
Second, consider the claim that respects can be accounted for in terms of resemblances 
between properties. One way to cash out this claim  is to provide an abstraction principle 55
for respects on properties: let us say, of four properties FGHJ, that F and G have the same 
respect as H and J just in case F and G collectively perfectly resemble H and J (collective), 
and F and G do not perfectly resemble each other, and H and J do not perfectly resemble 
each other.  Thus, to give an example, the principle is aimed at the following sort of case: 56
 To be fair on Johnson, I think that Armstrong has misread him on this point. The reason is that 54
Johnson’s account of predication (1921:179-80; see Chapter 4 in this thesis for discussion) does not 
leave exclusion as brute as Armstrong suggests.
 The proposal here parallels my proposal for property abstraction in Chapter 3. 55
 The formulation is very rough: I have left out, for example, any description of the relative levels 56
of specificity of these properties. However, it ought to suffice for the present discussion.
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red and green have the same respect as yellow and blue just in case red and green 
collectively perfectly resemble yellow and blue (collective). The idea is that this collective 
perfect resemblance should capture what red and green taken collectively, and yellow and 
blue taken collectively, have in common, namely the respect colour.  
However, the proposal is problematic. For one thing, it is too weak: the principle will admit 
cases in which F and G, taken collectively, perfectly resemble H and J, taken collectively, 
because F and G have some respect in common, and H and J have some respect in 
common, though F and G do not have the same respect in common that H and J do. For it 
is unclear why having some respect in common should not pass for collective perfect 
resemblance if having the respect colour in common should. Moreover, the principle will 
also admit cases where F and G on the one hand, and H and J on the other, do not share a 
respect. Thus, for example, it is perfectly unclear why the pairs red and square, and 5kg 
and 70km, should not qualify as perfectly resembling, as far as respect structure is 
concerned, precisely in virtue of their not having the same respects.  57
It is not clear how the proposed abstraction principle might be amended to get such cases 
right: resemblance, in general, presupposes respect structure. It is not clear, either, how it 
might help to drop the proposed abstraction principle and account for respects in terms of 
direct resemblance relations between properties. For consider the properties red, orange, 
and blue. Consider first the properties red and orange. It will not do to capture the respect 
colour by simply saying that red resembles orange, because such a claim fails to 
distinguish the sense - if there is such a sense - in which red resembles orange by being a 
 A parallel objection does not apply to my account in Chapter 3, since in my account I am able to 57
specify independently that the relevant objects should determine the relevant dimensions at all. 
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colour, from the sense in which red resembles orange as a colour. One might respond here 
that the point is clearer in the case of red and blue, the idea being that red and blue do not 
resemble as colours, so that their resemblance can consist only in their resembling by being 
colours. The problem then, however, is that it is simply unclear in what sense the target 
relation between red and blue is one of resemblance at all. Indeed, I suggest that our grasp 
of the notion of colour - the respect itself - is firmer than any grasp we might have of a 
resemblance between red and blue that might account for it. 
Third, consider the claim that properties and their respects stand in relationships of partial 
identity. Armstrong (1978b:120-4; 1997:48f) argues that such relations of partial identity 
characterise the range of determinates under a determinable. His stock example is length: 
what unifies the class of determinate length properties - what they have in common - is not 
a shady respect, but a certain interrelatedness. Specifically: any instance of being one metre 
will be equivalent to two instances of being one half-metre, and any instance of being two 
metres will be equivalent to two instances of being one metre, and so on. The class of 
length properties is simply that class of universals interrelated in this way. 
But Armstrong’s proposal is problematic. Consider, for example, the universals being 50 
people and being one person. These are related in the same way that being 50 metres and 
being one metre are: an instance of being 50 people is equivalent to fifty instances of being 
one person. Yet the range of universals: being one person, being two people […] being 50 
people do not form a respect in any obvious sense.  One might respond here that they 58
form a group under the respect number (if indeed number is properly understood as a 
respect), but in that case they form a group under the very same respect as the universals: 
 Population is an obvious suggestion, but not every instance of being 50 people is a population.58
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being one metre, being two metres […] being 50 metres. The problem here is not that we 
should then be unable to distinguish one set of universals from the other at all - but rather, 
that we should not be able to say why it is that one set of universals form a respect 
grouping while the other does not. 
Fourth, consider the claim that respects are second-order properties - that is, properties of 
properties. Thus, red and blue are properties of objects, while colour is a property both of 
red and of blue. The problem with this proposal is that it does not explain why red and blue 
should exclude each other. There is nothing about second order properties as such that 
should render their bearers their unique bearers among the properties of a given object. The 
second order property proposal is simply silent on this score. 
Fifth, consider the claim that the relationship between determinables and determinates can 
be cashed out in terms of subsets of powers. Roughly, the idea is that determinables - or in 
our case, respects - are associated with causal powers that are a proper subset of the causal 
powers associated with their determinates (or properties falling under those respects). The 
problem with this proposal is that even if it is true, it is too permissive. While it may be 
true that every respect is associated with a proper subset of the powers associated with the 
properties that fall under it (let us suppose that it is so), it does not follow that every proper 
subset of this sort that one might produce - however arbitrarily - will be a set of powers 
associated with a respect. The subset account overgenerates: it does not explain the 
difference: it does not tell between subsets of powers that are respects, and subsets of 
powers that are not. 
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In light of the preceding discussion, I suggest that respect structure provides good reason 
for positing dimensions. The remaining sections of this chapter will be briefer. 
3.2.2 Chance 
A further line of argument concerns phenomena connected with chance. I will outline two 
such phenomena, and suggest that dimensions stand well to explain them both.  
The first is discussed by Hugh Mellor (2000) in connection with the relationship between 
chance - objective probability - and necessity. Roughly, the relationship under discussion is 
this: the chance of a given event is 0 if and only if it is impossible. The problem that Mellor 
discusses is that this principle is open to counterexample. To pick Mellor’s most 
straightforward case: a spinning pointer will have an infinitely low - indeed, 0 - chance of 
stopping at a particular place, but it is obviously not impossible for it to stop there. Mellor’s 
response - which is thematic across several examples that he considers - is to point out that 
any real pointer must have some width, so any direction in which it might stop must have 
an interval value. Thus, reality - at least in a wide range of such cases - need not be 
maximally determinate.  If reality is, in places, not maximally determinate, then it may be 59
determinable instead. But how indeterminate should the relevant determinables be? This 
seems, from an ontological point of view, to be an arbitrary - indeed, empirical - matter. 
From an ontological point of view, I suggest, it is far simpler to posit dimensions and 
resemblance relationships under those dimensions, in a way that I will spell out in Chapter 
3. My discussion in Chapter 3 will not take up this theme from Mellor directly, but it 
should suffice to make clear how a dimensionist treatment of that theme could go. 
 Wittgenstein (2017:74-5) makes a similar point. Wilson (2012) provides further reasons for 59
thinking that fundamental reality need not be determinate. 
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The second phenomenon is a posit by Mumford and Anjum (2011:177): if a is disposed to 
F, then it is not necessarily the case that a does F (~⎕Fa): the manifestation of a 
disposition could always be prevented. As Vetter points out: 
[…] this seems to me a case of an ignoratio elenchi. The earlier argument [that dispositionality fails the 
‘antecedent strengthening test’], which rested on the possibility of prevention, masking and finking, 
established that being disposed to F does not entail being necessitated to F (or F-ing necessarily). There is no 
argument, so far as I can see, for the much stronger conclusion that being disposed to F does entail not being 
necessitated to F (or F-ing only contingently). No such argument is forthcoming in the context where [the 
above posit is made], except perhaps the conjecture, implicit in the above quote, that it is something about the 
very nature of dispositionality which allows for finking and masking […] but I fail to see what the nature of 
dispositionality might be. (2015:93) 
I will argue in Chapter 5 that dimensionism can supply an account of (nomic) governance 
in terms of internal relationships between dimensions. The account that I offer there is 
open to the following development. Given that some dimensions stand in a nomic 
functional relationship, it may be that those dimensions plus some others stand in further 
nomic relationships that swamp the former ones. Nomic relationships between dimensions 
may thus be ‘non-monotonic’, so to speak.  
Consider an example given by Cartwright (1983:57). Newton’s inverse square law fails to 
accurately describe the behaviour of bodies that are not only massed but charged. Such 
cases, as Cartwright points out, show up ineliminable ceteris paribus components of laws. 
These ceteris paribus components stand to explain what it is about dispositionality that 
leaves it open to finking, masking, and prevention. Moreover, I suggest, the account of 
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nomic governance that I offer in Chapter 5 stands to explain why, ontologically speaking, 
laws should have such a ceteris paribus component.  
3.2.3 Single Value 
My final argument of this chapter is really a promissory note. In Chapter 7, I will discuss 
Hasok Chang’s work on metaphysical principles and their relation to the intelligibility of 
epistemic activities. I will discuss there what Chang calls the principle of single value, 
which is, in effect, a principle of determinate exclusion for magnitudes. My discussion in 
Chapter 7 does not take place in the context of an argument for dimensions, but rather, in 
the context of a discussion of Chang’s ‘active realism’. Nevertheless, one might well argue 
that dimensions are the best explanans for the determination structures that the principle of 
single value - taken separately from Chang’s broadly Kantian framework - introduces to an 
explanandum role. In particular, for an object to violate the principle of single value would 
be for it to differ from itself. Since the principle of single value is discussed in Chapter 7, 
and since the line of argument suggested here is obvious enough, I will not pursue it 
further. 
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Chapter 2 - Determinables and Determinates 
0. Intro 
Chapter 1 completed the exposition of my core dimensionist ontology. In the next five 
chapters, I focus on building a case for that ontology. The present chapter argues that the 
dimensionist picture is the right ontological picture to explain determinable-determinate 
structure.  
My aim here is to establish two claims. First, I claim that dimensions, and their ontological 
form, are the underlying joint of nature at which discussions of determinable-determinate 
structure attempt to carve. Second, it follows from the first claim that a number of 
widespread, core assumptions about determinables and determinates should be rejected.  
These claims are, on the face of it, potentially in tension with each other: how can I claim 
both that dimensions capture the core notion in the debate, and that the debate is simply 
mistaken in its core assumptions? In Section 1 below, I offer a way to think about the 
'determinables debate’ - in terms of the notions of explanandum and explanans roles 
familiar from the previous chapter - which allows this difficulty to be circumvented. One 
consequence of my account of the debate will be that mere logical articulations of a 
determinable-determinate relation, such as Searle's (1959), fail to be a full account of that 
relation. If determinable-determinate structures are a feature of reality, then what is 
required is a metaphysical account of them.  
In Section 2, I discuss the roots of the notion of the determinable in the work of W.E. 
Johnson. In Section 3, I survey some of the ways in which the literature has set out to fix 
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an explanandum structure. In Section 4, I set out some extant proposals for an explanans 
structure. In Section 5, I then explain how dimensionism fits into the picture – which will 
not be as straightforward as just taking determinables 'as read' from the surface form of 
language. Finally, in Section 6, I survey the debate once more and discuss which core 
assumptions should – in light of the claims of Section 5 – be accommodated, and which 
rejected. 
1. Structure in Two Roles: Explanandum and Explanans 
Discussions of metaphysics that touch on determinables, in one way or another, go back a 
long way. As Jessica Wilson notes,  determinable-esque notions can be found in Aristotle, 60
Descartes, and Leibniz (see Wilson 2017. Similar comparisons are made elsewhere, e.g. 
Johnson 1921, Prior 1949, Hawthorne 2007). The terminology has roots in scholastic 
treatments of species and genus (Prior 1949, Wilson 2017 §1), but the term 'determinable' – 
as well as the first direct and explicit discussion of the theme in the analytic tradition – is 
found in the first volume of Johnson's Logic (1921). Beginning with Johnson, a whole 
discussion has arisen around the determinable/determinate distinction – but what is it 
about?  
The answer is less obvious – or rather, the obvious answers are less adequate – than one 
might think. One obvious answer would be “determinables, determinates, and their 
relation” (Wilson 2017 §2.1). But this is not quite right. One might, for example, be an 
eliminativist about either determinables or determinates, or one might hold that 
 The main arguments of this chapter were developed before I had the privilege to read a draft of Wilson 60
(2017) during the summer of 2016. Nevertheless, I am indebted to that article (both in draft and in its 
published form) for the clarification and regimentation of my own thoughts. In particular, Wilson's list 
(her §2.1) of characteristic features of determinables and determinates features here as the core of my 
discussion in Section 3 of the present chapter.
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determination relates determinables to some things other than determinates (or that what 
relates determinables and determinates is not determination).  
Another obvious answer might be “the determinate/determinable distinction” (see e.g. Fine 
2011). But again, this would not be quite right if, for example, the underlying structure 
were really - as I will be claiming that it is - a determination structure, understood as 
comprising a formal relationship holding between dimensions (superdeterminables, if 
anything – not determinables in general) and objects (not determinates in the normal 
sense). 
To be sure, such cavils are not especially devastating. It is true that the mooted answers 
(and other, similar, possible answers) may serve to highlight and perpetuate certain 
operative assumptions within the debate - for example, that there is a single determinable-
determinate relation that generates ontologically uniform determinable-determinate 
hierarchies - many of which, I will later argue, should be rejected. But their inadequacy – 
or indeed the lack of an adequate answer in their stead – should not stop the discussion 
from proceeding.   61
Nevertheless, what my cavilling does suggest is that the determinables debate comprises 
the pursuit of two distinct tasks. One is the positing of explanations for a certain target 
phenomenon or feature in the world – call it a determinable/determinate distinction, if you 
will – while the other is the task of identifying and articulating what the target phenomenon 
  I will continue talking of the ‘determinables debate’ in this broad sense, that leaves it an open question 61
what the determinables debate is about.
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is in the first place.  62
That target phenomenon is a certain structure. In the case of the determinables debate,  63
that structure can be described in a way that makes reference to predicates (for example: 
'…is red' and '…is coloured' stand in a distinctive sort of entailment relationship), or to 
properties (for example: properties form natural groupings such as red/green/yellow, and 
circular/square/triangular), or to resemblance structure (for example: similarity is always 
similarity in some respect). Or it might be stated more directly (for example: the world 
exhibits a kind of respect structure). Each approach carries its own distinctive 
assumptions.  To cancel out these commitments, I will speak inclusively of these target-64
identifying articulations of structure as articulations of structure in the explanandum role.  65
In carving out space for such articulations of structure in the explanandum role, I am 
assuming that such articulations may succeed in identifying an explanandum structure even 
if that structure is, in some fundamental sense, not a structure that the world really has. I 
will say more about this in Chapter 7, where I set out an account of metaphysical enquiry 
as enquiry that is both iterative and immersive. For now, the important points are these: the 
articulation of structure in an explanans role is committal (it involves a commitment that 
the world really has the relevant structure), while the articulation of structure in an 
 Of course, this is not unusual in philosophy. I am labouring the point in order to make it clear how I am 62
regimenting my discussion.
  The regimentation in terms of explanandum and explanans roles applies beyond the determinables debate. 63
I will be applying it in this wider way throughout the thesis.
  For example, the direct expression in terms of respect structure carries an assumption, which may be 64
challenged, that the other ways of framing the debate are convergent and indirect ways of getting at 
respect structure. Thus, directness here is not automatically better than indirectness. 
  ‘The’ here should not be taken to imply that there can be only one explanandum role, or only one realiser 65
of it, even in the context of a single debate.
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explanandum role need not be. This is, however, only to say that commitment is not 
required by the explanandum role as such: if one is committed to claiming that a certain 
explanandum structure also in turn plays an explanans role, then one is - obviously - 
committed to realism about that structure to the degree that its explanans role requires.  
I am, then, giving metaphysical explanation - understood as a relationship between 
structures - a central burden of theoretical work. The part played by these explanandum 
and explanans roles is in many respects similar to that played by a notion of fundamentality 
on Ted Sider’s view. My central notion here will be of an explanans structure explaining 
some corresponding explanandum structure. To be sure, we may say that such an 
explanans will be a 'more fundamental' structure than the corresponding explanandum. 
Insofar as this is all that one might mean by 'fundamental', I am happy to use that word. 
But fundamentality in any other sense bears no theoretical burden here: the work is done 
by form and explanation.  
This demand for metaphysical explanation is, in effect, a demand that the determinables 
debate be settled by a metaphysical theory – not a conceptual, logical, or semantic one. In 
particular, a good theory of determinables should say which are the entities whose 
ontological form accounts for the relevant target structure, and how they do so. 
I trust that the explanandum and explanans notions are, at this point, clear enough to use in 
regimenting the coming discussion. As already mentioned, the discussion in Chapter 7 will 
supply further context for these notions, and I will briefly note in the Conclusion of the 
thesis some yet further ways in which they may be clarified and developed. My present 
interest, however, is not so much in the full clarification of these notions as it is in their 
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use, so I will proceed. 
2. W.E. Johnson on the Determinable 
Before examining the debate on determinables more widely, I want first to discuss the 
account given by Johnson in the first volume of his Logic (1921 Ch.11). This is for two 
reasons. First, Johnson's discussion has a privileged, originating role in the wider literature: 
to a certain degree it is an anchor for subsequent discussion. Second, Johnson's discussion 
(and Prior's 1949 commentary on it) comes close, in a way worth exploring, to the view 
that I will be defending in Section 5.  
Johnson's discussion is focused on what he calls determinable adjectives.  This places his 66
discussion in the territory of logic, but in a way that invites further metaphysical 
explanation: 
The scope of logic has tended to expand in two directions – backwards into the domain of 
metaphysics, and forwards into that of science. These tendencies show that no rigid distinction 
need be drawn on the one side between logic and metaphysics, nor on the other between logic 
and science. […] It is, I hold, of less importance to determine the line of demarcation between  
logic and philosophy than that between logic and science; so that my treatment of logic might 
be called philosophical in comparison with that of those who implicitly or explicitly separate 
their criticism and analysis [of subjects discussed under the head of logic] from what in their 
view should be relegated to epistemology and ontology. (1921:xiii)  
Johnson introduces determinables through a distinction between determinable and 
determinate adjectives in the following way. Consider the division of a class of 
substantives – roughly, objects (or object terms) – into non-arbitrary, natural sub-classes 
 Not quite the same thing as a predicate. The difference will emerge in Chapter 4, where I examine 66
Johnson's distinctive treatment of predication.
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that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive of the class to be divided. Such a 
division must proceed according to what Johnson calls some one fundamentum disvionis. 
Moreover, this fundamentum divisionis is not a purely formal notion: it is grasped 
(“perhaps readily understood by the learner”) not on the basis of “its connection with, or its 
bearing upon, ideas which have entered into the previous logical exposition”.  To 67
illustrate:  
[…] when a class of things is to be divided according to colour, or to size, or to some other  
aspect in which they can be compared, then the colour, size, or other aspect contsitutes  
the fundamentum divisionis. Now, although, grammatically speaking, words like colour and  
size are substantival, they are in fact abstract names which stand for adjectives; so that the  
fundamentum divisionis is, in the first place, an adjective, and in the second, an adjective of the  
particular kind illustrated by 'colour' when considered in its relation to  
red, blue, green, etc. (1921:173-4)  68
What is in focus, then, is a distinctive structure which relates certain adjectives to each 
other. Moreover, the adjectives in question are, on the one hand, those that constitute the 
bases for categorising objects into classes, and on the other hand, those that constitute the 
basis for dividing them one way rather than another according to the first sort of basis – 
that is, given the fundamentum divisionis. Hence, the structure in question is both “a certain 
characteristic of the adjective as such, which perhaps throws the strongest light upon the 
 This is all in good keeping with my remarks in Chapter 7 about grasp and immersive enquiry. Of course, 67
that something may be grasped without an explicit formal account of it does not entail that no formal 
account of that thing may be given. Nevertheless, Johnson's own account of the distinction is not given in 
formal terms: rather, it is given by example and by reference to a 'special kind of difference' between co-
specific adjectives under the same determinable. Indeed, some of Johnson's formal remarks – especially 
about the logical form of predication (the copula) – are based on his non-formal remarks about the 
determinable. 
 Note here the dual use of 'adjective' that designates both a grammatical category and also – arguably – a 68
category of being. 
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antithesis between it and the substantive” (1921:173) – that is to say, intimately tied to the 
distinction between substantives and adjectives – and also intimately tied to the 
categorisation of objects.  Johnson goes on to say more about the features of this target 69
structure, but it is significant that he begins his discussion by tying the structure down to 
his basic categories of being: substantives and adjectives. In my terms: he begins by 
identifying the categories of being whose natures give rise to the explanandum structure.  
What is distinctive about this target structure? Its similarity to, and difference from, class 
membership. Here is Johnson:  
Superficially this relation appears to be the same as that of a single object to some class 
of which it is a member: thus two such propositions as 'Red is a colour' and 'Plato is a man' 
appear to be identical in form […] Our immediate purpose is to admit the analogy, but  
to emphasise the differences between these two kinds of propositions, in which common 
logic would have said we refer a certain object to a class. (1921:174) 
With his subject-matter set up, Johnson proceeds to characterise the distinctive relationship 
that his discussion targets. Most of Johnson's core points are summarised by Wilson 
(2017). My discussion here will naturally overlap with Wilson's to a great degree. I will, 
however, have some points to add to Wilson's reading of Johnson – and some points of 
disagreement.  
Wilson first notes that determinates stand to determinables in a specification relationship: 
determinable predicates characterise objects less determinately than determinate predicates 
(Johnson 1921:174). Moreover, the specification relation in question differs from the 
 Both of these points are respected in my ontology by dimensions and determination, which act as 69
surrogates for Johnson's (super)determinables and their relationship to determinates. I say more about this 
in Section 5. 
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species-genus relation in being non-conjunctive: determinate adjectives are not obtained 
from determinables by “that process of increased determination which conjunctivally 
introduces foreign adjectives” (1921:178). Same-level determinate adjectives (under the 
same determinable) are mutually exclusive: they cannot characterise the same object 
simultaneously (1921:181). They are also “opponent […] besides being related as non-
identical, [they] have a relation which can be properly called a relation of difference, where 
difference means more than mere otherness […]” (1921:175-6). Moreover, determinables 
are not only the aspects under which objects are categorised into classes (as already seen), 
but also the aspects under which objects may be compared:  
Further, what have been assumed to be determinables – e.g. colour, pitch, etc. - are ultimately 
different, in the important sense that they cannot be subsumed under some one higher determinable, 
with the result that they are incomparable with one another; while it is the essential nature of  
determinates under any one determinable to be comparable with one another. The familiar phrase 
'incomparable' is thus synonymous with 'belonging to different determinables', and 'comparable'  
with 'belonging to the same determinable' […] enquiry into the reason for the comparability 
 or incomparability of two qualities will elicit the fact that they belong to the same or to  
different determinables. (1921:175)   70
Moreover, determinables stand in certain subsumption relations to each other, distinct from 
their relationships to determinates. Specifically, determinables may be of higher or lower 
dimension: 
[…] a colour may vary according to its hue, brightness, and saturation; so the precise  
determination of a colour requires us to define three variables which are more or less 
independent of one another in their capacity of co-variation; but in one important sense they  
are not independent of one another, since they could not be manifested in separation. The  
 Note again the notion of metaphysical explanation at work: determinable-determinate structure explains 70
the possibility and impossibility of comparison. 
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determinable colour is therefore single, though complex, in the sense that the several  
constituent characters upon whose variations its variability depends are inseparable. (1921:183) 
This subsumption structure, whereby a determinable's value ranges vary along distinct 
determination dimensions, is of course a central theme picked up by Funkhouser's (2006, 
2014) account of the difference between determination and (multiple) realization.  
Up to this point, I am in agreement with the exposition of Johnson by Wilson (2017). 
However, two further points made by Wilson seem to me to need qualification. 
First, Wilson notes that for Johnson, while we may characterise objects more or less 
determinately, the objects themselves are completely determinate. As Johnson says: 
Furthermore, determinateness in either case is only approximately attainable, whether we 
rely upon the immediate judgments of perception or are able to utilize instruments of measurement. 
The practical impossibility of literally determinate characterisation must be contrasted with 
the universally adopted postulate that the characters of things which we can only characterise 
more or less indeterminately, are, in actual fact, absolutely determinate. (1921:185) 
Wilson observes: 
The assumption that determinable characterization reflects (mere) epistemic, perceptual, or  
representational limits remains common, and pushes towards giving one or other deflationary 
account of determinables. (2017 §1.3) 
While I concede that 'pushes towards' is not a precise or committal expression, I do not 
think that Wilson is correct here if she takes Johnson to be advocating a deflationary 
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account of determinables.  For what Johnson says is about the characters of the objects 71
that may be indeterminately characterised – not the adjectives that may indeterminately 
characterise them – and it is quite possible to hold that objects have fully determinate 
characters, without holding deflationary views about determinable adjectives. Indeed, the 
view that I defend here is precisely such a view. To pursue the point further, consider the 
following points in Johnson's discussion, not mentioned by Wilson. Immediately after 
noting that determinables characterise objects less determinately than determinates, 
Johnson adds: 
But, to supplement this negative account of the determinable, we may point out that 
any one determinable such as colour is distinctly other than such a determinable as shape 
or tone; i.e. colour is not adequately described as indeterminate, since it is, metaphorically 
speaking, that from which the specific determinates, red, yellow, green, etc., emanate; 
while from shape emanate another completely different series of determinates […] Thus 
our idea of this or that determinable has a distinctly positive content which would be 
quite inadequately represented by the word 'indeterminate'. (1921:174-5, my emphasis) 
Also:  
To illustrate more precisely what is meant by 'generates'; let us take the determinable  
'less than 4'; then 'less than 4' generates '3', '2' and '1' in the sense that the understanding 
of the meaning of the former carries with it the notion of the latter. Now no substantive  
class-name generates its members in this way; take, for instance, 'the apostles of Jesus',  
the understanding of this class-name carries with it the notion of 'men summoned  
 This is not to say that I am in agreement with Johnson's statement in its entirety. Specifically, we will see 71
later (in my discussion of the problem of universals) that I may be in some disagreement with what 
Johnson may be saying here about determinates. For now, let me note that 'absolutely determinate' is 
ambiguous: something may be absolutely determinate in the sense that nothing is more determinate than 
it, or in the sense that nothing could be. I hold that the qualitative characters of objects are absolutely 
determinate in the first sense, but not in the second sense. 
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by Jesus to follow him', but it does not generate 'Peter and John and James and  
Matthew etc.' […] (1921:177-8) 
The point here is not essentially epistemic: it is that what it is to be less than 4 is to be 3, or 
2, or 1, while what it is to be an apostle of Jesus is not simply to be Peter or John or James 
(etc.). Finally: 
A second characteristic of many determinates under the same determinable is 
that the differences between different pairs of determinates can be compared  
with one another […] In this case the several determinates are to be conceived as 
necessarily assuming a certain serial order […] (1921:182) 
Thus, Johnson's 'distinctly positive content' is at least a threefold affair: the determinable 
generates its determinates (its value-range), it generates a distinct value range from the 
value ranges of other determinables, and it generates a value range whose determinates 
may be ordered in a particular way. All this by way of cashing out a “certain characteristic 
of the adjective as such”, and the sort of adjective which – recall – is an adjective despite 
appearing grammatically as a substantive term. It seems clear from these passages that, 
contra Wilson, Johnson is committed to a non-deflationary conception of determinables, 
one which is integral to his account of the nature of properties.  
Secondly, Wilson notes that Johnson: 
[…] denies that determinables are in any sense shared by determinates: “the ground 
for grouping determinates under one and the same determinable is not any partial agreement 
between them” but rather “the special kind of difference” (1921:I,xi,1) distinguishing 
opposing determinates. (2017 §1.3) 
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In a note, Wilson adds that Johnson is here relying on an assumption that “the sharing of 
determinables would be like the sharing of parts”. To see this, consider the context of 
Johnson's own discussion, where he is concerned to reject the idea that determinables are 
shared by determinates as a second-level property: “is there any (secondary) adjective 
which analysis would reveal as characterising all these different (primary) 
adjectives?” (1921:176, my emphasis). The view being rejected, then, is that determinables 
are (analytical) components of determinates: its rejection is simply a consequence of the 
non-conjunctive nature of the determinable-determinate relationship. However, this is only 
to say that determinables are not shared by determinates as conjuncts. It falls a long way 
short of the stronger claim that determinables are not shared by determinates in any way. 
Contra Wilson again, I claim that Johnson does hold that determinables are shared by 
determinates. This is seen in the way in which determinables are integral to Johnson's 
conception of objects. Here we touch on issues to which we will return again when I 
discuss the structure of predication in Chapter 4. Remarking on the ascription of a 
(determinate) predicate to an object, Johnson notes: 
In fact, the foreign adjective which appears to be added on in the conjunctive process is 
really not introduced from the outside, but is itself a determinate under another determinable,  
present from the start, though suppressed in the explicit connotation of the genus. We propose 
to use a capital letter to stand for a determinable, and the corresponding small letter […] to stand 
for its determinates. Thus, in passing from the genus p to the species pq, we are really passing 
from pQ to pq; or again the apparent increase of intension from p to pq to pqr is more correctly 
symbolised as a passing from pQR to pqR to pqr. […] The summum genus ought to be represented 
by a conjunction of determinables […] In this way we represent from the outset the nature 
of the ultimate individuals under the summum genus […] (1921:178-9) 
For Johnson, determinate predication is not a matter of conjoining one thing to another – 
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an adjective to a substantive – but rather, a matter of moving from a determinable that is 
present from the start to a determinate value or characterisation.  'Present from the start' 72
here means that a certain conjunction of determinables – corresponding (as I will discuss 
later) to the dimensional profiles that mark out an object's ontological category – will be 
associated with an object by virtue of the kind of object that it is. In this sense Johnson is 
clearly committed to determinables being shared by objects. It is true that Johnson does not 
think such sharing is reducible to the sharing of determinates – because the determinable-
determinate relation is non-conjunctive – but that does not rule out his clear commitment to 
the sharing of determinables.  
Does this reading of Johnson conflict with his claim, cited above, that the characters of 
objects are completely determinate? No. For Johnson's remark applies to the character of 
an object insofar as it is characterised by more or less (in)determinate adjectives. Now for 
Johnson, objects and properties are related by a characterising tie, which is blended in 
natural English with a distinct assertive tie (1921:10-12). While all determinables are 
adjectives, not all adjectives are determinables – and it is significant that Johnson does not 
recognise a distinctive kind of tie between objects and determinables. This is for two 
interrelated reasons. First, because most determinables are also determinates: 'determinable' 
and 'determinate' are both relative terms. Hence, to characterise an object less-than-fully 
determinately is still to characterise it determinately relative to the determinable profile 
corresponding to the 'summum genus' to which the object belongs. Second, where the 
highest determinables are concerned – those directly constitutive of the 'summum genus' – 
 This notion of movement from one thing to another underlying Johnson's account of predication is tied 72
with my discussion in Chapter 7 where I discuss the operations involved in joint-carving. They should 
also ring a Fregean bell – specifically, that of the significance of Frege's assertion stroke (and his 
distinction between a wff and a name of a truth value). Johnson himself touches on these themes at the end 
of his discussion of determinables (as I will mention soon), and throughout volumes 2 and 3 of his Logic. 
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there is no logical gap to be bridged by any kind of tie. The determinable profiles 
countenanced by Johnson are simply built in to the very natures of the objects whose 
profiles they are: they partially constitute an object's ontological form. If N is a name for an 
entity of category C (as opposed to being merely a name of a C-entity, in Geach's (1980) 
sense), then any highest determinable will either be 'present from the start' already coupled 
to C, or incompatible with C in such a way that ascribing that determinable to a C-entity 
will merely be a category mistake.   73
Before ending my present discussion of Johnson, two further points bear noting.  
The first is that on Johnson's view, objects carry highest-determinable profiles in virtue of 
their natures – and the characterisation (or determination, 1921:10) of objects by means of 
adjectives is always the sharpening of some determinable from the corresponding profile to 
a more determinate value. The characters of objects are, to be sure, 'absolutely determinate' 
– but as noted, this need mean only that they are as determinate as anything is – not as 
determinate as anything could be.  This is because 'determinate' designates a relative 74
status: while the hierarchy of determinables and determinates is fixed at the top in a 
modally strong sense (“Further, what have been assumed to be determinables – e.g. colour, 
pitch, etc. - are ultimately different, in the important sense that they cannot be subsumed 
under some one higher determinable” (1921:175)), it need not follow that it is fixed in the 
same way at the bottom.  
 Johnson's treatment of determinables thus supplies an account of category which serves as a good basis 73
for an account of category mistakes such as that of Magidor (2013), as I discuss in Chapter 4. 
 An example to illustrate. Suppose that some magnitude has a smallest unit – suppose for argument's sake 74
that there is such a thing as unit charge. It will follow that nothing has a charge whose value is finer-
grained than that, but not – at least, not clearly – that nothing could do. I will discuss this point again in 
Chapter 3. 
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What emerges, then, is a picture according to which objects and highest determinables  75
are privileged, and indeed, intimately related: highest determinables constitute the 
ontological form of objects, and are irreducible because they contribute 'distinctly positive 
content' to the world's structure. While entailment traces the determinable-determinate 
hierarchy from the bottom up (determinates entail determinables), predication traces it from 
the top down. Two observations follow from this. One is that if Johnson's account of 
determinables leaves a question mark over the ontological status of anything, it is over the 
category of absolutely determinate properties, where absolute determinateness is 
understood in a non-relative sense – not over determinables. The other is that there is, 
underlying Johnson's account, an implied ontological distinctiveness attached to highest 
determinables which does not attach to determinable adjectives 'lower down': not all 
determinables are equal. To put it another way: the determinable-determinate hierarchy is 
not ontologically uniform.  76
The second, much briefer, thing to note is Johnson's mention, at the end of his discussion, 
of connections that determinables bear to the topics of measurement and sense perception. 
Discussion of the metaphysics of measurement has, of course, been a theme of growing 
interest over the last century; more recently, geometrical models of cognition and sense-
perception have also arisen which raise intriguing possibilities for integration (see e.g. 
Gärdenfors 2000). These connections are significant: it is plausible to suggest that it is a 
virtue of a dimensional ontology that it offers – especially in conjunction with the 
 I am careful with the term 'superdeterminable' when discussing Johnson. 'Superdeterminable' is often used 75
as interchangeable with 'highest determinable', but Johnson (1921:177) uses it as a relative term to 'sub-
determinate'. 
 This should not be too surprising, since determinate-determinable hierarchies are non-constructive.76
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metametaphysical picture offered in Chapter 7 – a powerful, unitary metaphysical 
treatment of them.  
3. Characterising the Explanandum: Core Features in the Contemporary Debate 
Having given an exposition of Johnson in some detail, I turn now to a more general 
overview of the wider – and more recent – debate. In this section I focus on the broad 
consensus over core features of the structure that occupies the explanandum role in the 
debate. Since this chapter is not a literature review on determinables, I will not survey the 
literature through a piecemeal exposition of individual authors, exhaustively or not. Rather, 
I follow Wilson's (2017) distilled list of core features that are “commonly taken to 
characterize determinables, determinates, and their relation”. Wilson frames her list with 
the following qualifications: 
[…] the presentation is in terms of properties, and may require adjustment to apply to entities 
of other categories. This is not a minimal or axiomatic set: some features follow from others; 
moreover, there are cases to be made that some of these features do not hold in full 
generality. In addition, how to metaphysically understand these features varies […] Motivated 
as they are by a limited range of paradigm cases, not all of these features may be characteristic 
of determination in the strong sense of being required for the holding of that relation, as 
opposed to being typically or generally true of some or most instances  
of the relation (or its relata). (2017 §2.1) 
Agreed. With these qualifications in place, I turn to Wilson's list. I will not consider the 
question of whether it is an exhaustive list, because the notion of exhaustiveness here is 
unclear: specifically, it is not always clear at what point a given feature ceases to belong to 
the core explanandum structure, and should be considered part of an explanans instead.  
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Wilson's list contains fourteen elements. The first is increased specificity: if p is a 
determinate of P, then p is more specific than P; in particular, to be p is to be P in a more 
specific way. There is, I add, some variation in exactly what force the expression 'in a more 
specific way' is supposed to have – specifically, over whether it is intended to capture 
something ontologically distinctive. It seems best, for present purposes, to take this point in 
the weakest available sense.  77
The second listed feature is that the determinable-determinate relation is irreflexive, 
asymmetric and transitive. As Wilson notes, these features are “characteristic of strict 
partial orderings”, and are entailed by the increased specificity feature.  Intuitively: 78
nothing is either a determinate or a determinable of (relative to) itself, nothing is a 
determinate or a determinable of anything that is in turn (respectively) a determinate or a 
determinable of it, and determinables of determinables (and determinates of determinates) 
of a property are determinables (determinates) of that property. 
The third feature comprises two distinct points: determination is levelled, and it is relative. 
It is levelled in the sense that things are not just determinate or determinable, but 
determinate or determinate to some degree: they may be more or less determinate than each 
other. It is relative in the sense that occupants of these determinable and determinate levels 
relate to each other as determinables and determinates of each other, and moreover, in the 
sense that to be determinate or determinable just is to be a determinate or determinable of 
 Note that this feature favours the kind of view that I have attributed to Johnson, according to which 77
highest determinable is absolute and non-relative, while lowest determinate need not be. For it is 
plausible that decreasing specificity may reach an in-principle limit, while increasing specificity may not. 
 Why, then, list these features separately? Because they are no less relevant than increased specificity for 78
identifying the explanandum role in question. Moreover, however unlikely it is in this context, a candidate 
structure might satisfy the second feature without satisfying increased specificity. 
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(that is, relative to) something else in this way.  These points are mutually independent. 79
Determinable-determinate structures may be levelled without being relative, and they may 
be relative without being levelled – at least if one drops the strict ordering requirement 
mentioned above.  
The fourth feature is what I will call simply the 'in respect of' feature: determinates are, in 
some sense, arrayed in respect of their determinables. Wilson puts the point in terms of 
specification: determinates are more specific than their determinables in respect of their 
determinables. But this seems to presuppose the very point being targeted: it is because 
determinates are arrayed in respect of their determinables that they can be more specific 
than them – and a fortiori, more specific in respect of them – at all. Moreover, it seems too 
narrow, since we may also say for example that determinates resemble, or differ, or are 
comparable, only in respect of their determinables. For these reasons, I will just call this 
point the 'in respect of' feature, that determinates – a little gnomically – are in respect of 
their determinables. Note also that while determinables (at least, excluding highest 
determinables) and determinates are arrayed in the same respects, the in respect of relation 
is a little more finicky to get right. For one thing, it is asymmetric: determinates may be 
arrayed in respect of their determinables, but determinables are not arrayed in respect of 
their determinates. Moreover, there is a certain oddness to the 'in respect of' locution as 
applied to mid-level (i.e. not highest) determinables. For example, while it is natural to say 
that crimson and scarlet differ in respect of redness, it is very odd to say that either crimson 
or scarlet is more specific than red in respect of redness. It is not so odd, however, to say 
that either crimson or scarlet is more specific than red in respect of their shared highest 
determinable, colour. This claimed tendency for in-respect-of locutions to prefer highest 
 I use 'thing' in this context because I do not want to commit to using 'property'.79
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determinables – fits well with what I will claim later: that the determinable-determinate 
hierarchy is ontologically non-uniform, and that specification and determination are in this 
context distinct relationships (in particular, that determination is not a kind of 
specification).   80
The fifth feature is determinate comparability and similarity. We have already seen a 
version of this point in the discussion of Johnson above. Wilson puts it like this: “if P and 
R  are different same-level determinates of the determinable Q, then P and R are similar, 81
and moreover comparable, in respect of Q.” The same-level requirement here may seem a 
little odd. After all, if crimson is more specific than red in respect of colour, does this not 
mean that crimson and red are comparable in respect of colour? Yet crimson and red are 
not same-level determinates of colour. Adopting a different idiom, we might say that the 
region of (colour) property space associated with crimson is a proper subregion of that 
associated with red – which seems, at least prima facie, like a legitimate sort of comparison 
to make. Once again, then, we find that the details are finicky, though it is clear that 
determinables are in some way closely tied to comparability and similarity. For the sake of 
exposition here, I leave open the question of exactly what form this close connection 
should take; indeed, that is something for the proper explanans to deal with. 
 'In respect of' expressions are rather hard to pin down. For example, they also admit of identification: we 80
may say that colour is the respect in which red and crimson differ in specificity – or indeed, that 
specificity is the respect in which red and crimson differ as determinates of colour. These nuances make it 
difficult to base any argument on the specifics of respect-talk. Nevertheless, I will be arguing throughout 
this thesis that the basis of respect-talk in general – the appearance of a certain respect-structure in an 
explanandum role – is a central target for metaphysical explanation. Indeed, one merit of my ontology is 
that it provides a well-motivated regimentation of this somewhat untamed talk of respects. 
 My own preference, in this context, is to preserve Johnson's convention of using lower-case letters for 81
determinates and corresponding upper-case letters for the corresponding determinables. However, where I 
cite Wilson, I follow her convention of using upper-case letters for both. I have not adopted a uniform 
notation, in order to more clearly mark out which statements are taken from Wilson, and which are not. 
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The sixth feature is non-conjunctive specification. Again, this is a feature that we met in 
our discussion of Johnson. As Wilson says: “if P determines Q, then P is not identical with 
any conjunctive property conjoining Q with any property or properties independent of Q.” 
The move from a determinable quality (here, Q) to one of its determinates is not a move 
from Q to some conjunction (Q ^ R) where R is a property (or some properties) 
independent of Q. Note that strictly speaking, we should distinguish this version of non-
conjunctive specification, where the second conjunct is taken to be a property or some 
properties, from a wider class of non-conjunctive specification conditions which reject any 
sort of second conjunct. An example of a second conjunct not consisting of a property or 
some properties would be a condition of something's standing in some formal relationship 
or other. While I am in agreement with non-conjunctive specification in its restricted form, 
we will see in a later chapter (on the problem of universals) that I am not in agreement with 
its wider construal.  
The seventh feature is non-disjunctive specification. Just as non-conjunctive specification 
demands that movement from determinable to determinate should not consist in movement 
to a conjunction, so non-disjunctive specification demands that the movement from 
determinate to determinable should not consist in movement to a disjunction. 
Determinables are not disjunctions of their determinates, either alone or in combination 
with any further properties independent from them.  82
 Curiously, there is no move with disjunctions that parallels the two versions of non-conjunctive 82
specification given above. One might conceive of some options on which the additional disjuncts in a 
move from determinate to determinable consist not in further properties but in elements of ontological 
form, but such options are irredeemably obscure. For example, given some totality T of ontological 
categories whose determinable profiles include the highest determinable P, and given some determinate p 
of P, one might characterise the move from p to P as a move from p to a disjunction either p, or both 
belonging to some category in T and not-p. But who would want to defend that?
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The eighth feature is determinable inheritance: possession of determinate qualities entails 
possession of all corresponding determinables. We have seen this point in Johnson's remark 
that the highest determinables are 'present from the start' in the generic nature of an object. 
However, determinable inheritance may be satisfied even if Johnson is wrong about that. It 
might be, for example, that a certain sort of trope bundle theory is correct and objects 
simply are bundles of maximally determinate property-instances. In that case there is no 
room to hold that determinables are 'present from the start' in the natures of objects: they 
must be generated from the bottom up. Yet it would still remain the case that possession of 
determinates entails possession of corresponding determinables.  
The ninth feature is requisite determination. Here is how Wilson puts it: “if x has Q at time 
t, then for every level L of determination of Q: x must have some L-level determinate P of 
Q at t.” In short: possession of a determinable entails possession of some determinate of 
that determinable at each level of determination. Interestingly, Wilson offers the intuitive 
paraphrase: “objects must have a determinate of every determinable they have”. This 
seems correct, though it is a weaker claim than the earlier formulation, since it does not 
entail on its own (i.e. without the aid of determinable inheritance) possession of 
determinates at every level under a determinable.  
The tenth feature is a requirement of multiple determinates: for any determinate p of P, 
there is at the same level of determination as p another determinate p' of P, distinct from p. 
The thought here is that, as Wilson says, “with determinate specificity comes multiplicity 
or diversity”. It is not clear, however, why this should be necessarily true. Thinking of 
specification as a kind of division may get us there, since then the multiple determinate 
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requirement plays a similar role to a kind of supplementation axiom. But is specification a 
kind of division? If it seems to be, we should be sure that it does not seem to be so on the 
wrong sorts of grounds – grounds that are incompatible with the non-conjunctive and non-
disjunctive constraints on specification. Indeed, it might seem that determinables that are 
essentially uniquely possessed – if there are any – might be counterexamples to the 
multiple determinate requirement.  I leave this as an open question here. 83
The eleventh feature is determinate exclusion: same-level determinates under a common 
determinable exclude each other. Put another way: if x has a determinate P of Q at time t, 
then x cannot have, at t, any other determinate R of Q at the same level of specificity as P. 
This point, too, has been seen in our discussion of Johnson. I have also appealed to it 
myself, as a premise in my discussion of thick entities in an earlier chapter. Of all the 
features of determinables and determinates, this is among the least disputed – the only real 
debate being over how metaphysically fundamental determinate exclusion is.  The point 84
also bears a close relationship to the question of the relative priority of contrary (polar) and 
contradictory opposition (see Horn 1989), a relationship marked inter alia by Johnson's 
talk of determinates being 'opponent' under a determinable.  
The twelfth feature is unique determination: for any object x, time t and determinable P, 
and any level of specificity L, if x has P at t, then x has only one determinate p of P at L at 
t. As Wilson notes, this follows from requisite determination and determinate exclusion, so 
I will not say more about it. 
 God might be a plausible candidate to uniquely possess such determinables. Such cases may be driven by 83
their connection with property spaces that have an archetype structure. In any case, the pursuit of such a 
topic is beyond the scope of my present discussion. 
 Dimensionism is, of course, able to offer an explanation of this, at least in some cases, in terms of the 84
reflexivity of resemblance. 
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The thirteenth feature is asymmetric modal dependence. As Wilson puts it: “if P is a 
determinate of Q, then if x has P then x must have Q, but for some y, y might have Q 
without having P.” This feature is entailed, as Wilson notes, by determinable inheritance, 
requisite determination, and multiple determinates, so I will say nothing further about it 
here. 
The fourteenth and final listed feature is causal compatibility: determinates and their 
determinables do not causally compete – that is, they do not exclude each other as causes 
of some common effect. Thus, the classic example offered by Wilson: “if a given patch is 
both red and scarlet, there is no in-principle difficulty with both red and scarlet being 
causally efficacious vis-á-vis the pecking of a pigeon trained to peck at any red patch.” 
This point has been brought to bear on discussions in the philosophy of mind (see e.g. 
Yablo 1992), in defence of the causal efficacy of mental states. For our present purposes, I 
note that causal compatibility sits somewhere between being a core feature of accounts of 
determination (such as the so-called 'subset view'), and being a core part of the theoretical 
utility of an account of determination.  
These, then, are the elements of Wilson's list: increased specificity, irreflexivity, asymmetry 
and transitivity, leveled and relative determination, the 'in respect of' feature, determinate 
comparability and similarity, non-conjunctive specification, non-disjunctive specification, 
determinable inheritance, requisite determination, multiple determinates, determinable 
exclusion, unique determination, asymmetric modal dependence, and causal compatibility. 
Together they form the core – or a plausible enough core, at any rate – of the target 
explanandum structure in the determinables debate.  
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One might note that a great number of these listed features are open to controversy, both in 
their details and at a broader, more gestural level. This raises a sharp question mark over 
the unity of the explanandum, in at least two ways. First: is there some one (or core 
plurality of) genuine target structure in the vicinity of the explanandum profile outlined by 
Wilson's summary list? And second: if so, to what extent do the listed features, or at least 
some majority of them, belong to that structure (or those structures)? How, in either case, 
would we know?  
While conceding that knowledge here is difficult to come by – we are after all, as I argue in 
Chapter 7, here in the business of making fallible posits – I say again that we should seek 
progress on these questions by pursuing an ontology – an explanans structure – that will 
offer a good metaphysical explanation of whatever natural core structure the explanandum 
profile might be capturing.  
It bears noting that a good explanans structure may turn out to be one which shows a 
significant number of explanandum features to be mistaken. This is partly because many of 
the explanandum features are driven by a narrow set of paradigm examples, and also 
simply by dint of the fact that the listed features are occurring in an explanandum role. 
Indeed, this will be an especially salient possibility if – as I will argue – the explanandum 
features are getting at more than one explanans structure.  
Before moving on, a few points are worth mentioning which do not entirely fit within the 
explanans side of the discussion, but do not quite belong to the explanandum side either. 
These are best characterised as emerging choice points within the debate – points which are 
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in transition from being (arguably) core features of the explanandum to being somewhat 
more peripheral and optional. 
One such choice point is the question of whether determinates are metaphysically prior to 
determinables. On this, the majority view was and remains affirmative. However, Wilson 
(2012) has argued in defence of fundamental determinables – that is, determinables that are 
neither reducible nor eliminable. I raise this here to note that the view I will be defending 
here offers a novel way to articulate and defend what remains very much a minority view, 
that some determinables are metaphysically prior to their determinate values (but not to the 
entities that determine them).  
Another choice point concerns the categories to which the modifiers 'determinable' and 
'determinate' properly apply. We have seen that Johnson applies the distinction to 
adjectives, understood roughly as either qualities or quality terms – and the majority view 
has indeed been that determinables and determinates are determinable and determinate 
properties. But this is not the only view. Various authors in the philosophy of mind, for 
example, have taken mental states to be examples of determinables – or at least, to stand as 
the determinable relatum in determination relations (see Funkhouser 2014 for a survey and 
critique of this idea). Jones (2016) has also recently suggested treating the notion of an 
individual object as a determinable. The range of options here will continue growing as 
new applications of the determinate/determinable distinction are explored. Nevertheless, 
there is something odd about the very question of what sort of thing determinables and 
determinates are. For determinable and determinate are – according to the common 
conception – terms that designate relative status, not categories of being. One might think 
that specification should impose categorial unity on the distinction: perhaps it is only 
!88
entities of some common sort that may be compared in respect of specificity, or have any 
degree of specificity at all. However, this is to assume that specification is central to the 
determinable-determinate relation, and this is an assumption which I will later deny.  
This brings me to a third point, which – unlike the previous two – remains at present a 
universal assumption in the literature, rather than a point of choice. It is the assumption that 
the hierarchy of determinables and determinates is ontologically uniform.  I deny this 85
assumption, and this denial is what enables me also to deny that specification is involved in 
every core structure underlying the explanandum (explananda?) of the determinables 
debate.  
Finally, there is a choice point which concerns how maximal determinables and 
determinates should be understood. Since determinable and determinate are terms of 
relative status which generate – as mentioned – strict partial orderings, it is natural to 
regard highest determinables and lowest determinates as simply the terminal entities in 
such orderings – that is, to conceive of them in a relative way. However, this is by no 
means required: one may also conceive of either terminus of a determinable/determinate 
hierarchy in a non-relative way. As mentioned in my discussion of Johnson, it is plausible 
that the very existence of many upper termini would suggest that such termini are not a 
merely relative affair: their occupants do not merely happen to be the highest 
determinables, but rather, there could not be any higher. But it is not clear that parallel 
reasoning applies to lower termini: one might quite coherently conceive of upper termini 
 This differs a little, as we will see, from the claim that the class of determinable predicates has an 85
ontologically uniform value-range. It is also compatible with the claim that there are multiple 
determinable-determinate hierarchies that are individually ontologically uniform but collectively 
ontologically diverse.
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non-relatively, and lower termini in a relative way.  
4. Some Extant Proposals 
I have examined both Johnson and the target explanandum structure at some length. In the 
next section I will argue that a dimensional ontology provides the best explanans structure 
for the explanandum, as well as the best ontology to complement Johnson's treatment of 
the determinable. Presently, however, I take a break to survey – in a relatively brief way – 
some other extant accounts of determinables. I will attempt no semblance of an exhaustive 
survey here. Rather, I focus on two accounts: Armstrong's partial identity view, and 
Funkhouser's trope realist approach in terms of theoretical constructs and levels of 
abstraction. In each case a moral will be drawn for later discussion. My discussion here 
overlaps substantially in focus with my discussion of respect structure in Chapter 1. 
However, these discussions are set in rather different contexts, so I have chosen to keep 
them separate.  
Armstrong's treatment of determinables – here I stick with the discussion in his 1997 book 
– is motivated by the theoretical utility of determinable structures in regimenting 
resemblances between determinate universals (1997:48). Determinates, being universals, 
are types of states of affairs, conceived as unsaturated, abstracted entities. Armstrong 
considers a set of determinates united under a common determinable:  
Since different such classes of determinates do not intersect, it is likely that what we have here 
is an equivalence class, falling under some particular equivalence relation. Without trying to specify  
this relation directly (it may differ from determinate to determinate), my proposal is that it is 
a complex relation involving partial identities, ones which hold either directly or recursively 
between any two members of the one equivalence class. In the best sort of case, found in one 
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dimensional quantities such as duration and mass, each member stands directly  
in a partial identity relation to every other member of the class. Probably this is not a necessary 
condition for all classes of determinates. (1997:51) 
For Armstrong, then, there are determinates – type states of affairs – and there are classes 
of determinates. Determinables are reducible to these classes of determinates, which in turn 
are obtained by abstraction – non-mereological decomposition – from states of affairs. 
Determinables thus figure a long way off the ground, if they figure at all. The classes in 
question are equivalence classes of a certain sort – those generated by complex networks of 
partial identities: 
The partial identity here is the sort of partial identity that can hold between universals. To take 
simple cases, it is the sort of partial identity that holds between the conjunctive universal P&Q 
and P, or between P&Q and Q&R. The claim is that every class of determinates falling 
under a determinable is held together by partial identities. I am not claiming that this proposition 
is convertible. There may well be classes of universals where the members are linked by partial 
identity but it is not the case that the class-members fall under a common determinable. (1997:51-2) 
One might well be puzzled by these remarks. Isn't Armstrong here endorsing precisely the 
kind of view that our explanandum list rules out – one which relies on conjunctive 
specification? This would not mean curtains for Armstrong in any case, since non-
conjunctive specification, while rather central, is not sacrosanct among our listed 
explanandum features. But things are not so simple. For Armstrong continues: 
Furthermore, as already noted, it remains possible that some of these classes are unified in 
a more direct manner. It is possible for some of these classes that to the determinable predicate  
there corresponds a property, a determinable universal. (1997:52)  86
  This is, of course, a change from his 1978b view. 86
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And many chapters later: 
It will at this point be useful to distinguish between logical and real determinables. All 
real determinables are logical determinables, but not all logical determinables are real ones. 
Logical determinables are W.E. Johnson's determinables. They are whatever obey the logical 
laws that Johnson laid down for determinables. […] Unlike logical determinables, which 
are properties of particulars, the real [or ontological] determinables are genuine, and non-relational, 
properties of determinate properties, properties providing a universal to unify  
suitable classes of determinates. (1997:246) 
Armstrong points out that such real determinables – now conceived as second-level 
properties, genuine types on types of states of affairs – are needed to supply the universals 
that feature in functional or determinable laws of nature. I will postpone a discussion of the 
relationship between determinables (or for me: dimensions) and functional laws until 
Chapter 5. It is not my aim here, either, to assess the plausibility of Armstrong's conception 
of real determinables: for space, I cannot engage at close quarters on this point. (For a 
different account along broadly similar lines, see Bigelow and Pargetter 1990.) My point is 
rather to draw out the duality of Armstrong's (1997) discussion of determinables. On the 
one hand, determinables are treated as forming a certain inclusive class – that of logical 
determinables – while on the other hand, a certain sub-class of logical determinables – the 
real determinables – are given an ontologically distinctive treatment quite apart from 
Armstrong's treatment of merely logical determinables. Thus, Armstrong – at any rate, 
Armstrong-during-1997 – seems to be in agreement with two of my present claims. First, 
that there is a certain explanandum structure which exhibits enough unity to be identified 
as such – namely, that of logical determinables; Armstrong (1997:48-9) employs a list of 
features to capture that structure, which is similar to but less wide-ranging than the one 
presented above. And second, that the class of logical determinables is nonetheless 
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metaphysically bifurcated. Thus, his treatment of the class of logical determinables is 
unitary; the duality of his view emerges at the level of the metaphysical bases for particular 
logical determinables.  87
Turning away from Armstrong, consider now the position defended by Funkhouser (2006, 
2014). I concede straight away that Funkhouser's work – especially the extended discussion 
in his 2014 book – is explicitly intended to focus on the logical structure of kinds, and to 
stay somewhat light on metaphysical commitments. However, Funkhouser does make some 
commitments. One such commitment is to property realism, and in particular trope realism, 
as an ontological backdrop for his discussion. Properties are held to be basic, and to be 
instances of kinds. Funkhouser then argues that kinds may stand in two distinct sorts of 
asymmetric necessitation relation to other kinds: determination and realisation. 
Determination occurs when the necessitating kinds vary along the same dimensions of 
determination as the necessitated kind;  realisation occurs when the necessitating kinds do 88
not share the determination dimensions of the necessitated kind.  
This is all very well, but – I suggest – not very satisfying if one hopes for an explanatory 
metaphysics of determinable structure. For Funkhouser holds that the nature of kinds is 
exhausted by their dimensions of determination (and non-determinable necessities), while 
dimensions of determination are theoretical constructs. Hence, sameness of determination 
dimensions is described at various points as sameness of level of abstraction.  
 In this way, Armstrong holds that the class of (explanandum; logical) determinables is not ontologically 87
uniform – but in a way that is distinct from holding that the hierarchy of determinables and determinates 
is not ontologically uniform. 
 This is simplified for exposition. I have omitted, for example, Funkhouser's discussion of 'non-88
determinable necessities' – roughly, the determinate values of determinables with which particular kinds 
are associated.
!93
Now granted, Funkhouser does not offer a developed ontology – nor does he claim to. 
There is nothing wrong with theoretical constructs; indeed, on the view defended in 
Chapter 7, it is plausible that theoretical constructs are by no means unsuited to substantive 
ontological work. But, nevertheless, in lieu of such a developed ontological account from 
Funkhouser, it is unclear exactly how treating dimensions of determination themselves as 
theoretical constructs – putting the notion of a theoretical construct to work in the first-
order metaphysical account as opposed to the metametaphysics – is supposed to help 
account for determinable- or respect-structure in the world.  89
Let me take stock. I have now surveyed the state of the determinables debate in relevant 
respects. I have considered the views of Johnson and Funkhouser, with which my own 
position has the greatest affinity – and I have suggested that both Johnson and Armstrong 
make, in their own ways, parallel manoeuvres to some of my main moves in this chapter. I 
have also set up the determinables debate as the task of articulating and explaining a 
certain target structure, and I have articulated that target structure. In the next section, I 
present my own dimensional account of the determinable. 
5. Dimensions and Determinables 
The core of my view is easy to state: I identify, as the ontological correlates of Johnson's 
highest determinables, what I have been calling dimensions. Anything that is, for Johnson, 
 One route open to Funkhouser would be to make more of theoretical construction and abstraction, perhaps 89
pursuing a connection with recent work on geometrical models of cognition and conceptual spaces by 
Gärdenfors (2000, 2014). Precisely where such a route leads, however, is open to debate. I am not 
claiming, in any case, that Funkhouser himself claims that dimensions of determination are theoretical 
constructs. As I have noted in Chapter 1, he appears to take them to be mind-independent features of 
reality. 
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a highest determinable, belongs on my view to the fundamental ontological category of 
dimensions. I take this to mean that the whole class of Armstrong's 'logical' determinables – 
whether 'real' or ‘logical’ – qualify as dimensions in my sense. This is because the category 
of dimensions, on my view, is individuated by the occurrence of its members as relata in 
the determination relationship (they determine nothing, but are themselves determined by 
objects) and moreover, because the category is fundamental in virtue of the non-derivative 
nature of the existence and identity criteria of its members. All this leaves the members of 
the category – dimensions – free to be non-fundamental in other senses of ‘fundamental’, 
and hence free to be (among other things) mind-dependent. 
Dimensions are, recall, respects in which objects are the ways that they are. They stand in a 
relationship that I am calling determination – but this is not the relation that is commonly 
held to obtain between determinable and determinate properties. It is, rather, simply the 
distinctive formal relationship that holds between dimensions and objects.  
Objects, recall, are conceived as thick – very much in line with Johnson's conception of 
substantives which carry their determinable profiles 'from the start'. Insofar as Johnson's 
determinable profiles are profiles of highest determinables, they correspond exactly with 
the dimensional profiles which, as I have argued in the previous chapter, are individuating 
markers of ontological categories.  
In short, I hold that dimensions, objects, and their associated ontological form – the 
ontology defended in the previous chapter – constitute the explanans structure underlying 
the explanandum features offered above.  
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That, at least, is one half of my view. The other half concerns the remaining explanandum 
features that are left over. For I have stated already that my dimensions are identical only 
with the highest determinables in Johnson's picture. So: what about the rest - the other 
terms in determinable-determinate hierarchies that also exhibit the relevant explanandum 
features? Here I must briefly anticipate the discussion of Chapter 3 by pre-empting certain 
aspects of the solution that I will defend to the problem of universals.  
The problem of universals admits of a treatment similar to the present debate about 
determinables: it is a twofold task of articulating an explanandum structure, and providing 
an explanans. The explanandum structure is significantly easier to articulate there than in 
the case of the determinables debate. Precisely how this is best done I will discuss in 
Chapter 3, but roughly, the target structure is that exhibited by – speaking non-committally 
– an object possessing a determinate property (under some determinable). Now, we have 
seen already that a certain part of this structure – that comprising the object and its 
associated highest determinables – is explained on my view by the existence of objects and 
dimensions. This leaves a structural remainder – the determinate property – still to be 
explained. 
Postponing details to Chapter 3, my claim is that no further entities are needed to explain 
this structural remainder. Determinate properties are not admitted as further entities; 
instead, statements purporting to ascribe determinate properties to objects are explained as 
statements ascribing resemblance relationships to objects and properties in a specific way 
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to be adumbrated in Chapter 3.  Determinate property terms thus emerge as incomplete 90
symbols in Russell's (1918) sense: symbols which disappear on the most ontologically 
perspicuous analysis.   
So: what about the other determinables – the ones that are not highest in determinable-
determinate hierarchies? My answer trades on the fact that such determinables differ from 
highest determinables in that they are also determinate relative to those highest 
determinables. My account of them therefore does not differ, in essence, from my account 
of absolutely determinate properties in terms of objects, dimensions, and resemblance 
(again, details are postponed until Chapter 3).  
(Note here that there is a certain parallelism between my approach and the standard one 
which treats determinates as prior to determinables. In both cases, where resemblance is 
relied on to construct the determinable-determinate hierarchy – whether bottom-up or top-
down – it is the relativity of the determinable-determinate distinction, and the resulting 
'dual status' that all except the highest and lowest terms in the hierarchies have, which 
allows resemblance  to do its constructive work in the way discussed in Chapter 3.) 91
6. Some Assumptions Revised 
With the dimensional treatment of determinables sketched, we may turn at least to re-
 In a Chapter 4, I will discuss the implications of this – already touched on – for the structure of 90
predication and instantiation, and hence, for the notion of a fact. It should also be clear that such a take on 
the problem of universals – coupled with the operation-based conception of joint-carving defended in 
chapter 1 – renders the relevant joints of reality into a form that is, I suggest, fit for carving by the 
operations involved in measurement. These connections, too, will get a chapter of their own.
 This point applies a bit differently in the cases of theories that appeal to resemblance all the way up, such 91
as Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's (2002) resemblance nominalism. 
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examine the determinables debate and draw out some implications. Which assumptions in 
that debate are preserved, and which rejected, on my view? 
My view is, first of all, in broad agreement with that of Johnson as I interpret him. While I 
do not hold, as Johnson seems to, that there are such things as determinate qualities,  my 92
account holds – just as Johnson's does – that the determinable-determinate relation, 
understood as that relationship which runs all the way through determinable-determinate 
hierarchies, is a relationship that is between, and distinctive of, adjectives (or something 
close enough to them). Moreover, my account agrees with Johnson that this distinctive 
mark of adjectives is generated by the ontological form of a specific class of adjectives, 
namely the highest determinables. It is these highest determinable terms – the dimensions – 
that arrange determinates into distinct and ordered arrays.  93
I cannot agree with Johnson, however, that the relationship of determinates to 
determinables is always a specification relationship. In particular, I cannot agree that the 
relationship of a (relative) determinate to a highest determinable is a specification 
relationship. This is due to my identification of highest determinables with dimensions, and 
hence in turn with respects. Accordingly, highest determinables are not the least specific 
terms in a series of properties or ways of being, but rather, the very respects under which 
the other terms in that series differ in specificity. 
  At least, in any non-derivative sense. My account is flexible on this choice point: I may say either that 92
determinate properties do not exist, or that they exist and are derivative. In general I have chosen the 
former course for simplicity, as I explain in Chapter 3. 
 This 'arranging' work sits well with the claim that determinates are ontologically derivative from 93
determinables. 
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I can agree, however, that same-level determinates under a common determinable exclude 
each other. Indeed, on my account we can even explain why this is. For the possession of 
determinate qualities, on my account, boils down to resemblance, and resemblance is – one 
might well suppose – a reflexive relationship. For one and the same thing to be 
simultaneously two ways, at the same level of specificity, in the same respect, would 
therefore be for that thing to both resemble and not-resemble  itself in that respect. 94
I can agree with Johnson, moreover, that highest determinables have a distinctive 'positive 
content' in virtue of which they may differ from each other: it is a basic tenet of my view 
that dimensions, being members of a fundamental category, have identity criteria that are 
not derivative from any other category. 
Finally, I can agree with Johnson that highest determinables are shared by objects, and 
even shared in a particular way, namely, through their figuring in the determinable 
(dimensional) profiles that mark the natures of objects and their partition into categories. 
Moving on from Johnson, how does my view relate to Wilson's list of explanandum 
features? I have already said that my view does not accommodate a conception of the 
relationship of determinates to highest determinables as one of increased specificity, 
though it is compatible with such an account of the relationship between determinates and 
non-maximal determinables. 
What about irreflexivity, asymmetry and transitivity? On my view, the determination 
 This term admits of two readings, as either the polar or the contradictory opposite of 'resemble'. I intend 94
both here.
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relationship is indeed irreflexive and asymmetric (to deny either would be a category 
error), but it is not transitive except in the vacuous sense that nothing which determines 
anything is itself determined by anything, and so any conditional whose antecedent 
requires such a thing would be trivially true. However, my account leaves it open whether 
the relation between determinates and non-maximal determinables might be transitive.  
Levelled and relative determination are both accommodated, again, in relation to non-
maximal determinables. 
The 'in respect of' feature is accommodated on my view, though by way of concession: 
respects are simply admitted as basic, and a basic category of being at that. I have defended 
this admission in Chapter 1, so I will not discuss it further here. 
Determinate comparability and similarity are accommodated and explained on my account, 
which treats determinates as constructed through, and hence essentially dependent on, 
objects, dimensions, and resemblance. Hence as far as determinates are concerned, 
resemblance is involved from the start.  
Non-conjunctive specification has already been remarked on. Non-disjunctive specification 
is accommodated, again, by the construction of determinates from determinables and 
resemblance: disjunctions are essentially composed of, and depend on, their disjuncts – but 
determinables are not essentially composed of or dependent on their determinable values. 
The derivative nature of determinates also serves to accommodate determinable 
inheritance. 
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Requisite determination is accommodated in the following way. It is accommodated first of 
all in the case of highest determinables: any object that determines such a determinable 
also perfectly resembles itself under that determinable (once again, I postpone the details), 
and so also possesses a determinate under that determinable. The determinate in question 
will also – according to my account – be maximally determinate,  and so requisite 95
determination follows for the case of non-maximal determinables also.  
The requirement of multiple determinates is met on my account insofar as it should be met 
on any account. For on my view, the posession of a determinate property is a matter of 
resemblance under a determinable – and a certain object which falls under a given 
determinable may resemble such-and-such things under that determinable without thereby 
ruling out another object's resembling different things under the same determinable. This is 
not to say that further factors could not rule it out – for example, it might be (to use 
Funkhouser's terminology) that a certain determinable is possessed only in cases where the 
associated non-determinable necessities prevent the multiple determinates requirement 
from being met. But quite apart from the question of whether there are any such cases, we 
may observe that this kind of case falls quite outside of the remit of an account of 
determinables to rule out (or indeed, to rule in).  
Determinate exclusion has been remarked on already, so I will not discuss it further. Very 
similar considerations serve to explain unique determination. Asymmetric modal 
dependence is entailed by determinable inheritance, requisite determination, and multiple 
determinates. 
 That is, in the terms that I will introduce in Chapter 3, maximally determinate in fact but not necessarily in 95
principle. 
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Finally, causal compatibility left a rather open question on my account, pending details – 
by no means foreclosed by the account of determinables itself – of exactly how 
determinables and determinates feature in causal relations. It does not seem clear, though, 
why determinables and determinates should turn out to causally compete on my account, 
regardless of how those questions pan out. Indeed, the causal roles of determinables and 
determinates should, on my view, turn out to be complementary to a large degree, 
especially in cases that concern nomic governance. (I discuss governance in Chapter 5.)  
It seems then, on this brief survey, that just about all of the listed features can be 
accommodated on my view. Some of them are accommodated by the category of 
dimensions directly; others by the bifurcation of my suggested treatment of the explanans 
structure. Still others are accommodated by the specific use of resemblance for the 
derivation of determinate qualities. I take it to be a benefit of my view that a number of the 
listed features may be not only accommodated, but explained by these means. 
My account, then, involves several reversals of majority opinion regarding determinables. 
Most prominently, it entails that highest determinables are metaphysically prior to their 
determinates, though non-maximal determinables are not. The most heterodox part of this 
reversal, as I have noted, is the bifurcated treatment of determinables. While this is a move 
that is also made, as I have shown, by Johnson and by Armstrong, it is not a normal move 
in the debate, and Johnson and Armstrong realize it in very different ways. My way is 
closer to Johnson's, insofar as I deny the uniformity of determinable-determinate 
hierarchies rather than merely the unity of the class of 'logical' determinables as such.  
This sort of bifurcated explanation allows for what I have called respect structure to be 
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posited separately from determinable-determinate structure (that is, the explanandum 
structure(s) in the present debate), in such a way as to stand as an underlying explanans of 
it. The chapter's target structure, then, is explained at three levels: it is shown to centre 
around two explanans structures rather than one,  it is explained in terms of positive 96
accounts of those two explanans structures, and moreover, one of those explanans 
structures stands in turn as explanans to the other.  
 This might not seem like the most obvious move. I am claiming a certain duality in the explanandum 96
structure, but I do not claim that my dimensions stand in the same relationship that determinables stand in 
with respect to determinates (the term 'determination' notwithstanding). Why then claim that my 
dimensions are ontological correlates of highest determinables at all? Why not conclude instead that we 
were simply mistaken in what we took to be actual examples of highest determinables, all along? Why 
not, in other words, remove such adjectives as colour, shape and mass from the determinable-determinate 
hierarchy altogether, and shift the status of 'highest-determinable' one rung down? The answer – besides 
inconvenience – is partly that this would not easily accommodate Johnson's discussion, and partly that the 
issue seems, to a large degree, merely a verbal one.
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Chapter 3 - Determinate Structure: the Problem of Universals 
0. Intro 
In Chapter 1 I argued that respect structure in the world is underwritten by a fundamental 
ontology of objects and dimensions. Chapter 2 applied the proposed ontology to the 
determinate-determinable relationships between adjectives. I argued there that dimensions 
are the ontological correlates are highest determinables – those not determinate relative to 
any other adjectives. Thus, on my view, determinable-determinate hierarchies are not 
ontologically uniform: highest determinables are singled out for their own treatment. The 
present chapter continues our focus on adjectives. 
The present chapter supplies an account that is complementary to that of Chapter 2. Here I 
argue that objects, and their resemblance relationships, are the ontological correlates of 
determinate adjectives, in a way to be explained. In particular, I will offer an account on 
which it is objects and their resemblances, rather than determinate properties, that play 
this role. My position is thus a variety of property nominalism comparable, in limited 
respects, to the resemblance nominalism of Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), as I discuss in 
Chapter 6.  
The majority of my discussion in this chapter will be targeted at maximal determinates: 
determinates that are not in turn determinable in relation to further ways of being. I will be 
arguing that objects and their resemblances can account, in the first place, for the 
maximally determinate properties that they share. The grounding of mid-level determinates 
- determinates that are in turn determinable - will not be a focal target for explanation in 
this chapter. I will offer a sketch of a dimensionist treatment of mid-level determinates in 
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the last section of this chapter, but it will not be developed in detail. 
I am, then, dividing determinable-determinate hierarchies in a threefold way, 
corresponding to three sorts of structure at the ontological level. Highest determinables are 
accounted for in terms of dimensions, maximal determinates in terms of objects and their 
resemblances, and mid-level determinates in terms of an extension of my proposed 
treatment of maximal determinates. I have argued in previous chapters for the first of these 
divisions: the separate treatment of highest determinables. I take the second division - the 
separate treatment of maximal determinates - to be rendered plausible by the widespread 
assumption that there is some distinction in ontological status between determinates (or at 
any rate, maximal determinates), and their related determinables.  
In Section 1, I set up the task of explaining determinate structure in terms of the 
explanandum-explanans framework familiar from previous chapters. I discuss the relation 
of this task to the problem of universals: my proposed account, if correct, will offer a 
solution to that problem. In Section 2, I set out my treatment of determinate structure in 
terms of resemblance structures on objects and dimensions. I introduce a Fregean-style 
abstraction principle, which captures how these elements hang together to do this 
explanatory work, and discuss the intended interpretation of that principle. In Section 3, I 
argue that the Julius Caesar problem, which besets abstraction principles in the context of 
neo-Fregean approaches to mathematics, does not transfer to the abstraction principle that I 
am advancing here. Finally, in Section 4, I discuss the application of the abstraction 
principle in explaining determinate structure, focusing on the treatment of mid-level 
determinates. 
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1. The Explanandum, and the Problem of Universals 
I have already defended the claim that determinable-determinate hierarchies are not 
ontologically uniform: highest determinable adjectives stand for dimensions, in contrast 
with adjectives that are determinate at any level. This means that highest determinables for 
me are excluded from the present explanandum, and included as an explanatory resource 
upon which the present explanans may draw. Indeed, my position in this chapter will rest 
upon the use to which dimensions are put in the explanans role. In contrast to this, on the 
standard view (see Wilson 2017, and Chapter 2 of this thesis, for discussion) that 
determinables – including highest determinables – are all dependent on their determinates 
(because entailed by them), determinables are not available as a resource for explaining 
determinate structure. While my view and the standard view conflict over the relative 
explanatory priority of determinates and highest determinables, there is convergence over a 
shared commitment to maximal determinates appearing in some explanandum role. The 
standard view has it that these lowest determinates, once explained, will in turn provide an 
explanatory account of highest determinables. On my view, the reverse is true: lowest 
determinates are accounted for by highest determinables, along with objects and their 
resemblances. But it is agreed on both sides that lowest determinates need accounting for, 
one way or another. I therefore take my present focus on the explanation of lowest 
determinates to be justified.  
An explanatory account of lowest determinates will not automatically furnish us with an 
explanatory account of determinables, highest or not, even if it is assumed that an object's 
possession of a (relative) determinate quality entails its possession of its related 
determinables. For what is needed is an account of how determinables are related to 
determinates so as to be entailed by them. Highest determinables are, of course, exempted 
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here on account of the arguments of the previous chapters. But all the other determinables 
– all those between highest determinables and lowest determinates, which I am calling mid-
level determinates  – are not. I will treat this mid-level structure as a further, albeit 97
subsidiary, part of the present explanandum, alongside and distinct from maximal-
determinate structure.  
I am, to be clear, treating the explanation of determinate structure as a two-stage process, 
consisting first of the explanation of lowest-determinate structure, and then of the 
explanation of mid-level determinable structure. The staging matters because it may, in 
principle, be important to be able to offer an account of the latter that is in some sense an 
extension of an account of the former.  
The explanatory task of this chapter, then, is closely related to the problem of universals. It 
is not exactly the same: for one thing, the problem of universals should be articulable in a 
general way that does not come already committed to my view that highest determinables 
stand apart from the rest of the determinable-determinate hierarchy. But this is not to say 
that a solution to my explanatory task could not also be a solution to the problem of 
universals – indeed, I will be arguing  that it is. In view of this prospect, let me now also 
set up the problem of universals. 
The problem of universals is multiply and disparately characterised. Galluzzo and Loux 
(2015:1) characterise it most broadly as the question of whether everything is particular – 
or supposedly equivalently, whether anything is universal – that is, whether anything is 
  Since these properties occupy the middle rungs of determinable-determinate ladders, they will all be both 97
determinable and determinate relative to different properties. Thus, ‘mid-level determinate’ and ‘mid-
level determinable’ are interchangeable. 
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repeatable. This characterisation of the problem remains ambiguous: it may be either a 
question about entities of a specific sort (or family of sorts), or a question about structures. 
In the former case, it is the question of whether any universals exist – entities that are, in 
some sense, said to be wholly co-located with each of their instances (whatever that 
means). In the latter case, it is the question of whether reality has a structure - or at any 
rate, a quality structure - which is repeated (whatever that means), and if so, in what such 
patterns of repetition consist.  
The problem is sometimes posed directly in terms of the categories object and property: 
what is it for an object to possess a property? To put the issue this way is odd, at first sight 
– objects and properties might be thought to belong properly to the explanans rather than 
the explanandum. Two options therefore arise. One is to keep objects and properties as 
given commitments, in which case the question's emphasis falls on possession: the issue 
becomes one about the nature of instantiation. I will discuss instantiation structures directly 
in Chapter 4, so I will not take up that theme here.  The other option is to treat this 98
particular way that the problem of universals is posed  – what is it for objects to possess 
properties? –  as non-committal. Such a non-committal construal of the question is, of 
course, not in tension with my position (modulo my exemption of highest determinables 
from the explanandum here), but it also leaves the problem of universals open to, and 
indeed requiring, some further elucidation. 
One might, then, also set up the issue in terms of a how-possible question: how is it 
possible for distinct objects (particulars) to have the very same properties in common? The 
 A further reason for not treating it as central here is that, put this way, it presupposes that there are objects 98
and properties. 
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explanandum  here is the sort of thing that is going on - the sort of structure that reality 99
exhibits - when sunsets and British post boxes are both red, and the apparent obstacle that 
generates the how-possible puzzle is the appearance, in some sense or other, of a 'one over 
many', a 'oneness in multiplicity' (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002:19). Precisely what the in-
principle problem with ones-over-manies is, however, rather unclear. That the world 
appears to have a repeating (qualitative) structure is plausibly a Moorean, or near-
Moorean, fact; the only purported obstacle to the very possibility of qualitative repetition, I 
suggest, arises merely as a consequence of privileging a kind of dud view on which the 
explanation of qualitative repetition modelled on the repeated occurrence of particulars. 
We might, then, make more of this way of presenting the problem of universals, by 
ditching the notion of an obstacle: the world does seem to contain ones-over-manies, and 
whatever it is that accounts for them (there being no even apparent in-principle obstacle to 
that), it cannot be merely more particulars. The task, according to this line of thought, is to 
identify the additional structure, beyond the mere existence of particulars, which accounts 
for qualitative ones-over-manies.  
One might also put the question in terms of resemblance: how do distinct particulars 
qualitatively resemble each other? Rodriguez-Pereyra remarks that the 'Moorean fact' that 
particulars resemble each other should not be puzzling unless it is assumed that 
resemblance consists in some more fundamental identity – that is, that two objects 
resemble only in virtue of their having some property that is the very same between them – 
in which case we are back to ones-over-manies again. Hence: ‘[r]ephrasing the Problem of 
 In the context of how-possible questions, the notion of an explanandum is different from that appearing in 99
my notion of an explanandum role. For explanation, in how-possible contexts, is tied with obstacles – 
specifically, with their acceptance, denial, or defeat. See Cassam (2007) for a general discussion of how-
possible questions. 
!109
Universals in this way makes no real difference' (2002:21). But it is doubtful whether 
resemblance should have the status of an un-puzzling, Moorean fact. While I will later 
argue that exact resemblance is a fundamental relationship, it does not follow that such a 
relationship does not stand for explanation. Indeed, there remains a question over which are 
the entities in whose ontological form resemblance relationships might be anchored. 
Moreover, even if exact resemblance were both fundamental and given in a Moorean way, 
it would not follow that inexact resemblance should be the same. I reject, therefore, 
Rodriguez-Pereyra's view that resemblances in the explanandum role are either un-
puzzling or not really different from ones-over-manies.  
Finally, one might also pose the problem in terms of a search for the truthmakers of a 
certain sort of truth. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002:40-1) points out that supplying truthmakers 
for statements of the forms 'a is F' and 'a has the property F'. Are these the right target 
statements? Perhaps, if it is assumed that determinable predicates are in some sense merely 
derivative from their determinates. Indeed, Rodriguez-Pereyra himself holds (2002:48-50) 
that determinables are simply disjunctions of their determinates – a view that I have 
rejected already. On the view that determinables are not so reducible, however, things are 
different: we may introduce two further target forms in parallel to those suggested by 
Rodriguez-Pereyra: 'a is F in respect of D', and 'the property of a in respect of D is F', 
where D stands for a dimension term. Thus, not 'the tomato is red', but 'the property of the 
tomato in respect of colour is red' – or more naturally, 'the colour of the tomato is red', and 
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'the tomato is red in respect of colour'.  100
The problem of universals is, then, a problem with many faces: we may identify problems 
concerning repeatability, property possession, property sharing, resemblance, and 
truthmakers. Faced with such a spread of approaches, I see no need to decide between 
them: they are tessellating aspects of a single explanatory task, admitting of a common 
solution. For my part, I will continue to talk in terms of the explanation of determinate 
structure – but with an eye kept on this wider, extended family of explananda connected 
with the problem of universals.  
Two final points of clarification are due relating to the explanandum of the present chapter. 
First, the problem of universals has often been divided into two explanatory tasks: on the 
one hand, tasks relating to truths such as ‘a is F’, and ‘a has the property of being F’, and 
on the other hand, tasks relating to truths such as ‘a and b are both F’, and ‘a and b share 
the property of being F’. It is commonplace to point out (see e.g. Oliver 1996:49) this 
distinction. Let me clarify how these two tasks are related, on my view. I said in Chapter 1 
that objects were thick particulars, needing no further entities to confer qualities upon 
them. In keeping with this, I will treat the question of how a and b may both be F - what 
Campbell (1990:29) calls the B-question - as prior. An answer to the B-question will tell us 
what it is for some objects to share a property. I will treat the A-question, what is it for an 
 The occurrence of F in the target forms, as an individual term standing for a determinate property, 100
introduces further complications. On my view, as we will see, the notion of a determinate quality is 
introduced (in a sense to be explained) by an abstraction principle, which introduces them via identity 
statements of the form 'the property of a in respect of D = the property of b in respect of D'. Further 
provisions have to be made for statements of the form 'the property of a in respect of D = F'. This issue – 
which parallels the Julius Caesar problem raised by Frege against the introduction of number via 'Hume's 
Principle' – is not difficult to resolve in the present context, but my point is that we are brought a rather 
long way from Rodriguez-Pereyra's target form 'a is F'. 
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object to have the property F? not as a question about how an otherwise qualitatively bare 
object should have F-ness conferred upon it, but rather, as the question of how it may have 
the property F that it shares with other objects. Thus, an answer to the A-problem - insofar 
as my position poses any A-question - will drop straight out of an answer to the B-question. 
Second, in light of this relationship between the A- and B- questions on my view, we may 
briefly relate the discussion of the present chapter to the fourfold conception of objects 
given in Chapter 1. The relationship is simple: the A- and B- questions are further features 
that may be added to my fourfold characterisation of objects. Objects have properties in 
common, in some sense, and moreover, where they do so, they each have the properties 
that they have in common.  101
2. The Abstraction of Determinate Properties 
With the chapter’s explananda in place, we turn to my proposed explanans. Section 2.1 
sets the scene, Section 2.2 presents the principle for property abstraction that is central to 
my account, and Section 2.3 discusses its intended interpretation.  
2.1 Preliminaries 
My claim is that determinate property structure is, at bottom, a resemblance structure. 
More specifically, it is a resemblance structure over tuples of objects and dimensions. 
While the core of my treatment of determinates is given by an abstraction principle, which 
I will present shortly, the motivation for my broader approach in terms of objects, 
dimensions, and resemblance may be presented in three points. 
  By ‘have in comnmon’ here, I obviously do not mean merely that objects are relata of relations. 101
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First, and most generally, there is a respectable tradition of treating qualitative sameness in 
terms of resemblance – of which the most prominent recent example is Rodriguez-
Pereyra's (2002) resemblance nominalism. This is especially so for ontological outlooks 
that treat objects as fundamental and qualitatively thick, and properties as derivative 
entities. As far as the problem of universals is concerned, my solution may be seen as an 
improved version of that view, as we will see (but see Chapter 6 which discusses the limits 
of this comparison).  
Second, dimensions and resemblance are integrally related. On one understanding of the 
relationship between them, dimensions are explained by resemblances between 
determinates. However, on my view, as I have discussed in Chapter 1, explanation runs the 
other way round: dimensions are not explained, but rather presupposed, by determinate-
level resemblances. 
Third, determinate properties plausibly give way, explanatorily, to objects that are 
determinate in character. The terms 'determinable' and 'determinate' do not – recall – stand 
as terms corresponding to ontological categories, but rather, stand for two sides of a 
distinction of relative status between adjectives: determinable-determinate structures are 
non-constructive. I have argued that highest determinables belong to an ontological class of 
their own – they stand for dimensions – and a similar point may be made about lowest 
determinates. So: which entities are maximally, or absolutely, determinate? One might 
think that they are properties – by which is usually meant type properties – but this default 
response cannot be based on the (rejected) assumption that that determinables and 
determinates simply are determinable and determinate properties. That properties should 
receive the status of absolute determinates – if indeed they should – cannot be simply read 
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off the determinable-determinate distinction itself. Indeed, given that highest determinable 
status is possessed by dimensions, which are – I claim – determined by objects – it would 
seem that absolute determinate status should be given not to type properties, but to either 
modes of objects (in Lowe’s sense), or to objects themselves.  
I will argue in Chapter 6 – when I consider rival theories – that modes should not be the 
bearers of absolute determinate status. To summarise: the reason has, roughly, the form of a 
dilemma: either modes are simply tropes, or not. If they are, then they fail to play the role 
of instances of determinables, in a sense to be explained in Chapter 6. If they are not, then 
it is unclear – so goes the argument – what sense is to be made of their being entities 
distinct from, and inhering in, objects in such a way as to confer upon those objects the 
'ways of being' that are associated with modes. Moreover, given commitment to objects 
and dimensions, type properties would merely be an unparsimonious additional 
commitment, supposing that commitment to them can be avoided (as I argue in the present 
chapter). My case against properties taking absolute determinate status thus involves a 
threefold case against tropes, modes, and type properties (universals).  
The view that I defend, then, is that objects are the ontological correlates of maximal 
determinates. Strictly speaking, what is absolutely determinate – as opposed to an absolute 
determinate – is an object's qualitative character (Johnson 1921:185)  What, then, is 102
meant by 'absolutely determinate'? It would seem, on my view, that how determinate 
something has to be to qualify as absolutely determinate is not necessarily – so to speak – 
 I use this term in a way that is not intended to incur commitment to reified qualitative characteristics. This 102
usage should run parallel to, for example, the use of 'phenomenal character' to describe an aspect of a 
representational state without thereby incurring commitment to qualia. What is the point of this 
regimentation? Really, it may just be uniformity: we may say, given the regimentation, than an object is 
determinate in respect of its qualitative character. 
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an absolute affair, but rather, hostage to the qualitative characters of such objects as there 
actually are. The point is made by Wittgenstein:  
It seems that you can go on giving more and more specific determinations or descriptions of  
the colour of an object. Need the process of more and more exact specification stop anywhere?  
In the similar case of more and more exact specification of the length of a rod, say, the process comes  
to an end when our instruments have given us as exact a specification as they can. (2017:75) 
We should, then, keep distinct two senses of ‘maximal determinate’. In one sense, maximal 
determinateness is maximal actual determinateness. Recall the point made by Mellor, 
raised briefly in Chapter 1, that a spinning pointer must have some width, so the direction 
in which it points will always have an interval value. In such a case, the interval-valued 
direction is maximally determinate in the sense of being as determinate as it gets: there is 
no sense in asking in what more determinate direction the pointer is pointing. In another 
sense, maximal determinateness is maximal determinateness in principle. Continuing with 
the pointer example, we may imagine imposing on the pointer a direction that is more 
determinate than the interval-valued direction that Mellor suggests. We might, for example, 
draw a line down the middle of the pointer and take its direction as the direction of the 
pointer. This, in turn, could be made yet more determinate by supposing that the pointer is 
perfectly symmetrical (so that such a line may be precisely drawn), and so on. There may 
be, in principle, no end to the idealisations that might drive such a pursuit of 
determinateness - but this is an idealised kind of maximal determinateness, not - in an 
ontological sense - the real thing. I will call these two kinds of maximal determinateness 
maximal determinateness in fact and maximal determinateness in principle.  
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2.2 The Principle PA 
My account of determinate structure relies on an abstraction principle not unlike Hume's 
Principle, which was discussed by Frege (1884), and rejected as a means for the 
introduction of number. Given a domain D, a binary relation R on D, and a term-forming 
operator T(x) for x ∈ D, an abstraction principle takes the form of an equivalence: 
(1) T(x) = T(y) ↔ x R y 
We will say that T(x) and T(y) are R-abstracts of x and y respectively. An abstraction 
principle thus states an equivalence between the R-relatedness of members of D, and 
whatever is expressed on the left hand side by 'T(x) = T(y)'. What is expressed by this is a 
matter of some controversy: it is not clear that the left hand side of the equivalence should 
be interpreted as expressing an identity between two further entities T(x) and T(y).  I will 103
discuss this issue later.  
Clearly, R is required to be an equivalence relation, because identity is an equivalence 
relation. Suppose, for example, that R were not transitive. Then for some x, some y and 
some z, Rxy, Ryz, and ~Rxz. Hence T(x) = T(y), and T(y) = T(z) (by the abstraction 
principle), from which follows that T(x) = T(z) (by the transitivity of identity). But then 
Rxz (by the abstraction principle again): contradiction. The 'proofs' for symmetry and 
reflexivity are equally straightforward.  
  Hence, while an abstraction principle might be interpretable as an identity criterion for the abstracts that it 103
introduces, this is not automatic. 
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A first pass at an abstraction principle for determinates might go as follows.  Given a 104
domain Do consisting of objects o1...om and a domain Dδ consisting of dimensions δ1...δn, a 
term-forming operator P(x) for x ∈ (Do × Dδ), and a binary relation R on members of (Do × 
Dδ), we may say: 
(2) P(x) = P(y) ↔ x R y 
I have given the principle in this form because it shares a form with our canonical 
abstraction principle, (1), above. The interpretation is straightforward enough. The product 
Do × Dδ is the set of pairs (x, y) where x is an object and y is a dimension. Read P(x) as the 
property of x. Finally, read R as exact resemblance.  Roughly, then, the principle (2) says 105
that pairs (o1, δ1) and (o2, δ1) pick out the same property if and only if they perfectly 
resemble (or more generally: pairs (o1, δ1) and (o2, δ2) pick out the same property just in 
case they perfectly resemble and δ1 = δ2).  
What we have so far is a principle which has a canonical form, and a halfway plausible 
interpretation. But our first-pass principle does not yet admit of an interpretation that is 
satisfactory from an ontological point of view, as I will presently argue. My claim will be 
that a better, second-pass principle may be offered which patches the problems with (2) 
above, but departs a little from our canonical form in doing so. I will argue, of course, that 
this change of form is not problematic.  
To see the problem, note that there is something odd with the notion of an ordered pair on 
 I offer a version of the abstraction principle here for dimensions determined by single entities – that is, for 104
monadic properties. The principle can be modified simply enough to apply to relations. 
  Exact, because R must be an equivalence relation, and inexact resemblance is not transitive. 105
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both sides of the equivalence. On the left – the side of the identity statement – it simply 
seems wrong to associate a property with an ordered object-dimension pair. Properties are 
of objects, and in respect of dimensions; this seems an appearance worth preserving. While 
the asymmetry of an ordered pair guarantees that the members of a pair cannot be simply 
permuted, the use of ordered pairs here does not indicate why this is so. Formally speaking, 
the problem is superficial: it may be resolved simply by finding the right interpretation of 
the left hand side, i.e. of 'P(o1, δ1) = P(o2, δ1)'; so long as the ordered pairs are understood 
under the right interpretation, we should not be misled. Nevertheless, a question remains 
whether ordered pairs are the best fit for the intended interpretation. 
A more pressing problem concerns the occurrence of pairs on the right hand side of the 
equivalence. The identity of P(o1, δ1) and P(o2, δ1) is said to rest on the exact resemblance 
between (o1, δ1) and (o2, δ1). But is this right? To be sure, both (o1, δ1) and (o2, δ1) are 
presumably the kinds of things that can resemble each other – they are, after all, both 
ordered pairs, and resemble in (for example) their having two members. But this is the 
wrong kind of resemblance, and our proposed principle fails to rule it out. Moreover, the 
abstraction principle requires exact resemblance, and it is plausible to hold that ordered 
pairs exactly resemble only if they are identical. So this sort of resemblance between pairs 
is hardly the sort of resemblance fit for work in the abstraction principle for determinates: 
it is at once both too weak, and too strong. What is intended on the right hand side of that 
principle is not a relationship of resemblance between ordered pairs, but rather a relation 
whose relata are the members of those pairs themselves. However one writes it in symbols, 
what is meant on the right hand side is, in regard to a certain object and a certain dimension 
on the one hand, and a certain object and the same dimension on the other, is that they (the 
first object and dimension) should exactly resemble them (the second object and the same 
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dimension). The relation R, in other words, should be taken as a two-place relation that is 
plural at both places, and indeed, collectively  so.   106 107
Such plural ascriptions of resemblance are tailored precisely to tolerate individual 
differences: the things a and b may collectively resemble the things c and d even if neither 
a nor b resembles c or d. The ascribed resemblance is between how a and b, and c and d, 
are together. For example, to say that C and G? collectively exactly resemble G and D?, 
for example, is not to say that either C or G? resembles either G or D? individually. It is to 
say – in a way that is not ontologically committal with respect to relations – that C and G? 
are related in a way that exactly resembles the way G and D? are related. We shall 
therefore take the expression 'wx R yz' to mean that w and x collectively, and y and z 
collectively, exactly resemble.   108
The point here – that we need a collective understanding of resemblance – is independently 
motivated by considerations concerning the logic of plurals. The thought – forcefully put 
  A plural predication 'the Fs are G' is distributive iff it is equivalent to 'each F is G', and collective 106
otherwise. 
  Besides getting the form of the resemblance relationship right, this way of understanding R also eases the 107
path from our present account to an account of relations, since it is easy to vary the number of entities 
collectively involved at each relation place. 
  It is hard to see, indeed, what difference the order of the object and dimension should make. There are 108
some cases of where order does matter: Abraham and Isaac, for example, collectively resemble Isaac and 
Jacob in that order and not in the reverse order. But this is because one might permute Abraham and 
Isaac, or Isaac and Jacob, within the relation x is the father of y, without committing any category error. 
By contrast, the determination that obtains between an object and a dimension is a formal, internal 
relationship: there is no corresponding sense, therefore, to thinking that one might 'permute' an object and 
a dimension within a determination relationship without thereby reversing the direction of the relationship 
too. Thus, while it does no harm, one might think that the use of ordered pairs on the right of the 
abstraction relationship actually supplies too much, since the order of the object and dimension should not 
matter. 
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by Oliver and Smiley (2001, 2013/2016) and Lewis (1991), is that collective plural 
predication is not in general reducible to singular predication on 'pluralities' or aggregates: 
given a collective statement 'the Fs are G', it is not legitimate in general to change the 
logical subject – as Oliver and Smiley put it – from a plural term the Fs to a singular term, 
the aggregate of Fs.  One might, then, think that the treatment of what ought to be a 109
collective resemblance relation as a binary relation between singular relata – ordered pairs 
– is therefore a one-off application of a singularist approach to plurals which cannot 
generalise, and which, hence, seems ad hoc for reasons quite apart from specific 
considerations concerning the abstraction of determinates.  
Drawing all this together, we may express the sought abstraction principle 'longhand' like 
this: the property of the object a in respect of the dimension δ is identical with the property 
of the object b in respect of δ if and only if a and δ on the one hand, and b and δ on the 
other, collectively exactly resemble. In symbols, we may make a second pass at property 
abstraction [PA]: 
(3) Pδn(x) = Pδn(y) ↔ xδn R yδn [PA] 
Here, read 'Pδn(x)' as the property of x in respect of δn, and read the right hand side as 
before (with underlined relata expressing collectivity). I have here eliminated ordered pairs 
from the left hand side in favour of indexing property terms to the dimensions in respect of 
  As I have put it, the reduction merely shifts collective plurality elsewhere since the aggregate in question 109
is an aggregate of Fs. But even without this issue, the singularist reductive strategy will not work. For 
suppose one holds that, in general, collective statements about Fs should be reduced to singular 
statements about F-aggregates. Then there will be some truth about all the aggregates, and hence, 
specifically, some truth about all the aggregates that are not aggregates of themselves. Such a collective 
truth could not be analysed along singularist lines, on pain of a Russellian contradiction. This argument is 
made in a more refined way by both Oliver and Smiley, and Lewis.
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which they are arrayed; the difference should not matter. 
R on the right hand side is now a binary relation  that is plural and collective at both 110
places. This replaces R in (2) which is singular and whose relata are ordered pairs. This 
means that PA, unlike (2) and our canonical form (1), no longer states an equivalence 
between the identity of abstracts and the R-relatedness of the very things whose abstracts 
are stated to be identical. While this constitutes a departure from the standard form of 
abstraction principles, it is no loss – indeed, as we will see in the next section, this is one 
feature that makes PA a better fit for our purposes than (2).  
2.3 Interpretation of PA: Further Details 
We have already discussed some issues of the interpretation of PA in the process of 
introducing that principle. In this section, I fill in some further details on that score. Section 
2.3.1 discusses objections to my account based on the factored structure of determination, 
while Section 2.3.2 adds some further details to the interpretation of PA. 
2.3.1 Factoring Objections 
In the context of PA, the relation R obtains between pluralities of objects and their related 
dimensions. Now, much in my account turns on the fact that the relationship between these 
objects and dimensions – the determination relationship – is an internal relationship. But 
one might object here with a dilemma. Either that relationship is internal, or not. If it is not, 
then it is a relation – in which case not only do I lose my whole ontology of objects and 
dimensions, but I also fail to offer a reductive account of properties (if relations are to 
count as polyadic properties). On the other hand, if it is internal, then the principle PA 
  I say 'relation' because that, formally, is what R is. Ontologically speaking, I treat R as a relationship 110
rather than a relation – but that distinction is alien here.
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would seem too weak to support the abstraction of determinate properties. For we may 
factor out two components involved in the relationship between an object and any of its 
associated dimensions: first, the relationship of determination – the object's determining 
that dimension at all – which is formal and internal, and second, the particular way in 
which the object determines the dimension, which is not a formal or internal relationship. 
The argument for this latter claim is straightforward: while an object may determine a 
given dimension essentially, it need not essentially determine that dimension in some 
particular way: a beard may essentially have some length, but it does not have any 
particular length essentially. Hence, that relation – the relation of the beard to the 
dimension length whereby it determines length in a particular way – is not internal, since 
both the beard and the dimension length could exist without the beard being that length. 
This is what I have called the ‘factored’ structure of determination, here turned against my 
view.  
If the above 'factoring' argument is correct, then I have a problem. For in that case, what is 
internal between objects and dimensions – the bare relationships of determination at-all – 
are too weak to support PA. For any combination of objects and dimensions will perfectly 
resemble any other pair, in the sense of 'resemble' that I have described, provided the 
objects in question determine those dimensions at all. So a merely collective approach to 
the R relation would not be enough: I would have to introduce explicit reference – and 
hence commitment – to a relation (the second 'factor' above) on each side of R. Thus, R 
would become merely a second-order relation or relationship – and it would be unclear 
how my account could still amount to a full explanation of determinate property 
possession. 
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The objection under consideration would seem to challenge my whole proposed account. 
But I reject it, because I reject the factoring argument. In particular, the factoring argument 
requires that that there be a certain kind of gap between an object's determining a 
dimension at all and its determining that dimension in some particular way – call these 
determination at all and determination somehow. While I admit that there is a distinction, I 
deny that it is a problematic sort of gap.  
One might initially be tempted to cast this response in modal terms: necessarily, if an 
object determines a dimension at all, then it determines that dimension somehow.  Thus, 111
there is no possibility of an object's determining a dimension at all but failing to determine 
it somehow: there is no modal gap of the appropriate sort between determination at all and 
determination somehow. While determination at all entails determination somehow in a 
non-rigid, nonspecific way, this is enough to rule out there being a relationship of bare 
determination – determination at all with determination-somehow, in some sense, 'factored 
out' – and so the factoring argument fails.  
But such a response only gets us partway. For the objector might respond that 
determination-somehow may necessarily accompany determination-at all without it 
following that the two relation(ship)s don't factor apart. Indeed, the objector's point seems 
to have a model in the following case. Let us admit, for argument's sake, a three-category 
ontology of objects, dimensions, and modes. Modes are conceived along Lowean lines as 
non-substantial, qualitative particulars inhering in objects – as ways that objects are. Let us 
also say that modes stand in a formal relationship of instantiation  to the dimensions that 112
  Wilson (2013) denies this in the case of the open future. However, I will set this complication aside here. 111
  This term is definitely not used in a Lowean way here, but I just need a word.112
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they fall under. Now, objects may be rigidly existentially dependent on dimensions and 
also non-rigidly existentially dependent on the modes that characterise them.  In the 113
resulting 'ontological triangle', we may identify determination-at all with the direct 
relationship of determination between objects and dimensions, and determination-somehow 
with the resultant of characterisation (from objects to modes) and instantiation (from 
modes to dimensions).  On such a model, determination-at all remains distinct from 114
determination-somehow – they are different formal relationships – even though there is no 
modal gap between them. 
The initial objection might be averted, then, if I were able to admit a further category of 
modes into my ontology. But to do so would entirely diminish the explanatory work left for 
a category of dimensions, and would diminish our reasons for believing in dimensions 
accordingly. In pursuit of a better alternative, it is worth staying with the mooted three-
category ontology a little longer. Consider again the objector's claim that determination-
somehow may be identified with the resultant of characterisation and instantiation: for an 
object determine a dimension somehow is for it to be characterised by a mode which 
instantiates that dimension. The objector's argument relies on there being such a model 
which factors apart determination-at all from determination-somehow – but we may reply 
here that the model itself is vulnerable to the very same factoring problem! For if 
determination admits of factoring into at-all and somehow components, why should the 
instantiation relationship in our mooted threefold model not also admit of the same 
factored structure? Consider: a mode – some way of being – falls under a dimension at all, 
but it also does so in a particular way.  
  I borrow the term 'characterise' straight from Lowe (2006). Whether it is, in some ultimate sense, correct, 113
is not relevant here. 
  The idea here is meant to parallel Lowe's (2006) treatment of exemplification.114
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It seems, then, that factoring cannot be averted by positing modes. But our objector may 
now take a different stance. Rather than arguing that that determination-somehow is a 
relation rather than a formal relationship because it is separable from determination at-all, 
at least in the case of objects, our objector might argue instead that it must be a relation 
rather than a relationship because it is susceptible to change. The point is that even if 
objects and modes should both stand in factored relationships under dimensions, objects 
can change their relationships of determination-somehow whereas modes cannot. Thus, a 
mode - in virtue of its being the very mode that it is - can only determine its associated 
dimension in a specific way, while an object may determine a dimension in different ways 
over time. This means - so the objector argues - that relationships of determination-
somehow do not supervene on the mere existence of their relata in the case of objects: an 
object and dimension may exist, and be such that the object determines that dimension at-
all, without it being fixed how. Hence, determination-somehow cannot be an internal 
relationship: it must, instead, be a relation. The objector may point out, furthermore, that 
modes are not susceptible to the same problem: the existence of a mode and its associated 
dimension does suffice to fix how the mode determines the dimension.  
In responding to this further objection, we may begin by noting that resemblance is often 
taken to be an internal relationship, not only where identity is concerned - for example, 
where tropes are said to resemble in virtue of their identities, and objects are said to 
resemble (on universalist ontologies) in virtue of the identities of the universals that they 
instantiate. Of course, this should not be so if by ‘internal relationship’ we mean a 
relationship that is fixed by the mere existence of its relata (that is, an internal relation in 
Moore’s (1919:47) sense). But there are other senses of ‘internal’ available. In particular, 
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dimensionism may avail itself of Armstrong’s (1978b:84-5; 1997:87-9) sense of ‘internal’, 
according to which a relationship is internal just in case its holding between its relata is 
fixed by the intrinsic natures of its relata. It is this sense of resemblance that is needed to 
make resemblance-based ontologies of properties go.  115
It would be extremely odd, then, for dimensionism to claim that resemblance is internal in 
Armstrong’s sense, but that determination-somehow is internal in Moore’s sense. The 
dimensionist ought to hold, instead, that both determination-somehow and resemblance are 
internal in Armstrong’s sense.  We can further motivate this move by considering what 116
dimensionism is claiming in the first place. I have said that objects are understood as 
qualitatively thick, and that they have their determination profiles essentially. We should 
expect, therefore, that determination at-all should be a Moorean internal relationship, and 
determination-somehow (as well as its cousin, resemblance) an Armstrongian one. With 
this core of a response in place, the dimensionist may then admit, without incoherence, that 
the intrinsic natures of objects undergo change over time, and that for this reason, an 
object’s relationships of determination-somehow and resemblance will change accordingly. 
Change will not, obviously, be analysed in terms of an object’s changing relations to 
properties, whether modes, tropes, or universals, or in terms of changes in which tropes or 
modes exist - but a further argument would be needed from our objector to show that 
change should be treated in this way (I will assume, here and in Chapter 5, that it need not 
be). 
  The same is true of Rodriguez-Pereyra’s resemblance nominalism. For suppose that resemblance were an 115
external relation. Then an object’s resembling other objects would itself need a further explanation 
beyond the intrinsic natures of those objects, and it is hard to see how such an explanation should not 
undercut resemblance nominalism’s account of property possession.
  By contrast, determination at-all is intrinsic in Moore’s sense. Thus, the proposed response here supplies a 116
further way to distinguish determination at-all from determination-somehow. 
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I have argued that the factored structure of determination can be turned into a problem for 
dimensionism only if dimensionism is committed to Moorean internality for determination-
somehow where it ought to, and can, be committed to Armstrongian internality instead. 
Our discussion of objections from factoring has resulted, then, in a clarification of the 
kinds of internal relationship to which dimensionism is committed. Indeed, as I argue at 
various points in this thesis, given proper commitments on this score, the factored structure 
of determination is a strength, not a weakness, of a dimensionist ontology. 
2.3.2 Further Details 
We now set aside our discussion of the factoring objection, and return to the interpretation 
of PA. Recall the principle:  
Pδn(x) = Pδn(y) ↔ xδn R yδn     [PA] 
A great deal of discussion of abstraction principles has focused on the epistemic, semantic, 
cognitive, and ontological commitments that are incurred in moving from the right hand 
side to the left of the biconditional.  The status and reputation of abstraction principles as 117
problematic arise, in large part, from the fact that these discussions occur for the most part 
in contexts where abstraction principles are put to use as means for introducing – 
ontologically, semantically, cognitively, or epistemically – the abstracts that are involved in 
the identity statements on the left hand side.  In the present context, however, the ulterior 118
  See e.g. Wright (1983), Fine (1998), Hale and Wright (2001, 2009), Heck (2011), and Ebert and Rossberg 117
(2016) for a sample of these discussions. 
  The special (and prominent) case of Hume's Principle in the neo-Fregean programme is, of course, even 118
more demanding.
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demands on PA are much less burdensome. I am not relying on PA to provide cognitive 
access to determinate properties Platonistically - or at any rate, transcendently - conceived, 
or to provide semantic or ontological machinery for the construction or generation of such 
properties (whatever that might mean). Instead, my use of PA serves the purposes of 
nominalism about determinate properties: the principle is intended to explain determinate 
properties away. More precisely, it is intended to explain statements of the form on the left 
– containing terms that purport to refer to determinate properties – in terms of statements 
of the form on the right, which don't – in such a way that no such referential commitments 
are incurred.  The sort of nominalism that I have in mind, then, is not a view which holds 119
that determinate properties are in some sense non-fundamental or derivative: there simply 
aren't any.  Determinate predicates turn out, in Russell's (1918) sense, to be incomplete 120
symbols – symbols which are analysed away and do not appear in an ontologically 
perspicuous (as Sider would say: joint-carving) language.  121
Finally, before moving on, recall from the previous section that according to PA, the 
abstracts occurring on the left hand side are not abstracts of the very same things that stand 
R-related on the right hand side of the equivalence. I said there that this counted in favour 
of PA. The reason is that it captures the explanatory role played by external denomination 
  I want to remain silent on the question of whether the two sides of the equivalence have the same truth 119
conditions. This question seems to involve certain complications – for example, over whether the 
statements on the left should be properly regarded as true – which it is not necessary to enter into here. 
  I make this choice for the sake of definiteness. Nothing much will turn on it: as far as the rest of the thesis 120
goes, it will be perfectly fine to say that determinate properties exist and are derivative entities. It might 
take some care to express such a view properly, in light of the framework that I will adumbrate in Chapter 
7. However, I am not at all against taking existence questions lightly in this sort of context, along the lines 
suggested by Schaffer (2009). 
  It is a little strange, given my nominalist intentions, to call PA an abstraction principle, or to call 121
determinate property terms (as they appear in PA) abstracts – one might after all protest that they are not 
being abstracted at all, but concretized away! Nevertheless, 'abstraction' is the term that I will stick with.
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– in the sense of Cowling (2014) – in my account. To see what this means, consider again 
the notion of a thick entity. My view has the following in common with Cowling's (2014) 
locationism, and ontologies based on certain conceptions of facts (as I explain in a later 
chapter): it supports a conception on which thick entities are compositionally simple but 
qualitatively complex. This means, in particular, that determinate properties – the abstracts 
introduced by PA – should not be components of the objects whose abstracts they are. 
According to PA, this condition is satisfied – and its satisfaction is secured by the fact that 
the relation R in terms of which identity is given for property abstracts relates more than 
just the objects whose abstracts they are. More intuitively, this means that the qualitative 
complexity of an object is not a matter of its having internal qualitative components – it 
has none – but is conferred upon it externally in virtue of its relationships of resemblance 
and determination-somehow. (This is not to say that the resulting view that I defend is 
either a relational or a constituent ontology. It is not a constituent ontology, because 
determinate properties are not constituents of objects. It is not a relational ontology, 
because PA offers no account of the relational conferral of qualitative profiles upon bare 
particulars: it offers only a relational account of how an object possesses a property  that 122
it shares with other objects.) On Cowling's view, the same result is achieved through the 
notion of location in property space; on fact ontologies it is achieved by rather diverse 
means (Armstrong 1997, for example, appeals to non-mereological composition). I will 
  Strictly speaking, since I am taking properties not to exist, I should say that it offers an account of what 122
underlies our truly saying that an object has a property. 
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argue in later chapters that none of these views is satisfactory.  123
3. Caesar?  
Frege famously got himself into troublesome cahoots with extensions and value-ranges as 
a result of rejecting Hume's Principle as a basic abstraction principle through which to 
introduce the notion of number, and hence, upon which to base his logicist programme. 
Here is Hume's Principle: 
#F = #G ↔ F ≈ G      [HP] 
Here read F and G as concept expressions, and # as a term-forming operator which takes a 
concept term to form an expression – such as #F – whose intended interpretation is 'the 
cardinal number of Fs'.  The relation ≈ expresses one-to-one correspondence. Thus, HP 124
says – under the intended interpretation – that the number of Fs is identical with the 
number of Gs if and only if the concepts F and G are equinumerous – that is, if and only if 
the objects falling under the concept F correspond one-to-one with those falling under the 
concept G. This principle was rejected by Frege, not so much because it was false, as 
because – he thought – it was inadequate to play the theoretical role that he needed it for. 
For while HP equips us to deal with number terms so long as they occur in the form #F, 
  Note, too, that external-denomination views are fruitfully dissimilar from amorphous-blob views. On an 123
external denomination view of determinate properties, objects – whose abstracts determinate properties 
are – are indeed blobs, in a compositional sense – but they are not thereby amorphous. External-
denomination views do not hold, either – unlike amorphous-blob views – that blobs receive their structure 
from an imposition of some language or conceptual scheme. We may say, then, that I conceive of objects 
as morphous blobs. (This gets us, I suggest, out of the way of worries raised by e.g. MacBride (2016) over 
amorphous blobs). The opposing intuition, that any blob must be amorphous – is closely tied to the 
factoring objection discussed above. 
  As various commentators point out, it is doubtful whether it HP manages to successfully pick out that 124
intended interpretation.
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#G, and so on, the principle says nothing of number terms that have simply the form N – 
that is, numerals. Thus, while we are in fact able to judge the truth-values of such 
statements as: 
#(sharps in the key of A) = 3,  and 
#(sharps in the key of A) = Julius Caesar, 
it is in no way thanks to HP that we are able to make such judgments (Heck 2011). It is a 
matter of some controversy (again) exactly why this problem rendered HP unfit for service 
in Frege's logicist programme. For our purposes, though, this does not matter: we are 
concerned to see whether any analog of the Caesar problem arises for the principle PA as I 
am using it here.  
PA, recall, allows us to deal with occurrences of property terms when they appear in 
identity claims in the form Pδn(x) = Pδn(y). Thus, for example, the following is fine: 
PCOLOUR(Sunset) = PCOLOUR(Postbox) ↔ Colour/Sunset R Colour/Postbox 
The question of whether there is a 'Julius Caesar' problem here is the question of whether 
we can make sense, on the basis of PA, of statements of the following form:  
PCOLOUR(Sunset) = F,   specifically: 
PCOLOUR(Sunset) = Red,  and   
PCOLOUR(Sunset) = Julius Caesar.          
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The short answer here is 'no'. A longer answer, however, is 'no, but it does not matter'. 
Consider the statement PCOLOUR(Sunset) = Red. This is true, and we know it  – again, no 125
thanks to PA. The difference, though, is context: in our case it does not matter. For both 
HP and PA may be helped around their respective Caesar problems by supplementation 
with a background understanding that is, broadly speaking, ontological. In the case of HP, 
what is needed is a background understanding of what numbers are (Heck 2011); in the 
context of Frege's logicist project, this is (supposedly) sufficient reason to reject HP as 
unfit for purpose. In the case of PA, we may take it that if PA needed supplementing with a 
background understanding of what properties are, then PA would likewise be unfit for the 
purpose of explaining what properties are (or rather: what property statements mean). 
Fortunately, though, it is not so. We can get away with supplementing PA with something 
weaker: a background understanding of the determination dimensions of determinate 
property terms, or concepts.  
Consider again the statement 'PCOLOUR(Sunset) = Red'. It is a problem, but not a problem 
for PA, if the term 'red' occurs here uninterpreted.  For 'red' to occur interpreted, 126
however, is for it to be associated in this occurrence with a range of assignments that it can 
take. To understand an interpreted occurrence of 'red' is, to use Geach's (1980) distinction, 
to understand what it is occurring as a term for (as opposed to of). In this case, we are 
interested in whether 'red' occurs as a term for a colour. And what it is for 'red' to occur as 
a term for a colour is just for the determination dimensions of 'red' to be the dimensions 
along which the dimension colour varies. Now, knowing whether an occurrence of 'red' is 
  Likewise: 'PCOLOUR(Sunset) = Julius Caesar' is false and we know it.125
  By 'uninterpreted' here I do not mean to suppose that the sentence has not been assigned some particular 126
interpretation function, i.e. an assignment of values from the domain of discourse to the terms of the 
sentence. Rather, I mean to suppose that the sentence – or the term 'Red' in particular as it occurs in the 
sentence – has not been associated with a range of such functions, i.e. the assignments that it could take.  
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associated with the right determination dimensions is not a matter of grasping or 
understanding the nature of anything, but rather, simply a matter of grasping its use on an 
occasion.  Given such a grasp, what is required by way of background understanding is 127
simply an understanding of the dimensions of variation of the dimension in question – not 
an antecedent understanding of the nature of determinate properties.  The Julius Caesar 128
problem, then, does not directly transfer from HP to PA.  129
4. Mid-Level Determinates 
I have set out, interpreted, and defended PA as the core of an account of determinate 
structure. It remains to apply the account. To apply the account, here, means to eliminate 
reference to determinate properties by supplying corresponding instances of PA.  In the 130
canonical case, we may eliminate statements of the form Pδn(x) = Pδn(y) in favour of 
statements of the form xδn R yδn. For example, intuitively, we eliminate the sunset and the 
postbox are the same colour in favour of the sunset and the postbox exactly resemble in 
respect of colour.  
  How is this to be realized empirically and concretely? Gärdenfors (2000) offers a detailed overview of 127
one promising kind of answer. 
  I leave open the question of whether such an answer is available on behalf of HP too.128
  It does not follow, of course, that the spirit of the Caesar problem does not transfer from HP to PA. In 129
particular, one might think that statements involving determinate colour terms that are not of the form 
PCOLOUR(Sunset) = PCOLOUR(Postbox) need not be of the form PCOLOUR(Sunset) = F, either. This will be 
the case if one admits higher-order properties – that is, properties of properties – so that determinate 
properties may be bearers of properties and hence, subjects of predication. We would have, then, besides 
statements of the form PCOLOUR(Sunset) = F, also statements of the form F[PCOLOUR(Sunset)] not covered 
by PA. In that case, PA would need supplementing with some further reductive principles. But the issue 
here is piecemeal, and hostage to a decision about which putative higher-level properties one should be 
salvaging in the first place. I am sceptical that there are any such cases. The two paradigm cases – 
examples of which are 'red is a colour' and '...is a current British prime minister has exactly one instance' 
both receive natural treatments on my view that do not seem to disturb the explanatory role of PA. 
  To reiterate: I am reading PA 'left-to-right', and therefore stay clear of all the problems associated with 130
reading it 'right-to-left'. 
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Cases of the form Pδn(x) = F may be treated as derivative from the canonical case. Given 
the class C of all the things y such that xδn R yδn, we may treat a statement of the form 
Pδn(x) = F as saying that xδn R yδn for some arbitrary value(s) of y ∈ C. The predicate F is 
thus useful for picking out the class C where it does not matter – or where there is 
divergence over – which members of C serve as the value(s) of y in a particular occurrence 
of Pδn(x) = Pδn(y), but it introduces nothing new to our ontology.  
Our account so far has dealt with determinates on three assumptions. Here are two of them. 
First, I have dealt only with maximal, or lowest, determinates. Second, I have assumed, 
tacitly, that - in the terms introduced at the end of Section 2.1 - the qualitative characters of 
objects are not only actually maximally determinate but also maximally determinate in 
principle. Both of these assumptions might be plausibly rejected. I have already mentioned 
some reasons given by Mellor (2000), and Wilson (2012), for doubting the first 
assumption. Moreover, these reasons carry over for doubting the second assumption too. It 
is therefore necessary to extend the account given above to cover determinate properties 
that are mid-level determinates in the sense of their not being maximally determinate in 
principle, and also to cover properties that are mid-level determinates in the sense of their 
not being maximally determinate in fact.  
The third assumption I have made is that resemblance is always perfect or exact 
resemblance. This was, as noted, in part simply a constraint imposed by my use of PA, 
since R is required to be an equivalence relation and imperfect resemblance is not 
transitive. In part, however, it is also motivated by the thought that perfect resemblance is a 
more tractable notion than imperfect resemblance from an ontological point of view. So, in 
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any case, I will assume. In what follows, then, this third assumption – that resemblance is 
perfect resemblance – will continue to stand as a constraint on what may pass as an 
acceptable amendment to PA. The remainder of this chapter will be concerned to sketch 
how such an amendment might go. My aim will not be to develop the extended account in 
detail, but rather, to summarise the trajectory of the approach.  131
My proposed revision to PA concerns the notion of perfect resemblance expressed by R. 
Initially, we may point out that while the intended interpretation for R must be perfect 
resemblance, this does not settle the question of how, in the world, relationships of perfect 
resemblance are realised. We are, then, seeking an understanding of perfect resemblance 
that plays three roles: (1) it must be fit for the purpose of offering a version of PA that 
deals with mid-level determinables, (2) it must show how the relation R remains an 
internal relation, and (3) it must offer some explanatory account of apparent relations of 
imperfect resemblance. It will turn out - obviously - that the amended interpretation of R 
expresses perfect resemblance only in an extended, metaphorical sense, but this is no 
problem for the proposed account. 
Let me begin with Mellor’s thought that a spinning pointer must have some positive width, 
and hence, must point in a direction that has a positive interval value. These claims carry 
with them a notion of grain, or minimal discernible difference: that is, so to speak, the gap 
between maximal determinateness in fact and maximal determinateness in principle. Let 
me say - as a rough way to capture this notion - that where maximal determinates in fact 
are mid-level determinates in principle, the in-fact maximal determinates span a positive 
interval relative to the in-principle maximal determinates. The determination of the value 
  I will leave it an open question how, and two what extent, my proposal here is related to the more 131
developed views of Funkhouser (2006, 2014) and Gärdenfors (2000, 2014). 
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of such intervals will not concern us here: let us call any such interval value simply I.  
Continuing on the assumption that maximal determinates in fact are mid-level determinates 
in principle, I will assume that the notion of perfect resemblance that I have used up to this 
point suffices only for an account of in-principle maximal determinates. I will now aim to 
define a further relation, R*, that is able to stand in place of R in an amended version of 
PA, which will supply an account of in-principle mid-level determinates.  
I have introduced I as an arbitrary term for an in-principle interval spanned by in-fact 
maximal determinates. I understand the notion of an interval here in terms of Armstrong’s 
(1978b:122) notion of partial identity, already introduced briefly in Chapter 1. Given the 
notion of an interval, I will say that two in-principle maximal determinates are I-related 
just in case they are both spanned by a single interval of value I. Put intuitively in terms of 
spaces, to be I-related is to be no further than the distance I apart in the relevant quality 
space.  
Plainly, I-relatedness is not fit, as it stands, to be a surrogate for R: a good surrogate for R 
must be an equivalence relation, and I-relatedness is not transitive. To get a surrogate R* 
for R from I-relatedness, we must find an appropriate equivalence relation that is defined 
in terms of I-relatedness.  
Note that I-relatedness is, in a way, perfectly well suited to explain the pairwise sharing of 
in-principle mid-level determinates: transitivity only becomes a problem when further 
entities are introduced (or when pairwise property-sharing entities are supposed to share 
those properties with each other). This observation suggests an obvious way to build on I-
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relatedness: we may say that some things - plural and collective - are R*-related just in 
case every pair of things among them is I-related. Since I-relatedness is symmetric and 
reflexive, it is trivial to prove that the relation R* will be an equivalence relation.  132
My proposal, then, is that an amended version of PA may be posited in which the relation 
R*, understood as outlined here, stands in for R. Since I am aiming here only to sketch an 
outline of this extended account, I will not pursue its details further.   
  
  
  The easy availability of such a proof leaves no room to wonder whether my argument here is open to any 132
objection analogous to the problem of imperfect community that I will discuss in Chapter 6 in relation to 
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s resemblance nominalism. Indeed, my invocation of pairwise I-relations here bears 
only a superficial resemblance to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s use of pairs. For the problem in Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s case concerns the invalidity of inferring, from the premise that for all x and all y, there is some z 
that x and y share the conclusion that there is some z such that for all x and all y, x and y share z: the issue 
is one of quantifier scope. In my case, by contrast, no such issue is afoot. 
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Chapter 4 - Facts, Instantiation, and Predication  
0. Intro  
Having set out my dimensionist ontology in Chapter 1, I have gone on to discuss its 
application to determinable-determinate structure (Chapter 2) and properties (Chapter 3). I 
have given a dimensionist treatment of properties on which properties are either derivative 
entities or nonexistent. Since I do not treat property structure as fundamental, my proposed 
view does not include any fundamental formal relationship of instantiation, the 
relationship that characterises the ontological form of objects and properties. Why, then, a 
chapter on instantiation structure? 
Let me offer three answers. First, other ontologies do feature instantiation in a fundamental 
role. Instantiation structure - as I will later explain - may occupy an explanandum role, 
even for an ontology that does not treat instantiation structure as belonging to any 
explanans structure. Second, as I have mentioned, my view is flexible on the question of 
whether properties are nonexistent, or existent but derivative. One could, then, understand 
the present chapter as offering a treatment of what instantiation structure is if it is real but 
derivative. Even if one were to think, for more principled reasons than my pursuit of 
simplicity, that properties do not exist, the availability of such an account would make 
dimensionism more flexible in a desirable way. Third, one may understand the discussion 
of this chapter as centred around the structures that predication introduces as explananda, 
and thus remain noncommittal about instantiation. These themes will be expanded upon as 
the chapter’s discussion develops.  
The main rival position, over which dimensionism will be argued to improve in this 
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chapter, is factalism.  I begin by searching out some sense of unity from the literature on 133
facts. Section 1 surveys a range of ways in which facts have been conceived, focusing on 
specific ontologies of facts and choice points facing any ontology of facts. It will be seen 
that while such approaches may impose greater clarity upon discussions of facts, they do 
not draw out much greater unity. Section 2 draws things together. I relate what I will call 
the problems of instantiation and predication structure to the literature on facts. Sections 3 
and 4 argue, drawing on previous chapters, that the target explanandum structures under 
discussion are are ternary determination structures, not binary instantiation structures. 
Finally, Section 5 sums up the explanatory light that my proposed ontology sheds on facts 
and fact ontologies. I will suggest that dimensionism should be preferred over factalism, 
but that it also preserves the best elements of the factalist view.  
1. Conceptions of Facts: A Survey 
'Fact' is a wretch of metaphysical nomenclature. Philosophical discussions embark from a 
currency of platitudes about what facts are, developing them into conceptions that are 
alarmingly conflicted. Facts are said to be, inter alia: things, not things, things that exist 
but do not obtain, things that obtain but do not exist, truths, truthmakers, concrete, abstract, 
complex, simple, combinations, combinings, proposition-like, substance-like, mode- like, 
trope-like, chain-like, composed by their constituents, and abstracted into their 
constituents. To be of any use, the notion of a fact must be demarcated in a principled way: 
an account is needed of how facts may legitimately be conceived. It is, I suggest, not 
possible to construct a general conception of facts by looking for common factors between 
  Factalism shares with dimensionism a rejection of conferral approaches to quality. I will say more about 133
this in the main body of the chapter. 
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theories of facts. We consider a range of theories to show this.  (The range of views 134
considered is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.) 
One common conception of facts (implicit, for example, in Dummett 2006) is as the 
referents of terms of the form: the fact that p. Here the fact that p consists of a 
propositional term p, and the operator the fact that... which takes p as an argument and 
yields a term – the fact that p – which purports to refer to a fact. The problem is that a 
term's merely purporting to refer to a fact settles neither what it is that is purportedly being 
referred to, nor whether the term succeeds in referring to it. For one thing, the term-former 
is not associated with any existence condition for facts. It will not do to merely stipulate 
that 'the fact that p' successfully refers whenever p is true, since such a claim will either 
yield a vacuous notion of a fact, or will be severely hostage to metaphysical fortune (even 
cases of successful references will be 'flukes', as far as the conception of facts is 
concerned). 
The term-former does not supply much of a criterion of identity for facts, either.  This is 135
not, to be sure, because no identity criterion might be supplied. Lowe, for example, 
 Since I am concerned only with conceptions of facts as they appear in fact ontologies – by which, for 134
now, I mean ontological theories in which facts play some fundamental explanatory role (this will be 
clarified later) – I am ruling out certain senses of 'fact' from the start as irrelevant. For example, I will not 
be discussing the idea (see e.g. Austin 1950) that facts are simply truths. I will not discuss, either, 
conceptions of facts as contents of judgments – what was sometimes meant by sachverhalte in a certain 
pre-analytic tradition – except insofar as such views might overlap with conceptions of facts as states of 
affairs understood as I discuss later. A further, obviously irrelevant conception is the epistemic conception 
of facts as known or established truths. 
 I offer some focused discussion here on identity conditions because I do not think that the general 135
impression – that identity criteria for facts are deeply and indefensibly problematic – is entirely fair. I do 
not aim to show here that they are a straightforward matter – only that they are more defensible than their 
reputation might suggest. 
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suggests the following criterion: the fact that P = the fact that Q iff necessarily: P iff Q. 
Now, Lowe argues that such a criterion is unsatisfactory.  For, as he points out 136
(1998:239), the right hand side of the first biconditional is true when a contradiction is 
substituted for P and Q: necessarily, (Fb & ¬Fb) iff (Fb & ¬Fb). Since the right hand side 
is true, the left must also be: the fact that P = the fact that Q. In this case, the fact that (Fb 
& ¬Fb) = the fact that (Fb & ¬Fb). This would be right, except that x = y only if x and y 
exist. So it follows that the fact that (Fb & ¬Fb) exists: reductio.  
But Lowe's argument can be resisted. Lowe's reductio here draws on the assumption that 
identity entails existence. He acknowledges that this assumption fails in free logics, but the 
argument may be resisted without resorting to such moves. For given that identity entails 
existence, we can – and should – exclude instances such as Lowe's reductio by amending 
our identity criterion to say: if the fact that P exists and the fact that Q exists, then the fact 
that P = the fact that Q iff necessarily, P iff Q. This cuts out cases where contradictions are 
substituted for P and Q on the right side of the biconditional, since such cases will not pass 
the new antecedent of our criterion in the first place. Moreover, the amendment is not ad 
hoc – for given that identity entails existence, we should, in any case, wish to provide 
identity conditions for facts only when they exist.  I suggest then, that one can resist 137
Lowe's argument at this point.  
So, the problem with the fact-that term-former, vis a vis fact identity, is not so much that no 
accompanying criterion for identity can be given – but rather, that the term-former does not 
 This is, of course, also the territory of the infamous 'slingshot' argument. Neale (2001) sets out, with great 136
clarity, both the problem that the argument poses, and the conditions that any conception of facts must 
satisfy in order not to be susceptible to it. 
 With the exception of conceptions of facts as states of affairs, as I explain shortly.137
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introduce, but rather presupposes, a prior understanding of what facts are – including a 
prior  understanding of their identity criteria.  
A close relation of propositional conceptions of facts is the family of conceptions on which 
facts are modelled on situations. Such conceptions are marked out by the thought that facts 
exist whether or not they obtain. Turner (2016) leaves open the option of such a view, 
which has close structural affinities with Cowling's (2014) absolute conception of location 
space. Here I merely note that the view exists, and reserve the term state of affairs for facts 
conceived this way.  
Closely related to the views above is a family of views according to which facts are 
worldly correlates of thoughts, truths, sentences, or assertions.  Russell (1918) holds a 138
representative version of this view: facts are the things in the world that are meant by 
whole sentences, just as objects are the things in the world that are meant by individual 
terms.  Russell's view relies on a great deal of metaphysics in the background: just as 139
before, it is no trivial matter to set out the conditions under which whole sentences succeed 
in meaning anything at all. Moreover, the sense in which Russell's facts  are correlates of 140
anything is a semantic one. This is by no means the only kind of correlate conception of 
facts in play, however. For example, one might instead understand 'correlate' in terms of 
 It is worth stressing this both ways: not just worldly correlates, but worldly correlates. It is possible to 138
hold, on a correlate view, that necessary truths – at least, necessary truths of a certain sort, such as 2+2=4 
– have no corresponding facts. Whether this is because they have no truthmakers (and facts are essentially 
truthmakers), or for some other reason, is optional. 
 Note that, strictly speaking, on Russell's view it is not possible to refer to facts, since referring is how 139
individual terms mean, and facts are the things that are meant by sentences. Others have, of course, held 
that it is possible to refer to facts – see e.g. Fine 1982 – though it is far from clear whether this 
discrepancy is more than merely verbal. 
 I restrict my focus here to Russell's views in the Logical Atomism lectures.140
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truthmaking, as has been widely suggested.  Here it becomes hard to draw a clear, 141
substantive line between facts and other notions that are not introduced as conceptions of 
facts, but which are nonetheless similar - Lewis’s (2003) things-qua, for example.  142
Correlate conceptions of facts go hand in hand with the idea that facts are proposition-like 
entities: they are, after all, conceived to be worldly correlates either of propositions, or of 
other proposition-like things (or actions, such as assertions). According to some views, part 
of what it is for a fact to be proposition-like is for it to have constituents that correspond to 
the constituents of propositions.   143
(Facts may have constituents whilst being themselves either simple or complex. What 
brings together the present family of conceptions of facts is their concern, one way or 
another, with the combining of fact constituents.) 
 Lowe (1998:245) has suggested that a truthmaking conception of facts need not supply distinctive identity 141
criteria for a category of facts. This is because facts – conceived functionally as the kinds of entities that 
are truthmakers for at least atomic truths – may turn out to be a species falling under some broader and 
more fundamental category of being. Lowe's suggestion is that facts, on such a view, may be understood 
as ways that the world is, standing to the world as ordinary modes stand to objects. A similar point is 
made by Sommers (1993). 
 Indeed, once one drops the assumption that facts must be referred to by means of the fact-that term-142
former, the line becomes very hard to draw. Consider, for example, the following putative fact: the fact 
that Bertie is bespectacled. It is well within the customs of the literature on facts to refer to this fact by 
other expressions – such as Bertie's being bespectacled, and that Bertie is bespectacled. It is a very short 
hop from here to the further thought that one might also get at the same fact using the expression 
bespectacled Bertie, or indeed, Bertie qua bespectacled. If the latter expressions could not even purport to 
refer to facts, then it is a task for metaphysics to show why. 
 But one can also hold that facts are truthmakers, or correlates of propositions, without thinking this. 143
Turner (2016), for example, offers a view on which facts get their 'constituent' structure through external, 
quasi-geometric relationships with each other, and on which correlation is understood in terms of these 
relationships and a certain translation function. What sets Turner's view apart is his insistence that facts 
are utterly structureless, so that fact 'constituents' cannot even be conceived as abstractions on some non-
mereological internal structure of facts. 
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One might think that facts combine their constituents by being themselves complex.  An 144
early version of this view is at work in Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment.  145
The Tractarian Wittgenstein arguably also held a complex view of facts.  In more recent 146
times, Westerhoff (2005) has defended a conception of facts as complexes. Armstrong 
(1997) has also defended a conception of facts  as non-mereologically composed of their 147
constituents (precisely what non-mereological composition is is unclear, but I am taking 
facts on such a view to be non-mereological complexes – whatever that means).  
Here, too, challenges have been raised against the cogency of identity criteria for facts. 
Suppose that facts are indeed complexes. Then Lowe (1998:239)  moots the following 148
representative identity criterion: if x and y are facts, then x = y iff x and y contain the same 
constituents structured in the same way. Now Lowe argues by reductio: Suppose it is an 
 One might wish to distinguish here between facts being combinations of their constituents, and their being 144
composed of their constituents. 
 According to that theory, judgments are not relations to propositions, but 'multiple relations' between 145
subjects and the constituents of propositions judged. Hence Russell believes that Wittgenstein loves logic 
is a relation – on one version of the theory – between Russell, and the sundry complex Wittgenstein, logic, 
love, and xRy. Add to the multiple relation theory a correspondence theory of truth: for a judgment to be 
true is for a complex (a fact) to exist corresponding structurally to the complex judged. (This structural 
correspondence was a further guarantee of propositionlikeness, since facts had to structurally parallel 
what could be judged – i.e. propositions.) For details, see Bostock (2012).  
 TLP 2.03: 'In the atomic fact, objects hang in one another, like the links of a chain.' Wittgenstein does not 146
say very much about what this 'hanging' amounts to. This is a little problematic, as Ramsey (1925) 
famously pointed out. We will come to this later in the chapter, when we discuss instantiation structure. 
 I am regimenting my terms. Armstrong talks about states of affairs, but I am using fact. It should make no 147
difference. In my usage, state of affairs is reserved for the kind of thing that either obtains or does not, 
and may exist even if it does not obtain. 
 Lowe's argument is a dilemma; I have presented the horns separately. 148
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atomic fact that Fa.  Then Fa is true. Fa is true iff {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a}. That is: a is F if and 149
only if singleton {a} is identical to the set of things that are both F and identical to a. Now, 
either the fact that Fa is identical to the fact that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a}, or not. If they are 
identical, then by our criterion of identity, the two facts have the same constituents. But 
then it is utterly opaque what those constituents are, for on the face of it, one fact has as its 
constituents F and a, and the other {a} and {x|Fx ^ x=a}. So, suppose that the two facts are 
not identical. We have noted that Fa is true iff {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a}. So now infer {a}={x|Fx ^ 
x=a}. Since Fa is true, {x|Fx ^ x=a} will have a as its sole member. So{a} and {x|Fx ^ 
x=a} are intersubstitutable: they are different ways of representing the same set. So, the 
fact that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a} has as its constituents {a}, {a}, and identity. Likewise the fact 
that {a}={a} has as its constituents {a}, {a}, and identity. These two facts therefore have 
the same constituents. Moreover, their constituents are structured in the same way: {a}
={a} in both cases. So by our identity criterion, the fact that {a}={a} is identical to the fact 
that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a}. But the fact that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a} entails that Fa, while the fact 
that {a}={a} does not. The two facts differ, hence they cannot be identical: reductio.  
Again, however, Lowe's argument may be resisted. Note that a crucial step in the argument 
states that, since Fa is true, the expression '{x|Fx ^ x=a}' designates the set {a}. The 
evaluation of the argument turns on precisely how it does so. Here are the options: '{x|Fx ^ 
x=a}' designates either a set, or a class. If it designates the set {a}, then the form of the 
expression '{x|Fx ^ x=a}' is merely a notational flourish: the appearance of Fx adds nothing 
to the meaning of the symbol. Then it is indeed the case that the fact that {a}={a} is 
identical to the fact that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a}, but the fact that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a} no more 
entails Fa than the fact that {a}={a} does. On the other hand, if '{x|Fx ^ x=a}' designates a 
 Lowe uses the example 'Mars is red'.149
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class, then the claim that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a} when Fa is true is simply false: {a} and {x|Fx 
^ x=a} are different kinds of entity, and so cannot be identical. For it will be true of {x|Fx ^ 
x=a}, that if it is not empty, then it will intersect {x|Fx}. By contrast, the same is not true 
of {a}, and this is precisely because {x|Fx ^ x=a} being nonempty entails Fa while {a} 
being nonempty does not. In that case, the argument does not get as far as the final 
reductio.  150
One might also, instead, think that facts combine their constituents while being themselves 
simple. These views divide again into those according to which the constituents of facts are 
abstractions from some non-compositional internal structure of facts, and those according 
to which the combining of fact constituents is effected by facts externally. Examples of the 
former sort of view are Armstrong's (1997), again, and arguably, the view defended in 
Appendix C of the second (1927) edition of Principia Mathematica,  according to which 151
fact constituents are explained in terms of facts standing to each other in relations of 
predicate-resemblance and subject-resemblance. Examples of the latter sort of view 
include Hossack (2007), according to which facts are not combinations, but rather external 
combinings of constituents, and Turner (2016), who moots the view that apparent fact 
constituents are explained in terms of quasi-geometrical relationships between internally 
structureless facts.  152
 A parallel objection to the argument can be made in different terms: assuming that '{x|Fx ^ x=a}' 150
designates a set rather than a class, does it designate the set {a} rigidly, or nonrigidly? If rigid, then the 
fact that {a}={x|Fx ^ x=a} does not entail Fa. If nonrigid, then there is no reductio at the end of the 
argument. Compare: 'the fact that Bertie = the author of Principia is identical with the fact that Bertie = 
Bertie'. If 'the author of Principia is nonrigid, then the two facts are simply not identical. 
 It is unclear exactly who wrote (which parts of) the appendix. Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia – of 151
course – but seem to have credited much of the philosophical work in the appendix to Wittgenstein.  
 Turner's discussion is not too far from the 'locationist' view of Cowling (2014). I return to this point later. 152
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Our fast survey of the literature has thrown up some systematic groupings of conceptions 
of facts. These are propositional conceptions, situational conceptions, correlative 
conceptions (either in terms of semantic values, truthmaking, or simply truth), and 
constituent-combining conceptions (on which facts may be either complex – by way of 
composition or combination – or simple, with constituents on simple conceptions being 
either abstracta or externally combined).  I have indicated, in passing, that identity 153
criteria for facts may not be the terrible challenge that they are reputed to be. Rather, I 
suggest, the problem here is the sheer spread of different views. Our survey – which is 
representative, but far from exhaustive – has shown that while it is possible to impose 
some structure, and hence clarity, on the discussion by grouping various conceptions of 
facts together, this does not result in much increase in unity. The next section turns to the 
task of imposing unity. 
2. The Unifying Explananda: Predication and Instantiation 
To get unity from the literature on facts, I draw again on a familiar resource: the 
 Another way to frame the discussion in this section is in terms of the choice points that a theory of facts 153
must face. Here is a non-exhaustive list, in no particular order: Do facts have constituents? If so, what are 
they? Are facts complex or simple? If complex, are they combinations of, or composed by, their 
constituents, or neither? If simple, do they combine their constituents externally, or are their constituents 
abstracts of them, or neither? Are facts structured – mereologically or otherwise? Internally or externally? 
Are they correlates – semantic, alethic, or otherwise – of anything? If so, what? At what level of grain are 
they correlates of those things? Are there any atomic facts? Are there only atomic facts? What is the 
explanatory role of facts? Three especially important choice points bear mentioning, to which I will 
return: (1) Are facts fundamental entities? (2) Are the various things that are said of facts a part of their 
theoretical role, or a part of the very way in which they are conceived? (3) Is commitment to a fact 
ontology commitment to the existence of a kind of entity, or to the world's having a kind of structure?
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regimentation of structure into explanandum and explanans roles.  We saw this resource 154
at work in previous chapters in relation to the structures associated with respects (Chapter 
1), determinables (Chapter 2) and universals (chapter 3); here we apply the same approach 
to facts.  
One might think at first that such a regimentation must be futile: there are just too many 
different explanandum structures in the mix. This is true, to a degree: facts have been 
posited in pursuit of explanations of phenomena as diverse as instantiation, truthmaking, 
truth, judgment, predication, and so on. Indeed, the notion of a fact seems as fraught as it 
does – arguably – precisely because it falls under such multifurcating explanatory 
demands: as an explanatory resource, it is hopelessly stretched.   155
None of this, however, implies that our present pursuit is futile. For the unfruitfulness of 
facts under such conflicting explanatory demands is no indication that facts will be 
similarly unfruitful when the air is less thick with explananda. The task, then, is to clear 
the air. 
To clear the air, I suggest that we take instantiation structure as the core explanandum 
 Turner (2016) discusses a similar idea in terms of appearances. On Turner's regimentation, what I have 154
called the relationship between explanans and explanandum structures is expressed as a relation between 
a metaphysically sober fundamental language F and a language of appearance L, where sentences in F 
provide the 'appearancemakers' – rather than truthmakers – for selected (i.e. somehow privileged and 
worth preserving) sentences in L. I leave it open to what extent the two regimentations coincide. 
 But this is not a problem with my regimentation: it is a problem with the discussion. The regimentation 155
remains helpful insofar as it offers a clear way to articulate what is going on. 
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structure where facts are concerned.  By instantiation structure here, I mean the 156
relationship – whatever it is – between an object and its associated properties.  We may 157
regard the present explanatory project as a close relation of its broader neighbour, the 
problem of universals. For while the problem of universals seeks an explanation of what it 
is for an object to have a property (in a neutral sense) or for some objects each to have the 
same property, we may regard the present problem as asking what the relationship is 
between objects and their properties, whereby objects have their properties – that is, on the 
assumption that objects, in a less neutral sense, have properties at all. 
Understood this way, the task of explaining instantiation structure (which I will call the 
'problem of instantiation') arises within a certain solution to the problem of universals – 
namely, one which posits objects and properties as explanatory categories of being. On 
such a conception of the problem, the problem of instantiation is expressed by two 
questions: what is the relationship between an object and a property whereby the object has 
the property?  
But we should not stop here. The problem of instantiation is not parochial: it is not merely 
a problem within an object-property solution to the problem of universals. To see why, 
consider two factors. First, the problem of universals itself has a certain explanandum 
 I offer no argument for this other than the theoretical utility of doing so, which I demonstrate in the 156
remainder of this chapter. Really, my claim goes no further than this. I do not claim that instantiation 
structure is a core explanandum in any deeper sense: all I claim is that it is theoretically fruitful to treat it 
as such. I am not claiming that instantiation structure is, in some spuriously profound sense, the 
underlying concern of every philosopher who ever wrote about facts; indeed, I leave it open whether 
privileging other explananda might lead to other, equally fruitful understandings of facts. (A further point, 
in the context of my thesis, is that I am considering facts at this point in the thesis because they offer a 
distinctive treatment of instantiation structure.) 
 Here I am using 'property' in a neutral sense, without the regimentations imposed on it by my own views 157
in previous chapters. 
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which is quite general and neutral with respect to most substantive ontological 
commitments – in the terms introduced in Chapter 1, that explanandum is the ontological 
structure of objects conceived in the fourfold way that I have outlined, which are 
understood to be qualitatively thick. Second, consider one core motivation for fact 
ontologies within object-property views: Bradley's regress. The regress argument holds that 
an object cannot possess its properties in virtue of the mediation of any instantiation 
relation, since such a relation would itself relate the object to its properties only in virtue 
of further mediating instantiation (or super-instantiation) relations, and so on: the regress is 
vicious since explanatory success at each step is deferred to the next step, which iterates 
the same explanation. Bradley's regress motivates a fact ontology because it motivates the 
thought that objects and properties are not prior to the instantial 'complexes' in which 
objects possess properties, but rather, those instantial complexes  are ontologically prior 158
to objects and properties.  
Now, fact ontologies are obviously not the only option here. One might, following Lowe, 
hold that instantiation is not a relation but an internal formal relationship. Or one might, in 
a more Quinean spirit, hold that instantiation belongs to a theory's ideology rather than its 
ontology. But fact ontologies remain an option. They are, indeed, an option which turns the 
whole object-property approach to the problem of universals on its head. If objects and 
properties are not fundamental entities, what are they? In particular: why should they have 
the privileged status of appearances to be preserved in the resulting fact ontology? The 
answer here cannot be that objects and properties are needed to solve the problem of 
universals: in positing facts as prior to objects and properties, a fact ontologist should hold 
that facts supplant objects and properties in the explanans role in the problem of 
 I drop the scare quotes, but they remain implicit since 'complex' is used loosely. 158
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universals.  
It is, I suggest, the apparent structure of predication  that confers special explanandum 159
status upon objects and properties.  By 'structure' here, I do not mean grammatical or 160
syntactic structure. It is irrelevant, for example, exactly how one's preferred natural 
language expresses the copula. Rather, I mean the operational structure of predication. The 
thought is that the act of predication, in assertoric contexts, is an act which gets at the 
structure of the world in a certain way, and moreover, appears (since we seem to predicate 
successfully) to be one that correlates successfully with the structure of the world in a 
way  that stands for explanation.  In predicating and asserting, we do not just react 161 162
verbally to the world in arbitrary ways which happen to suit us pragmatically: we operate 
on the structure of the world.  
Successful predication succeeds in virtue of the underlying operations that carve at the 
joints of nature. It succeeds not in virtue of some transcendental relationship that linguistic 
contents bear to reality, but rather, in virtue of the immersion of the vehicles of those 
contents in the world that the contents are about. In the present setting, the point is this: it 
is the immersive, operational success of predication in virtue of which predication 
introduces structure into the explanandum role.  
 Strictly speaking: predication in assertoric contexts. I return to this point in a later chapter. 159
  One might object here that it is simpler than this: even an ontology, such as factalism, that does not treat 160
objects and properties as fundamental may treat them as derivative, and hence, fitted to an explanandum 
role. My reply, however, is that it is their salience in predication structures that gives plausibility to the 
idea that objects and properties should be kept as derivative entities in the first place. 
 Of course, not the only way. Szekely (2015), for example, makes a case for thinking that feature-placing 161
assertions do not have a predication structure. 
 Turner (2016, §1.4.2) makes the point nicely.162
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Call this question – what structure does predication introduce into the explanandum role? - 
the problem of predication. We are now in a position to set out the problem of instantiation 
as well. For given an answer to the problem of predication – an appropriate structure in the 
explanandum role – the problem of instantiation will arise if and only if the corresponding, 
proximal explanans structure is fundamental. In other words: if the explanandum structure 
of predication is explained directly by the world's structure at a fundamental level, then the 
explanandum structure of predication will supply 'constituents' – objects and properties, 
say – concerning which a fundamental problem of instantiation may be posed. On the other 
hand, if the explanandum structure of predication is explained only indirectly by the 
world's fundamental structure, then there is no reason to think that the putative 
'constituents' supplied by that explanandum structure should occur amid the fundamentalia 
of the world. In that case,  no corresponding problem of instantiation can arise.  163 164
So much for the problems of predication and instantiation. What has all this to do with 
facts? In the remainder of this chapter, I will defend three claims. First, I claim that the 
notion of a fact is best captured as a specific kind of solution to the problem of 
instantiation, constrained by a specific understanding of predication. Second, I claim that 
the specific understanding of predication in question rests on mistaken assumptions. Third, 
 Suppose, for example, that a trope bundle theory of objects is true. Then predication will still look much 163
as it does, but there will not be, fundamentally, objects and properties: there are instead property-instances 
and bundles thereof. Predication structure, in this case, is explained only indirectly by reality's 
fundamental structure. Now, there is still a mystery in the neighbourhood that looks a little like Bradley's 
regress: what is coinstantiation, and do tropes need to be coinstanced with that to be coinstanced with 
each other? However, it is hard to see in what sense the resulting problem – problem though it 
undoubtedly is – should be a version of the problem of instantiation in my sense.
 I am not saying that instantiation is ontologically posterior to predication – but that is, I think, the right 164
order of discovery. 
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I claim – by distinguishing fact structures from facts – that a significant core of the fact 
ontologist's idea may be preserved on my dimensional ontology after the false assumptions 
are dropped. My view may be seen, then, as preserving the best of fact ontologies.  165
Suppose that predication has a binary structure: suppose that it consists of the production 
of (or reference to) an object, and the attribution of a property (or a predicate) to it. Thus, a 
paradigm case of predication is the assertion ├Fa. Take it as read, for the sake of argument, 
that this means the relevant 'constituents' thereby introduced are objects and properties. A 
fact ontologist will hold that the fundamental entities of the world  are not objects and 166
properties, but the entities captured by a and F (or rather, the corresponding operations) but 
rather, whatever is captured by the whole assertoric act ├Fa.  Fact ontologists are free to 167
differ over how the whole assertion ├Fa captures the fact that a is F, exactly how it is that 
a and F are constituents of the fact, and so on. Fact ontologists may differ on all such 
matters, but must concur that the entities of the sort captured by ├Fa are the fundamental 
beings of the world.  
Two features of this view bear noting. The first is an assumption that I will call attachment: 
that predication consists in an act of attaching, or appending, a predicate to a subject. The 
second is an assumption that I will call the thin constituent assumption: that distinct facts 
have constituents 'in common' in some way other than their having one and the same 
 It will turn out that this inheritance from fact ontologies bears significantly on a central, contentious 165
theme running through my whole proposal: the 'factoring' of determination relationships. This factoring 
claim will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 At least, relatively fundamental with respect to objects and properties.166
 For this reason the assertion sign here is indispensable. As I will argue in Chapter 7: terms in a language 167
carve at joints via their associated operations, and hence, only when they are used in assertoric contexts. 
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constituent (no constituent is thick enough to span more than one fact).   168
In terms of thick and thin (in the senses introduced previously), fact ontologies so 
described occupy a strange middle ground. Indeed, the point of my argument overall is that 
such a middle ground is a compromising place to be. For on the one hand, it is a central 
insight of fact ontologies that the (relatively) thick thing – the thing captured by ├Fa – is 
ontologically prior to the thin things – the things, if there are any, captured by F and a – 
which are its abstracts. Yet, on the other hand, the fact ontologist stops short of admitting 
the priority over facts of a still thicker thing: what I am simply calling the (thick) object.   169
3. The Ternary Explanandum 
Both assumptions – attachment and thin constituents – are false. This is, at bottom, because 
the assumption that predication introduces a binary structure into the explanandum role is 
false. Or rather: the appearance that it does so is misleading. For while predication may 
seem to involve two linguistic elements,  this does not at all entail that the operations 170
 I am factoring out here those views on which constituents are overlaps between facts. This sort of view 168
raises some significant complications – for example, over how overlap is to be understood if facts are not 
to be taken as mereological sums, and hence, non-fundamental entities. 
 It gets stranger: what is the fact ontologist to say about properties (determinates under different 169
dimensions) that necessarily go together, such as – for argument's sake – colour and extension? It would 
seem that in such cases, facts bleed into one another: the fact that my apple is green is not entirely distinct 
from the fact that it is roughly spherical, or at any rate from the fact that it has some shape or other. 
(Compare Treanor's (2013) discussion of the notion of exactly one belief.) So it would seem that facts 
must come in clumps, or must vary in thickness. I discuss a similar argument against tropes in Chapter 6. 
 Even this appearance is questionable. Predication occurs, for example, in quantificational contexts – all 170
Fs are G and so on – where the received wisdom is that we know better than to treat all Fs as a subject 
whose predicate is ...are G. True, one would standardly write (x)(Fx → Gx), where substituting a name 
for x yields say, (Fa → Ga), wherein the atomic predications Fa and Ga do look straightforwardly binary. 
Still, such examples suggest a general caution about 'surface' form. 
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involved carve at only two ontic  joints. I argue in the present section that predication 171
introduces into the explanandum role a structure that is not binary, but ternary. More 
strictly speaking, I argue for a structure in the explanandum role that is at least ternary: I 
do not rule out more joints, but three are enough for my purposes.  The next section will 172
relate this conclusion to my dimensional ontology.  
A proper understanding of predication's structure should supply the resources to explain 
not only what is happening when predication goes well, but also what is happening when 
predication goes awry. For it may be that a part of the structure of predication is hidden  173
when predication succeeds, and revealed only – or predominantly – when it fails.  
Of course, predication may fail in multiple ways – not least by simply being false. For our 
purposes though, category mistakes are a more interesting kind of case. Magidor (2013) 
offers roughly the following account of category mistakes.  Category mistakes occur 174
when a subject and a predicate are mismatched in the following specific way: picking out 
that subject does not raise any question of whether that predicate applies to it. For 
  I use this term here in Heidegger’s sense, in which the ontic concerns entities, while the ontological 171
concerns the ‘being’ (roughly: ontological form) of entities. 
 Perhaps this move is made too lightly. One may think this if one worries, for example, that I will struggle 172
to set a non-arbitrary level of specificity at which operations, in the relevant sense, are to be understood (a 
similar problem afflicts reliable-process theories of knowledge). I will return to this issue in a later 
chapter. For now, my short answer is that I take it to be a good thing that my view leaves it an open, 
empirical question exactly what kinds of operations there are, and which kinds are relevant. 
 Or at least, less noticeable – but not entirely hidden: see the discussion of Johnson in Chapter 2. 173
 It does not matter a great deal for my purposes whether one considers the example that I will offer shortly 174
to be a genuine category mistake, or just an odd and infelicitous predication: in either case, it is an 
example of predication failing in a way that brings out what I want to illustrate. Indeed, Magidor's stated 
aim is simply to explain what is infelicitous about such statements, though she does also consider them to 
be category mistakes. 
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example, 'Mozart is prime' is a category mistake (at least, in a broad sense) because 
nothing about Mozart raises any question about whether or not he is prime. Magidor cashes 
out what I am calling 'not raising any question' in terms of presuppositions, in keeping with 
her stated aim of explaining “what makes category mistakes infelicitous” (2013:2). For our 
purposes, we may note that Magidor's account brings out a third structural element in 
predication, which is evident when predication fails through a category mistake – the 
aforementioned presuppositions.  
Magidor's presuppositions set us on our way toward a ternary structure. But for our 
purposes, Magidor's presuppositions had better turn out to be more than a merely 
psychological affair. It must be the case that certain predications – category mistakes – fail 
because they contravene something stronger than a mere expectation. What is contravened 
must be some aspect of our dealings with the world which – unlike mere expectation – 
succeeds in a way that requires explanation.  
A good next step would be to show that the third structural element in predication is 
present as a broadly logical, and not just psychological, matter. For this, we return to 
Johnson. For present purposes it is enough to recap four central points from Johnson's 
(1921) discussion (for more detail, see chapter 2):  
i. Determinable-Determinate Hierarchy: Adjectives stand to other adjectives in 
hierarchically ordered determinate-determinable relationships. 
ii. Upward Presupposition: possession of (relatively) determinate adjectives always 
entails – or rather, presupposes – possession of their related determinables. 
iii. Non-Conjunctive Specification: Determinates are non-conjunctive specifiers of 
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their determinables.  
iv. Fundamentum Divisionis: Determinables play the role of a fundamentum divisionis 
– a founding basis for the division of objects into exclusive and exhaustive natural 
classes. 
We may treat these four statements as premises in arguing for two further claims.  First: 175
each object (Johnson: each substantive) is associated with a set of (highest) determinables 
which amount to a profile of the kind of object that it is. Second: objects are related to their 
determinate qualities not directly but via their associated (highest) determinables.  
Here is an argument for the first claim. Consider first the observation (iv) that 
determinables play the role of a fundamentum divisionis in the classification of objects. 
This underwrites my claim that determinates presuppose their determinables rather than 
merely entailing them. For it is hard to see how determinables could play their categorising 
role – how they could be the basis for classifying objects – if they were merely entailed by 
their determinates. To be clear, there are two ways in which determinables serve to 
categorise objects: objects may be classified either according to the determinate values that 
they have under some given determinables (for example, fugues may be classified 
according to their determinate number of voices), or they may be classified according to 
which determinables they fall under at all (for example, a minim must have some pitch). If 
determinables are merely entailed by their determinates, then both of these classifying roles 
suffer. For in the first place, it is hard to see how an object could be classified by 
determinables in the latter way – according to which determinables it should fall under at 
 The premises, as well as the further claims, are all to be found in Johnson. The present regimentation of 175
the argument, however, is my own. 
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all – if determinables are merely entailed by their determinates. For in that case, 
determinables are mere 'danglers', and should not do any explanatory work. Moreover, the 
former kind of classificatory role suffers in turn because of this. For if objects cannot be 
sensibly classified according to the determinables that they fall under at all (not in the 
sense that they cannot be so classified, but rather, in the sense that it is a mystery why they 
can), then it is equally unexplained why the determinate values of these determinables 
rather than those should be the basis for classifying such-and-such objects into their natural 
classes. For this reason, we may suppose that determinables are presupposed, and not 
merely entailed, by their determinates. To put it another way: an object's relationship to the 
highest determinables under which it falls is intimate and direct: it is not related to them 
via its determinate qualities under the relevant determinables, but directly, in virtue of the 
kind of thing that it is. This gives us our first claim. 
Here is an argument for the second claim.  Suppose that an object's relationship to some 176
determinate  quality is direct. By direct here I mean not mediated - in particular, not 177
mediated by the determinable under which the determinate falls.  Then it is unclear how 178
an object’s relationships to determinates may be constrained, and in particular, how they 
might be constrained by an object’s relationships to its associated profile of determinable s. 
  A full argument for this point, which I am developing elsewhere, goes beyond what I can give here. Here 176
I offer a telescoped version of one argument for the intended conclusion. To give the argument in full 
would require a long digression about determinables and determinates, which is best reserved for another 
occasion.
  By ‘determinate’ here I shall, by default, mean ‘maximal determinate’; by ‘determinable’ I shall by 177
default mean ‘maximal determinable’. 
  See Lowe (2006, 2013) for an illustration of this distinction. On Lowe’s view, instantiation and 178
characterisation are both direct formal relationships. Exemplification, by contrast, is indirect: objects 
exemplify attributes by being characterised by modes that instantiate the relevant attributes, or by 
instantiating kinds that are characterised by them. The relationship between objects and attributes is thus 
indirect: it is mediated by modes (when exemplification is occurrent) or kinds (when exemplification is 
dispositional). 
!158
What constrains the domain of determinates which an object may possess, in such a way 
that it coincides with the domain of determinate values under the profile of highest 
determinables with with an object is associated in virtue of its ontological kind? Since we 
are supposing that an object’s relationships to its determinate qualities is unmediated, it is 
quite mysterious how its relationships to its determinable profile might play this 
constraining role. In that case, three options remain. Either (1) the coincidence is a happy 
accident, or (2) it occurs in virtue of an object’s being directly and essentially related to 
some common factor among the determinates which it may possess, or (3) it occurs in 
virtue of an object’s being directly and essentially related to each determinate which it may 
possess in a piecemeal way.  
Plainly, (1) must be rejected: it is an admission that an object’s relationships to its 
determinate qualities is not constrained at all.   
Option (2) should also be rejected, on the grounds that highest determinables cannot be 
reductively accounted for in terms of the determinates that fall under them.  This is of 179
course a controversial claim, and I can only offer a briefest defence of it here. To be clear, 
the claim is not that determinables in general cannot be accounted for in terms of their 
determinate values - indeed, I believe that plenty can. My claim is rather that highest 
determinables are not so reducible.  (Determinable-determinate hierarchies are by no 
means sure to be ontologically uniform: determinate and determinable by themselves, after 
all, only mark a relative distinction.) The reason for this is, as Johnson himself pointed out, 
that what unifies determinates under a common (highest) determinable is not a shared 
factor which marks and grounds their similarity to each other, but rather, a special kind of 
  For a different view in a similar ballpark, see Wilson (2012). 179
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difference: determinates under a common highest determinable differ from each other in a 
distinctive way. Specifically, they differ from each other in respect of their shared highest 
determinable; that determinable is nothing other than the respect in which those 
determinates differ (and hence, in which the objects that possess those determinates may 
differ or resemble). Interestingly, non-maximal determinables diverge from maximal 
determinables on precisely this point: determinates under non-maximal determinables are 
united by characteristic resemblances.  Highest determinables are distinctive respects of 180
difference: they are the common factors - the common respects of difference - that their 
determinate values share, and so leave no room to be reductively explained by some 
further common factor.  
Finally, option (3) should be rejected on grounds that, once again, it fails to explain the 
coincidence of the two domains of determinates. While it explains how an object may be 
related to the relevant plurality of determinates distributively, it does not explain why those 
determinates should collectively exhibit the structure - unity under a profile of 
determinables and completeness under those determinables - that they do. This gives us our 
second target claim, that objects are related to their determinate qualities not directly but 
via their associated (highest) determinables. 
I have argued that objects are related to their respective dimensions directly, not via their 
associated determinate values. I have also argued that objects are related to their 
determinate qualities indirectly, via the associated dimensions whose values they are. The 
resulting, ternary view looks like this:  
  They are related to each other by resemblances, in addition to the distinctive respect of difference that 180
they share with the wider class of determinates under their common highest determinable.
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 This ternary structure is, I suggest, what predication introduces into the explanandum role. 
The next section argues that my proposed ontology of dimensions offers a better explanans 
structure for predication structure, so understood, than standard fact ontologies. The final 
section (Section 5) will argue that a core idea behind the notion of a fact is nevertheless 
preserved on my view.  
4. From Facts to Dimensions 
If the explanandum structure of predication is indeed ternary as I suggest, then standard 
fact ontologies are in trouble, because the attachment and thin constituent assumptions are 
in trouble. The challenge to attachment is both direct and thorough. It is direct because on 
the ternary view, objects and determinate qualities are simply not directly related. It is 
thorough because the attachment assumption cannot be simply shifted and reapplied to the 
threefold explanandum structure. At a logical level, the reason for this is that dimensions 
are presupposed by both objects and determinate properties. They are, in Johnson's phrase, 
associated with objects “from the start”, and the attribution of a determinate property to an 
object does not consist – Johnson again – in the appending of a wholly new adjective to the 
relevant substantive, but rather, consists in specifying the determinate value of a 
determinable adjective that the substantive already possesses. There is thus no room within 
the explanandum for the 'attachment' assumption to reappear. Predication and instantiation, 
then, do not involve copular ties. Rather, they are determination structures, in a sense to be 
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further clarified below. 
The challenge to thin constituents follows on from this. If the relationship between an 
object and a dimension is intimate in the way outlined, then an object will bear it to all the 
dimensions that it falls under (that is, the dimensions that collectively constitute its 
categorial profile – see chapter 1) if it bears it to any such dimension at all. If the thin 
constituents assumption is true, then given some arbitrary predication P1 of some property 
to an object O under the dimension D, and some further predication P2 of some property to 
O under the further dimension D*,  it will be true both that O occurring in P1 is 181
intimately related to D, and that O occurring in P2 is intimately related to D*. But it will 
also be true that O occurring in P1 is not intimately related to D* – or at any rate, it will be 
true that if O occurring in P1 is intimately related to D*, this has nothing much to do with 
O's occurrence in P2 being so. (A similar thing follows for O in P2). This, in turn, 
undermines the very grounds for holding, in the first place, that O in P1 and O in P2 are 
intimately related to D and D* respectively. The explanandum has changed; standard fact 
ontologies are no longer able to save the appearances in a satisfactory way.  
Factalism, then, make a poor explanans for our ternary explanandum. My proposed 
ontology of dimensions, by contrast, is well-placed to stand in the explanans role. Objects 
and dimensions, on my view, correspond with their explanans counterparts directly; 
properties are derivative entities introduced by abstraction on objects in respect of the 
relevant dimensions, in the manner discussed in Chapter 3.  
The abstractionist account of properties given in the previous chapter works in favour of 
 Where D* is independent from D in relevant ways, etc.181
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my proposed view here. For on that account, it is clear just how acts of predication get at 
the world's structure, and moreover, it is clear that the operations involved have much in 
common with the operations involved in the ubiquitous and relatively tractable activity of 
measurement.  Moreover, acts of predication offer a clear application for the indexed, 182
instrument-oriented conception of resemblance described in my account of determinates.  
On my view, the operations of predication are – or are at least continuous with – operations 
that bear directly on reality's fundamental structure: predication structure is, then, of a 
piece with instantiation structure. Such an outcome is by no means guaranteed a priori, but 
desirable nonetheless.  
Moreover, on my view, a clear story can be told about why the attachment and thin 
constituent assumptions are false, not only at the explanandum level but (as one would 
expect) at the level of the explanans structure. For the relationships between objects, 
dimensions, and properties are all internal relations (so attachment is false), and objects 
simply are not sliced up into proposition-shaped portions by their relationships to their 
determinate properties (so no thin constituents). I suggest, then, that my dimensional 
ontology solves both the predication problem and the instantiation problem in a satisfying 
way.  
5. Not Factalism, but Near Enough 
Standard fact ontologies – understood as those that subscribe to proposition-shaped facts 
through the attachment and thin constituent assumptions, motivated in turn by a binary 
view of predication structure – are mistaken. I have argued against the binary view of 
 I will touch on the significance of this in Chapter 7. 182
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predication, and so against attachment and thin constituents. What remains of fact 
ontologies if these assumptions are dropped? 
At least two core components of the standard conception of facts must go. One is the 
proposition-like nature of facts. The other is the closely related view that the ontologically 
fundamental things are those picked out by whole atomic assertions such as ├Fa. If one’s 
conception of a fact is wedded to these features, then the picture that I offer amounts to an 
obliteration of facts. Turner (2016), for example, holds that a key distinction of fact 
ontologies is the contrasting alternative that they offer to object-centred conceptions of the 
world's structure. By such lights, I have not preserved much of a fact ontology.  
But it needn't be so. I said above that I would single out instantiation structure in the 
explanandum role (and as it turns out, predication structure along with it) on grounds that it 
would be fruitful to explore the contribution of fact ontologies with respect to those 
explananda in particular. It is not clear at all, in that connection, that either of the 
jettisoned components – propositionlikeness and facts as fundamental correlates of atomic 
assertions – is really a central insight of fact ontologies.  
The core 'factalist' insight, in relation to instantiation structure, seems not to concern facts 
as entities at all. It seems, rather, to concern a certain structure – a structure exhibited by 
facts, but the exhibiting of which is by no means limited to facts. It amounts to this: that 
instantiation, understood as the relationship between objects and properties, understood in 
turn as constituents in predication structures – is not a direct relationship, and hence, not a 
fundamental one.  
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In this regard, dimensionism may be considered broadly factalist in spirit. In particular, 
objects, as I conceive them, are – as mentioned – unstructured particular and qualitative 
wholes from which at least one kind of constituent – their properties – are understood to be 
introduced by abstraction.  The insight of such structural factalism concerns the priority, 183
where quality is concerned, of the ontologically thick over the ontologically thin (the latter 
being abstracted from the former), rather than what we may term ontic factalism, the 
positing of facts as a distinctive and fundamental category of being. 
I have argued that the most viable factalism is structural, and that structural factalism best 
fits a substance - indeed, dimensionist - ontology. We should be receptive to the idea 
behind facts structurally conceived, but we should reject conceptions of facts as sui generis 
entities. The moral, then, is: thus far, and no further. In view of the problems discussed, my 
proposed view marks a kind of balance point - an optimal middle ground between the spirit 
of factalism and the concrete demands of the problems of predication and instantiation.  
  I leave it open whether dimensionism may permit the abstraction of objects. As I mention in the 183
Conclusion to this thesis, the Cartesian approach of Hawthorne (2007) may be one option here.
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Chapter 5 - Factoring and Governance 
0. Intro 
Chapter 4 advanced a conception of instantiation as determination. A central resource of 
that account - and indeed much of the rest of the thesis - is the claim that determination has 
a factored structure: the claim that objects determine dimensions in a twofold way, both at 
all and somehow. The present part of the chapter discusses this factoring claim more 
directly. In Section 1, I supply some plausibility arguments for the factoring claim. I then 
put the claim to work in relation to the topic of nomic governance. In Sections 2 to 4, I 
apply factoring to Stephen Mumford’s ‘Central Dilemma’. Section 2 presents the dilemma, 
in the abstract, and brings it in line with the dialectic of my discussion. Section 3 presents 
the first horn of the dilemma, applied to ‘the’ DTA theory of laws. Following Mumford, I 
focus on Armstrong’s theory in particular. In Section 4, I present the second horn of the 
Central Dilemma. Following Mumford again, I discuss its application to Lowe’s (2002, 
2006, 2013) account of laws, and again. In Section 5, I set out a dimensionist treatment of 
the Central Dilemma’s challenge, which incorporates the lessons that - I argue - should be 
learned from Armstrong and Lowe: in particular, my account will be a Platonist one, 
insofar as I will be rejecting a principle of instantiation for dimensions. I argue that the 
proposed view falls on neither horn of Mumford’s dilemma. The view that I will propose is 
an instance of what I will call an ⌶-theory (read: I-theory), whether of laws or not. 
1. Factoring 
I have claimed, at various points, that determination is a factored formal relationship. For 
instance, in chapter 2, it was the factored structure of determination, relating objects to 
dimensions, which allowed objects to stand as ontological correlates of maximal 
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determinate adjectives. In chapter 3, it was the factoring that allowed determination to give 
rise to a property abstraction principle of the form that I proposed: the collective plural 
relata of the resemblance relation featured in that principle depended on one factor of 
determination, while the resemblance relationship itself depended on the other. In Chapter 
4, the factoring of determination plays a key role in my argument for dimensionism and 
against factalism. The factored structure of determination is, then, a very central resource 
of the dimensionist view.  
The factoring claim may be put, most generally, as the claim that objects determine 
dimensions both at all and somehow, and hence, that determination has a twofold, factored 
structure.  Why think that factoring is a plausible thing to posit?  184
One reason is that determination-somehow and determination at-all do appear to be distinct 
relationships. For it may be a part of the essence of an object, both that it determines some 
particular dimension at-all, and that it determines it somehow. But to determine a 
dimension somehow is always also to determine it in a particular way,  and it may not be 185
a part of the essence of that object to determine that dimension in some particular way 
rather than another. Thus, determination-somehow may feature in the essence of an object 
in a nonrigid way, in a way that determination at-all does not. 
 It is perhaps possible, if a bit misleading, to talk about determinable determination and 184
determinate determination. I will generally avoid talking this way, preferring the terms 
‘determination-somehow’ and ‘determination at-all’. 
 I have offered an account of identity for these ways in chapter 3. 185
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Another reason to posit factoring is that certain obvious attempts to reduce it away fail. In 
particular, it is at least plausible that factoring should not be explained away in terms of 
determinables, or in terms of modes.  186
Determination is concerned with dimensions, not with determinables. ‘Determinable’, and 
its relative ‘determinate’, are after all not categorial terms, but rather terms that mark a 
relative distinction in status within an ordering of some kind or other. I have argued in 
Chapter 1 that determinates - determinate adjectives, say - under a common determinable 
are united by a certain kind of one-over-many - a respect of comparability - that cannot be 
reductively accounted for.  The relationship between objects and these respects is not 187
straightforwardly the same as the relationship between determinate and determinable 
adjectives, nor is it the same as the relationship between objects and those adjectives. Thus, 
there is no straightforward way in which determination is reducible to instantiation or 
satisfaction: the factoring of determination cannot be simply reduced to the co-instantiation 
of determinate and determinable properties (or the satisfaction of their corresponding 
predicates).  
 It is not straightforwardly obvious, either, that factoring in this context should be an instance of 186
any unified wider phenomenon. Consider, for example, the claim, mooted briefly by Simons 
(1994b), that there is room for an ontology of ways - that is, in my terms, that ways (roughly, 
adverbially understood) belong in an explanandum role. Simons proposes an ontology of ways that 
appeal to higher-level tropes. I leave it an open question, whether my description of factored 
determination as involving different ways of determining is covered by the sense of ‘way’ discussed 
by Simons. 
 To recap briefly: respects are not only respects of sameness but also respects of difference. Thus, 187
two things may have a respect in common by differing in that respect, and hence, not in virtue of 
some shared quality in that respect. It will not do, either, to put the sharing of respects down to the 
sharing of a subset of causal powers, since the subset account (which does not respect the ‘non-
conjunctive specification’ condition on determination) overgenerates and fails to distinguish 
respect-constituting subsets of powers from others. 
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Moreover, determination is concerned with objects, not objects and modes. There are two 
reasons for this. The first, general reason concerns parsimony: as I argued in chapter 3, 
given objects and dimensions, there is no further need to posit modes. The second, more 
specific reason is that an ontology of objects and modes faces a dilemma: either 
determination is distributed between objects and modes, or not.  
Suppose that determination is divided between objects and modes. The proposal under 
consideration is that objects do the work of determining at-all (since they essentially 
determine the dimensions that they do), while modes do the work of determining 
somehow.  But the proposal faces a further dilemma: do objects and modes only 188
determine dimensions at-all and somehow, respectively? 
Suppose that they do. Here the proposal is that objects determine dimensions at-all and not 
somehow, while modes determine dimensions somehow and not at-all. The problem with 
this proposal is just that it is not clear at all what is being proposed. On the one hand, it is 
unclear how something can determine a dimension somehow, without also determining it 
at-all. On the other, it is unclear how something can determine a dimension at-all without 
determining it also somehow.  One might doubt this latter claim precisely in the case of 189
objects and modes: one might think that an object can determine a dimension at-all, and 
leave the work of determination-somehow to its modes. But in that case, it is quite unclear 
why we should think of the object as determining a dimension in any way - why, that is, we 
 One might - to keep the analogy with determinables going - hold that objects instantiate 188
determinable properties, while modes instantiate determinates. But this would be to introduce many 
complications to the proposal. 
 One might think that an object can instantiate (in a sense of ‘instantiate’ that I have rejected in 189
Chapter 4) a determinable property without instantiating its relative determinates. But not every 
determinable is a highest determinable; hence, not every determinable is a dimension. 
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should not rather think that it is modes that determine both at-all and somehow. (On such a 
view, the determination profiles of objects would be the dimensions that their modes would 
determine.) We should not, then, think that objects and modes determine only at-all and 
somehow, respectively.  
Suppose instead that they don’t: suppose that objects and modes both, each, determine 
dimensions both at-all and somehow. One obvious issue here is that it is no longer clear 
how determination is a formal relationship. For formal relationships are grounded in the 
ontological forms of their relata, and it is not entirely clear how an object-dimension 
relationship and a mode-dimension relationship could be the very same. Setting that issue 
aside,  we have a further bifurcation: let us call the options internal and external. 190
On the internal option, it pertains (to use an intuitive expression; nothing here will turn on 
clarifying it) to each of the natures of objects and modes, that they should each determine 
dimensions both at-all and somehow. Besides leading to some redundancy, this view 
immediately entails what I am claiming, that determination is a factored relationship - 
indeed, even more so than I am arguing.  
On the external option, the proposal is that objects and modes each do their determining 
work separately (at-all for objects, and somehow for modes), and that they, in some sense 
 The issue is rather unclear. In Lowe’s (2006) ontology, the duplication of formal relationships is 190
allowed: characterisation relates both objects to modes, and kinds to attributes, while instantiation 
relates both objects to kinds, and modes to attributes. The same is true of constituted formal 
relationships: exemplification relates objects to attributes both via kinds and via modes. (Indeed, 
Lowe’s exemplification is another example of a factored formal relationship.) One might think that 
this is permissible because the two instantiation (mutatis mutandis, characterization) relationships 
are involved in constituting structurally comparable relations of ontological dependence. I will not 
pursue this issue here.
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or other, confer the fruits of these labours upon each other. But the notion of conferral 
required here is, as ever, obscure.  191
Still, things might not be so simple. A defender of an object-and-mode ontology, taking this 
external option, might offer an explanatory setup that parallels my treatment of Mumford’s 
‘Central Dilemma’ later in this chapter. Here is the idea: let us say that it is part of the 
essence of an object that it should be characterised by some mode.  Now, a particular 192
mode will determine (somehow) some dimension or other; indeed, it will be a part of the 
essence of the mode that it should do so. Very roughly, the point is that determination-
somehow features as a part of the essence of a mode, and hence features indirectly as a part 
of the essence of an object. Note that in Lowean terms, the characterisation relationship 
constitutes a relationship of nonrigid dependence of objects on modes: the existence of an 
object depends on its being characterised by some modes or other. Thus, although the 
dependence of modes on the dimensions that they determine is rigid, no mode confers 
upon an object the determination of either a specific dimension (rigidly understood), or the 
determination of a given dimension in a specific way (though it will be a part of the 
essence of a given mode not only to determine a particular dimension somehow, but also to 
do so in a specific way).  
I cannot see, in principle, why this kind of divide-and-confer strategy could not work - at 
least, given a prior commitment to an object-and-mode ontology. But my aim here is not to 
argue against such an ontology; rather, it is to argue that determination is a factored 
 This is a recurring point in the thesis. See the Introduction, and the discussion of module and 191
modifier tropes in Chapter 6. 
 Here I adopt the terminology of Lowe (2006, 2008a) for convenience. I set it out in more detail 192
later on. 
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relationship. We have seen that there is a plausible way to make sense of how modes might 
confer determination-somehow, in an indirect way, upon objects - but it is less clear, for the 
external conferral strategy under consideration, how objects could confer determination at-
all upon modes. It seems clear that whatever determines a dimension somehow, by that 
token will determine it at-all. Thus, modes will stand in both kinds of determination 
relationship - at-all and somehow - and will, importantly, stand in at-all determination 
relationships quite independently of any role that objects might have in conferring such 
relationships upon them. Thus, even on this picture, determination has the factored 
structure that I am claiming for it.  193
We have supposed that the two varieties of determination (the somehow and at-all 
varieties) are divided separately between objects and modes, with the result that 
determination turns out to be factored anyway. The other horn of the dilemma, that the two 
facets of determination do not occur divided - leaves three options: determination will 
relate dimensions to modes, to objects, or to both.  We need not pursue the details here: 194
the important point is that on each option, determination comes out as a factored 
relationship in precisely the sense that I am claiming.  195
 There are further ways to complicate this picture. For example, one might posit two factored 193
relationships, one between objects and dimensions, and the other between modes and dimensions. 
But I will not pursue this line further. 
 Or indeed, neither. But in the present context, this option is not salient. 194
 It is true that factored determination relationships have less flexibility in the case of modes than 195
objects: an object may have, in Vetter’s (2015) terms, various potentialities to determine a given 
dimension in more than one way, and thus to come to resemble or cease to resemble other objects in 
respect of that dimension. With modes - at least, understood as maximally determinate - this is not 
so. But while this alters the details, it does not change the score: determination remains a factored 
relationship. 
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2. Mumford’s Central Dilemma 
Let us proceed, then, on the assumption that determination is a factored formal 
relationship. We turn now to an application of this idea. I will discuss the Central Dilemma 
posed by Stephen Mumford (2004, 2005) against nomological realism.  
Some stage-setting is needed to bring the Central Dilemma into the dialectic of our 
discussion here. Mumford’s own discussion takes place within his case for realist 
lawlessness - the view, roughly, that the explananda that laws are posited to explain - the 
patterned, animated behaviours exhibited by entities, which go beyond Humean mere 
patterns - are real enough (realism), but that reified laws of nature are the wrong things to 
play the explanans role (lawlessness). Thus, Mumford poses the central dilemma in as a 
challenge to nomological realist ontologies. But I am not concerned here with laws of 
nature - at least, not directly. It will not matter much for my account, whether the view that 
I arrive at is an account of laws or not. I will, then, frame the dialectic differently, in terms 
of animation, structure, and conferral.  
To begin, it is worth giving Mumford’s own setup (2004:158) in detail. The setup begins 
with a dilemma. Nomological realist positions claim that laws of nature are entities that 
play a governing role with respect to the patterned behaviours of entities. So Mumford 
poses an initial dilemma: either laws govern, or they don’t. Call this the Frame Dilemma. 
Plainly, if they do not govern, then nomological realism is false. So nomological realists 
must take the first horn of this dilemma.  
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On the first horn of the Frame Dilemma, a further dilemma arises: either laws govern their 
instances externally, or internally.  This is the Central Dilemma. Let me briefly present 196
the two horns in the abstract.  
On the first horn, laws govern their instances externally. Laws are, to put it a little 
differently, external to the things over which, or in relation to which, they play a governing 
role. The problem, on this horn, is that the governing relation remains unclear - and that it 
remains unclear in a way that threatens to lead to quidditism about properties.  
On the second horn, laws are internal to the things over which they exercise a governing 
role. Such a theory must do two things. It must give a clear sense to ‘internal’, and it must, 
again, make clear how the exercise governing relation is supposed to work. Mumford’s 
claim (2004:153) is that internal accounts cannot successfully do both.  
Since neither horn of the Central Dilemma is viable, the nomological realist is forced onto 
the second horn of the Frame Dilemma. But this is to concede that laws play no governing 
role in the world: nomological realism should be rejected.  
To bring the central dilemma in line with my present discussion, consider the notion of a 
feature, as I have been using that term throughout this thesis. The notion of a feature is a 
broad notion indeed: it includes any aspect of reality that stands for grounding or 
explanation: any structure in the explanandum role. Quality is an example of a feature, in 
this sense, that has featured prominently in the rest of this thesis; respect structure is 
 There are two kinds of externality in the mix here: that pertaining to the relation between 196
universals, on the DTA account of laws, and that pertaining to the governance relation between 
laws and their instances. The Central Dilemma, on my understanding of it, concerns both. 
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another. Mumford’s discussion focuses on a further feature, which I will call animation. 
The idea is, intuitively, that the world moves: things in the world are dynamic, acting over 
time in ways that are constrained and driven by their modal involvements with each 
other.  Central to the metaphysical project in which nomological realism is involved is 197
the idea that the animation of the world is a feature that requires explaining - that without 
such an explanation, it would be unclear why reality should not be inert and inanimate. As 
Mumford puts it: 
Recall that Lewis allows modal truth but no modal properties that might be their truthmakers. His is the 
Humean demodalized world. The problem with nomological realism is that it accepts the demodalized world 
as its starting point. It sees the world as containing no modal properties and therefore needing the imposition 
of laws to make the world active and dynamic. Our world self-evidently is active and dynamic, but are laws 
the best explanation of the source of such dynamism? (2005:407) 
I will follow Mumford here in taking animation to be a central explanandum feature under 
discussion. To accept animation as an explanandum is to deny the Humean view of laws, 
that the regularities - the lawlike patterns in the world - are not targets for further 
explanation.  It is to accept that among the explanatory tasks of a metaphysical or 198
ontological theory is the task of accounting for the source - the generative, determining 
grounds - of such patterns. Taking ‘governance’ broadly, any such view is committed to the 
claim that whatever turns out to be the source of nomic regularities plays a governing role 
with respect to the things that exhibit those regularities. Thus, we can offer a generalised 
version of the Frame Dilemma: whatever the source of the relevant worldly regularities 
turns out to be: does that source play a governing role? Here it is hardly coherent to 
 Schaffer (2010) has developed an argument for priority monism that draws on a notion of modal 197
independence. I leave it open exactly how these notions are related. 
 Of course, animation is not, by itself, necessarily patterned animation. I will take up this point 198
later. 
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suppose that there is such a source to be accounted for, and yet such a source does not play 
a governing role. So the first horn of the generalised Frame Dilemma is one on which any 
anti-Humean should quickly find themselves. Thus, since in the present context I am not 
considering Humean views, we can cast the Frame Dilemma as a question for anti-
Humeans: whatever plays the governing role on your account, how does it do so?  
To take stock: both Humean and anti-Humean accounts can, and should, be equally 
committed to the claim that a certain domain of entities does, in fact, exhibit regularities of 
a certain sort.  Anti-Humeans are committed to the further claim, which Humeans deny, 199
that these regularities can be explained in terms of modal features of the world: the entities 
that exhibit the regularities in question are governed in such a way as to produce the 
regularities.  The things that play this governing role may, but need not, be laws. Thus, 200
the Central Dilemma faces not only nomological realism, but any anti-Humean view. In a 
generalised form, the Central Dilemma asks whether the things  that play the governing 201
role are external to, or internal to, the things that exhibit the explanandum regularities.  
Note that the Central Dilemma, thus posed, leaves room for the notions of governance, 
internality, and externality to be understood in a range of ways. This freedom matches a 
further dimension of freedom in the dilemma, which is general with respect to the 
 It is not important in the present context to put this more precisely. It is not clear, at a first pass, 199
how patternedness relates to the feature that I have called ‘animation’ (a point that Tugby 2017 has 
developed into a challenge for anti-Humeans). 
 Humeans about nomic regularities - ‘nomic’ meant neutrally - could be committed to modal 200
features in the world, but tend not to be: their attitude toward regularities is closely tied to their 
commitment to ‘Humean supervenience’, a ‘mosaic’ world-picture of maximally local matters of 
fact, on which there are no genuinely modal connections between distinct things. 
 I use ‘things’ here in a loose way, that is not intended to rule out whatever might be real but not 201
an entity, such as a formal relationship (Lowe 2006, ch.3). 
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underlying ontological accounts that one might give of the things that govern, and the 
things that exhibit, the explanandum regularities. As we will see, the Central Dilemma 
relies on certain connections that these notions must stand in: governance, in the required 
sense, must involve determining, while externality must be related appropriately to 
independent variation, while internality allows a greater breadth of theoretical 
interpretation. Anti-Humean theories wishing to meet the challenge of the Central 
Dilemma - as they must - must give a clear account of the lines that they take with respect 
to these choice points.  
Finally, it bears mentioning here that the Central Dilemma dovetails with recurring theme 
in this thesis: the notion of a conferral ontology.  Since Mumford’s discussion of the first 202
horn of the Central Dilemma focuses on David Armstrong’s theory of laws, the problem is 
most directly put in terms of Armstrong’s ‘principle of instantiation’ and the notion of 
independent variability. However, there is a further background threat that external 
approaches to governance may turn out to be what I am calling conferral ontologies of 
animation. Since I am committed to rejecting conferral ontologies in general - at least, such 
ontologies that do not heavily clarify the notion of conferral that they employ - I am 
committed to addressing the first horn in a way that does not appeal to a problematic 
notion of conferral.  
 See the Introduction for discussion. 202
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3. The First Horn: External Governance 
Since the Central Dilemma, as noted, leaves interpretive luft  with respect to the notions 203
of internality and externality, it is not entirely clear why the Central Dilemma should be 
understood as a dilemma, if this is taken to mean that the two horns are mutually exclusive. 
Whether they are so is a matter to be decided by filling in one’s account of what internality 
and externality amount to: it seems quite possible, in the abstract, to offer a non-
dichotomous conception of those notions. Indeed, dimensionism - as I will argue - is 
compatible with such a conception. On the view that I will propose, therefore, 
dimensionism will not meet the Central Dilemma’s challenge by taking either horn and 
rejecting the other. The proposed account will fall in more closely with the second horn 
than the first - but it will not be a clean division.  
Mumford (2004, Ch.9) discusses the dilemma in relation to the DTA theory of laws and 
Jonathan Lowe’s (2002, 2006, 2013) four-category ontology. Since my view has much in 
common with both of these positions, I will follow Mumford’s choice of examples. My 
goal in these sections is to bring out some weak spots in the DTA and Lowean theories that 
generate the problem posed by the Central Dilemma, before arguing later that a 
dimensionist treatment avoids these weaknesses. In presenting the dilemma against 
Armstrong and Lowe, I will mix my own argumentation with that of Mumford. 
Mumford discusses the theories of Dretske, Tooley, and Armstrong in detail (2004, Ch.6), 
but focuses on Armstrong’s position - in Mumford’s view, the most plausible of them - in 
his presentation of the Central Dilemma. Here I shall focus on Armstrong directly.  
 In the chess player’s sense. The term is used (‘creating luft’) to describe moves that make space 203
for a (typically castled) king to move, as prophylaxis against tactical motifs (such as back-rank and 
smothered mates) that rely on the restriction of the king’s freedom of movement by its own pieces. 
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Armstrong’s ontology of laws is set within his systematic ontology of universals and states 
of affairs (Armstrong 1983, 1997). Roughly, states of affairs are concrete particulars whose 
abstracted, non-mereological constituents are objects and universals. A universal is an 
unsaturated entity: it is a type of state of affairs. Thus, on Armstrong’s view, for an object a 
to have a property F is for there to exist a state of affairs whose constituents are a and F 
paired just so:  the state of affairs F(a). Universals are types that distinct states of affairs 204
may share: the states of affairs F(a) and F(b) share as a constituent the universal F.  Since 205
they are merely abstracted constituents of states of affairs, Armstrongian universals fall 
under a principle of instantiation: only instantiated universals exist.  
On an Armstrongian ontology, the explananda in focus here are the regularity-constituting 
relations between states of affairs. It is these relations that a Humean would claim to be 
mere regularities, and which, on Armstrong’s view, are the target for explanation by laws.  
Let us take, as a dummy example, some regularity-constituting relation R between the 
states of affairs F(a) and G(a) as a target for such explanation. If such states of affairs exist, 
then the universals F and G exist. Moreover, the universals F and G may be related. In 
particular, they may stand in a relation of natural necessitation. This will be a matter of 
their being the relata of a higher-order relational universal - that is, a matter of the 
existence of a higher-order state of affairs: N(F,G).  On Armstrong’s view, the state of 206
affairs N(F,G) obtains contingently. But that it does obtain is sufficient to explain the R-
 This qualification is a simplified fix here against distinct states of affairs with the same 204
constituents, such as R(a,b) and R(b,a) where R is a non-symmetric relation. 
 Or rather, F(x). 205
 So it is customarily written. Again, N[F(x),G(x)] would be more perspicuous in some respects.206
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relatedness of instances of F and G - or so goes the claim. We can represent the 
Armstrongian view diagrammatically: 
On Armstrong’s picture, then, the explananda in focus in our dummy example are the 
regularity-constituting R-relations between states of affairs F(a) and G(a), and the 
explanans is the existence of a higher-level state of affairs N(F,G); the explanatory relation 
is a relation of governance between this state of affairs - a law of nature - and the R-related 
states of affairs, which are its instances.   207
The Armstrongian theory, sketched here, faces objections that have been extensively 
discussed. Here I focus on the problem that features most directly in Mumford’s Central 
Dilemma. The problem begins with the Armstrongian claim that the relation N is an 
external relation between F and G. This makes the law N(F,G) contingent not only in the 
sense that F and G might have gone uninstantiated and thus not existed, but also in the 
stronger sense that they might have existed and not been N-related. This, in turn, makes the 
governance relation external. In particular, the R-relata F(a) and G(a) might have existed 
and not been R-related. Since the target R is not guaranteed by the existence of F(a) and 
G(a), or by the existence of F and G, it falls to the relation N to secure the explanandum R. 
 One might hold that instances of R-relatedness should coincide broadly with instances of causal 207
relatedness. Since this point is not central to my discussion, I will not pursue it.
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But what, in turn, explains N? Since N is an external relation between F and G, so F and G 
cannot play that role alone. What further factor is involved? Since N is posited to explain 
R, so it cannot be that R in turn is what secures N. This leaves two options: either the states 
of affairs F(a) and G(a), or nothing. To take the first option is, in effect, to flatten the 
Armstrongian explanatory picture: the relation N will govern the target regularity, R, only 
because it is itself explained by the relata of R. Here we veer toward the second horn of 
Mumford’s dilemma: R becomes an internal relation between its relata, and the relation N 
is redundant. On the second option, N becomes a brute posit. It is brute not only in the 
sense that it is an arbitrary matter to say which part of Armstrong’s picture is the ground of 
N’s obtaining, but in the worse sense that Armstrong’s picture leaves no room to ground N. 
Thus, we cannot even say that N should be taken as a theoretical posit whose bruteness is 
mitigated by its functional, explanatory role - for it is precisely that explanatory role which 
shows that N has no viable ground in the Armstrongian ontological picture.  
Can Armstrong amend his view, and claim that the relation N is internal between F and G? 
I argue not - at any rate, not in a beneficial way.  The culprit here is the principle of 208
instantiation. For N to be an internal relation between F and G is for the existence of F and 
G to suffice for their N-relatedness.  But N is not superinternal: we cannot simply 209
suppose that the existence of either relatum suffices to guarantee the existence of the other. 
What guarantees the existence of both relata, according to the principle of instantiation, is 
their both being instantiated. This makes the instantiations of F and G ontologically prior 
 I leave aside the question of whether Armstrong’s further systematic commitments permit this 208
amendment. As Mumford (2004:95) points out, they do not.
 It will not help matters to add that the existence of F and G ‘just as they are’ should suffice for 209
their N-relatedness. Although such an addition would make the instantiation of F and G specifically 
in the object a available as a ground for N, it would not help N to play its explanatory role any 
better than before.
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(or at least, not ontologically posterior) to their being N-related, but it is precisely 
posteriority on the part of those instantiations that is required if N is to exercise a 
governing role over them. Thus, even internalising N between F and G will not help 
Armstrong’s account of laws. Here again, the problem isn’t just that making N internal 
leaves the explanatory role of N mysterious - but rather, that the demands of internality and 
explanation are in conflict given Armstrong’s principle of instantiation. 
A further problem for Armstrong’s view is that it entails a quiddistic conception of 
properties.  As Mumford points out, if N is an external relation between F and G, then F 210
and G may exist without being N-related. Now, N is the ground of the modal profiles of F 
and G (or else it would be explanatorily redundant). So to say that F and G may vary with 
respect to N is to say that they - the very same properties - could exist with modal profiles 
that differ from that expressed by N. Since N, F, and G are arbitrary terms, the point 
generalises: properties are not individuated by their causal profiles. As Mumford (2004, 
§9.5) notes, quidditism is an implausible thesis.  Moreover, it raises the further question 211
of how (natural) modal profiles could be externally conferred upon properties at all. So: if 
Armstrong’s theory of laws entails quidditism, then so much the worse for Armstrong’s 
theory.  
I have argued that Armstrong’s account is brought down by two factors: his principle of 
instantiation, and his claim that N is an external relation. Moreover, the theory cannot be 
saved by dropping just one of these components. For, as I have argued, to drop N-
 In this context, quidditism can be understood as the claim that properties and their causal/210
dispositional profiles may vary or recombine independently of each other. 
 While this is by no means uncontroversial, I will simply assume here that Mumford is right. 211
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externality without dropping the principle of instantiation brings no explanatory benefit, 
while N-externality entails quidditism without appeal to the principle of instantiation.  
4. The Second Horn: Internal Governance 
I have discussed the downfall of Armstrong’s theory as an example of the first horn of 
Mumford’s dilemma at work. We saw that N-externality, besides posing direct problems for 
Armstrong’s explanation of laws, also led to quidditism. Yet N-externality was 
unavoidable, since Armstrong’s background theory - in particular, his principle of 
instantiation - could not allow a different setup. In the present section, I turn to the second 
horn of Mumford’s dilemma, and follow Mumford in discussing Lowe’s four-category 
ontology as a case study. 
Before turning to Lowe, it bears noting that various other theories take the second horn of 
Mumford’s dilemma that are very different from Lowe’s in their form. Examples are the 
dispositional essentialist views of Ellis (2001, 2002), and Bird (2007), and indeed 
Mumford’s own ‘realist lawlessness’. As Mumford points out, what unifies some of these 
accounts (such as those of Mumford and of Bird, but arguably, not that of Ellis) is their 
claim that the things that exhibit our target features - animation and nomic regularities - are 
themselves the things that play the governing role. It is properties that exhibit the target 
features, and properties themselves that possess the dispositional profiles that explain them.  
Such views are not vulnerable to Mumford’s dilemma. For Mumford’s dilemma is not 
intended for them - at least, insofar as they do not claim to be nomic realist theories. 
Rather, the dilemma is raised as a problem for accounts that purport to explain the target 
phenomena by positing laws. Mumford’s discussion (2004:xii) concerns the reification of 
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laws, but - as I explain in the next section - I will focus my discussion here on ontologies 
that explain the target phenomena by appeal to a particular sort of structure. It is ontologies 
with this structure - shared by the views of Armstrong and Lowe - that Mumford’s dilemma 
attacks, and an ontology of such a structure that I will be concerned to defend. For this 
reason, I will leave dispositional essentialism and other related views out of my discussion.  
As above with Armstrong, I will restrict my presentation of Lowe’s view to the bare 
minimum. Lowe’s account of laws is set within his four-category ontology, defended in 
various writings (2002, 2006, 2013 inter alia).  According to that ontology, there are - 212
unsurprisingly - four fundamental ontological categories: objects, kinds, modes, and 
attributes. Obtaining between members of these categories are two formal ontological 
relationships: instantiation (between objects and kinds, and between modes and attributes) 
and characterisation (between objects and modes, and between kinds and attributes). 
These can be represented diagrammatically in an ontological square:  
 Lowe himself cautions (2006:114) against too-readily combining his statements over a large 212
span of time into a single system. The context for his warning is his discussion of Fraser 
MacBride’s argument - inspired by Ramsey (1925) - against categorial uniqueness in the four-
category ontology. Indeed, Lowe’s treatment of categorial uniqueness underwent further change 
later (2013), with the introduction of strong and weak dependence relationships. I will therefore 
only claim, if pressed, that the account discussed here is Lowean, rather than Lowe’s, or even 
Lowe’s-at-t. 
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Each category can be uniquely identified by a distinctive dependence profile. For example, 
objects depend rigidly for their existence on the kinds that they instantiate, while kinds 
depend nonrigidly on the objects that instantiate them. Likewise, modes are rigidly 
dependent on the attributes that they instantiate, while attributes depend nonrigidly on the 
modes that instantiate them. These dependence relationships are constituted by the formal 
relationships of instantiation that relate objects to kinds, and modes to attributes. These 
shared formal relationships are the basis, in Lowe’s ontology, for the distinction between 
universals and particulars: universal is a transcategorial term that includes both attributes 
and kinds, while particular is a transcategorial term including objects and modes. The 
characterisation relationship plays a similar role in underwriting the distinction between 
substantial and nonsubstantial entities (latterly, properties).  Thus, objects, kinds, 213
attributes and modes may be termed respectively: substantial particulars, substantial 
universals, non-substantial universals, and non-substantial particulars.  
On Lowe’s ontology, the relationship of characterisation between kinds and attributes 
plays a role similar to that played by the N relation between universals within Armstrong’s 
theory. On both accounts, laws of nature are accommodated as relations between 
universals. Here it will help my case to consider some points of similarity and difference 
between the two views.  
The differences between Lowe and Armstrong are extensive; here are a few. First, the 
relation to which Lowe’s account appeals is not an external relation, but an internal one. 
 There is a curious apparent glitch here, since modes depend rigidly on objects, but kinds depend 213
rigidly on attributes - yet attributes characterise kinds, and modes characterise attributes. It is not 
clear how this reversal in the direction of rigid dependence, without a reversal in the direction of 
the constituting characterisation relationship, is supposed to be understood. This is why I have 
included lines, rather than arrows, in the ontological square. I return to this point later.
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Indeed, in Lowe’s terminology, it is not a relation at all, but a formal relationship - whose 
obtaining does not consist in the existence of a further entity (a relation), but which obtains 
simply as a matter of the ontological forms of the relata. On Lowe’s view, the formal 
relationship in question is not Armstrong’s natural necessitation, but the characterisation 
relationship between kinds (substantial universals) and attributes (nonsubstantial 
universals). Second, Lowe’s account relies explicitly upon a distinction between two sorts 
of universals: substantial and non-substantial. Lowe’s relationship between universals is a 
transcategorial relationship, unlike Armstrong’s. Thus, Lowe’s relationship is richer than 
Armstrong’s, in the sense of being grounded in the ontological forms of two categories 
rather than one. Third, Lowe’s conception of universals - which, unlike Armstrong’s, is 
transcategorial - does not involve a conception of universals as unsaturated, abstracted 
constituents or types of states of affairs. All this is to say that the background ontology in 
which Lowe’s account of laws is couched is wholly different from that of Armstrong.  
The similarities between Lowe and Armstrong are fewer. Here I will point out only one, 
which is most important: Lowe, like Armstrong, subscribes to a principle of instantiation 
for universals (kinds and attributes): universals are non-rigidly existentially dependent on 
the particulars (objects, modes) that instantiate them. 
An intuitive first pass at an explanatory picture for governance, on Lowe’s scheme, might 
look like this: 
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Here the governance relationship is posited to relate characterisation relationships directly: 
kind-attribute characterisation governs object-mode characterisation. That is not too far 
wrong, as far as it goes, as I will explain in the next section. But to stop here would be to 
pass over the richer resources of Lowe’s ontology in comparison with Armstrong’s. For 
Lowe’s distinction between two kinds of universals allows for an explanation of 
dispositionality in terms of a formal relationship of exemplification. Exemplification, in the 
four-category ontology, relates objects to attributes In particular, objects may exemplify 
attributes two ways: dispositionally, and occurrently. For an object to exemplify an 
attribute occurrently is for it to be characterised by a mode that instantiates that attribute; 
for it to exemplify an attribute dispositionally is for it to instantiate a kind that is 
characterised by that attribute. Thus, exemplification relationships are indirect: they are 
constituted by instantiation and characterisation relationships (in an order appropriate to 
the kind of exemplification in question). Diagrammatically: 
Here the letters D. and O. label what I will call the dispositional and occurrent tracks of 
exemplification. Note again that exemplification is a relationship between objects and 
attributes. It is objects that exemplify attributes occurrently or dispositionally. This places 
the explanatory work in Lowe’s theory firmly at the feet of substantial particulars and 
universals.  For objects depend rigidly on the kinds that they instantiate - they are objects 214
 On an Aristotelian ontology, this is just as things should be.214
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of those kinds - and kinds, in turn, stand in a direct relationship to attributes; it is in virtue 
of these direct relationships between kinds and attributes that objects dispositionally 
exemplify the attributes that they do. Roughly, we may say that it is the characterisation of 
a kind by an attribute that makes it possible that an object instantiating that kind should be 
characterised by a mode instantiation that attribute: kind-attribute characterisation confers 
on objects the potentiality to be characterised by modes that instantiate the relevant 
attributes. Three things can be noted here. 
First, kind-attribute characterisation relations express tendencies (Lowe 2013:41). These 
tendencies correspond to the dispositional profiles that kinds confer upon the objects that 
instantiate them. This point helps Lowe’s case in two ways. First, it helps to make clear 
how the four-category ontology improves upon Armstrong’s view by avoiding quidditism, 
at least with respect to substantial universals. It avoids quidditism because kind-attribute 
characterisation is an internal relationship, in what I have in Chapter 3 called a Moorean 
sense, not an external relation. Second, the fact that kind-attribute characterisation 
expresses a dispositional profile of which object-mode characterisation expresses the 
manifestation, goes some way toward helping to make sense of the strange reversal of 
dependence relationships at the top and bottom of the ontological square. Without this 
connection to dispositionality, it is hard to explain how those characterisation relationships 
should constitute dependence relationships in opposite directions, despite themselves being 
directed ‘in the same way’.  
Second, we may observe that on the four-category ontology, governance is properly 
understood as a relationship between the two tracks of exemplification. An object’s 
exemplification profile on the dispositional track governs its exemplification profile on the 
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occurrent track. Here we can note, further, that the work of governance is done entirely on 
the substantial side of the ontological square: the characterisation profiles of kinds 
constitute the dispositional profiles that kinds confer upon objects, consisting of 
dispositions to be characterised by modes that instantiate the appropriate attributes. We 
may note, too, that it is rather unclear what work the instantiation relationship between 
modes and attributes is supposed to do in the resulting picture. Indeed, this ambiguity of 
role is symptomatic of the problem for Lowe’s view that I will discuss below.  
Third, we may observe that kind-attribute characterisation must be a direct relation, since it 
is an internal formal relationship. This is a direct consequence of the explanatory role that 
that relationship is supposed to play with respect to dispositions and laws; in particular, 
kind-attribute characterisation must not turn out to be grounded in prior relations at the 
particular level. This is, as we will see, a source of problems for Lowe’s theory. 
Lowe’s account of nomic governance draws, as we have seen, on far richer ontological 
resources than Armstrong’s: something that is not immediately obvious from the similar 
surface forms of the theories. Unfortunately, despite these improvements upon Armstrong’s 
theory, Lowe’s account of governance suffers from problems as a result of the principle 
that it shares with Armstrong’s view: the principle of instantiation.  
The problem gets going if we note that dispositionally exemplifying an attribute is not the 
same thing as being disposed to exemplify it (occurrently). This is because an object 
dispositionally exemplifies an attribute in virtue of its instantiating a kind that is 
characterised by that attribute, and this kind-attribute characterisation relationship requires 
that the attribute in question should exist. For attributes are universals, and universals - the 
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principle of instantiation tells us - must be instantiated to exist. This poses a problem in at 
least those cases in which an object may be disposed to occurrently exemplify an attribute 
which, but for its being exemplified by that object, would not exist. The point here is not a 
temporal one: it is not that an object may be disposed to occurrently exemplify an attribute 
that nothing yet exemplifies. For positing a four-dimensionalist world-picture here will not 
help. We may imagine a world in which a given object is the unique occurrent exemplifier 
of a given attribute. On four-dimensionalism, the attribute will exist simpliciter at any time. 
But in such a case, that object’s exemplifying the attribute dispositionally will be explained 
by its exemplifying that attribute occurrently, and this is to get the direction of explanation 
- if we are concerned about governance - entirely wrong. The point will not be helped by 
introducing further objects for which the direction of explanation is right, in virtue of our 
initial object’s having secured the existence of the attribute in question, since (especially on 
a four-dimensional world-picture) the choice of the initial ‘anchoring’ object will be 
entirely and viciously arbitrary. This leaves kind-attribute characterisation relationships 
being governed by object-mode relationships after all, which is precisely the wrong 
result.  215
As an account of governance, then, Lowe’s view does not quite work. While Lowe’s view 
improves upon Armstrong’s by allowing an internal governing relationship within an 
 Mumford makes the same point in terms of a resurgence of Humean mere regularities within the 215
Lowean framework. 
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enriched ontological framework, its preservation of Armstrong’s principle of instantiation 
gives rise to the very same problem that afflicted Armstrong’s view.  216
5. Dimensionism and Governance 
We have seen how the theories of Armstrong and Lowe fall on problems associated with 
external relations (for Armstrong) and the principle of instantiation (for both views). But 
we have also seen that the Central Dilemma is not universally problematic: lawless theories 
are well-equipped to pass by unharmed. In arguing against Armstrong and Lowe, however, 
nothing has turned out to hinge on calling their views nomic realist views - or indeed on 
calling anything in their accounts laws. Rather, the Central Dilemma is targeted against 
theories that have an Armstrongian or Lowean structure, that are theories of governance.  
I will call the class of theories of governance, to which Lowe’s and Armstrong’s theories 
belong, the class of ⌶-theories (to be read: I-theories). The reason, in the case of 
Armstrong, is obvious enough. In Lowe’s case, it is less obvious, since I have taken Lowe’s 
account of governance to involve a governance relation between two tracks of 
exemplification. Nevertheless, I will maintain that Lowe’s theory has the general form of 
an ⌶-theory. In general, ⌶-theories, as I understand them, take the target explananda of an 
 Heil (2012:116-117) raises a further problem for Lowe’s principle of instantiation. Suppose that 216
there is no salt in the light cone of any water. In such a world, we should still hold that salt is 
disposed to dissolve in water, but there will be no instances of salt dissolving in water, and hence, 
since universals require instances to exist, none of the relevant attributes will be available to 
characterise the kind quantity of salt. It should be noted, however, that Heil takes this to be an 
argument against admitting universals, not an argument for Platonism about universals. Thus, 
arguments against the principle of instantiation are not necessarily arguments for Platonism. 
However, Tugby (2016) has argued in favour of taking the Platonist route here. I will not discuss 
those arguments here. The reason is that my aim in this chapter is to present a dimensionist account 
of governance, and it would not be a dimensionist account of governance that I was presenting, if 
dimensions were eliminated (Heil-style) from their claimed governing role. 
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account of governance to be certain regularity-constituting relations between entities 
(particulars, presumably), and take the explanans to involve two components: a 
relationship between further entities (universals, perhaps), and a relation of governance 
between the two, however this relation of governance is cashed out. I will say, then, that 
Lowe’s account has the specific form of a ⎕-theory, but the general form of an ⌶-theory.   217
The rest of this chapter will take up the task of presenting a dimensionist account of 
governance. The account that I present will qualify as an ⌶-theory, but - I will argue - one 
that does not run into the problems that face the theories of Armstrong and Lowe. I will 
argue this by offering an account that rejects the two problematic assumptions of 
externality and the principle of instantiation, and by making clear exactly how 
dimensionism avoids problems at the points where these assumptions posed problems for 
Armstrong and Lowe. I am not aiming here to show that the dimensionist account that I 
will propose is true. That would require a discussion beyond the scope of the present 
chapter: I would have to show that the account can deal with all kinds of further objections. 
Moreover, I do not intend to argue that the account offered here is the only account of 
governance that is compatible with dimensionism. Rather, I will pursue the more modest 
goal of showing that dimensionism can supply an account of governance that is at least 
preferable over the accounts of Armstrong and Lowe.  
On dimensionism, the target phenomena for an account of governance are the nomic,  218
regularity-constituting relations between the determinate properties of objects. Since 
 A further, irrelevant but pleasing reason that I have for being keen about the ‘⌶-theory’ term is 217
that the Chinese character  (gōng) happens to translate roughly, but appropriately, as work. 
 This is intended, as usual, in a neutral sense. 218
!192
dimensionism, as I have presented it, is committed to a nominalist account of such 
properties, this is not the full story. Recall, from chapter 3, the account of determinate 
property abstraction: two objects have the same determinate property in respect of D just in 
case the pluralities consisting of each object and the dimension D collectively perfectly 
resemble. This reductive account of determinate properties rested on the factored structure 
of determination: the appeal to resemblance is enabled by the lack of additional ontological 
commitments incurred in specifying the relata of resemblance, namely the pluralities of 
objects and dimensions. What enables the account to use simply pluralities rather than say, 
sets, is the at-all determination relationships between objects and dimensions, which 
guarantee some accompanying relationships of determination-somehow, supplying the 
space in which resemblance relationships may be situated.  Thus, the target phenomena, 219
on dimensionism, for an account of governance, are concerned with patterns in these 
resemblance relationships situated in the ontological space provided by relationships of 
determinate determination, or determination-somehow - an ontological space provided, 
moreover, by relationships of determinable determination, or determination at-all. On the 
dimensionist view, as we will see, an account of governance can be given on which these 
relationships of determination at-all and somehow play a central explanatory role. 
Dimensionism thus shows at least as much integrality as the Armstrongian or Lowean 
accounts: the central resources for the explanans of governance are the very resources that 
are appealed to in the ontological account of the explananda.  
 The at-all determination relationships are not easily eliminable from the account. For suppose 219
they were eliminated. Then trivially, any two objects could perfectly resemble under a dimension 
by not determining that dimension at all. But it is absurd that objects should have the same 
properties (in a neutral sense of ‘properties’) in respect of D precisely by having no properties in 
respect of D. At-all determination relationships enable the account to avoid such cases by 
specifying that the account is concerned with resemblance relationships between only those objects 
that determine the relevant dimensions at all. 
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Objects enter into determinate determination relationships in such a way that their 
resemblance relationships with each other, in those determination relationships, is 
constrained by something or other that is external to those relationships of determination-
somehow. This is the phenomenon of governance that I aim to explain. 
Here is the rough picture. Objects determine the dimensions that they do, at all, essentially. 
Those dimensions stand in certain internal relationships which are functional relationships, 
of the sorts expressed by functional laws. These relationships are not themselves 
individuated by appeal to determinate properties (which are reduced away on the 
dimensionist ontology), but represent, functionally, relationships that determinate 
determinings of those dimensions must satisfy. These relations can be understood as joint 
potentialities that dimensions have, or rather, as their joint lack of potentialities to be 
determined in any other way than would count as satisfying the functional relationship 
between them. This amounts to a constraint, not directly on determinate properties that 
objects can possess, but on the ways in which objects may resemble under the dimensions 
in question. The claim is, in effect, that the joint potentialities of dimensions place 
restrictions on the range of determinings-somehow that count as determinings at-all. 
Diagrammatically:    
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The diagram is admittedly rough. Here the lower-case letters designate the formal 
relationships of determination at-all (a), determination-somehow (s), and the governance 
relation (g). L and R label the horizontal bars, that stand in for laws - the functional 
internal relationships between dimensions - and regularities, or regularity-constituting 
resemblances between objects in virtue of their ways of figuring in relationships of 
determination-somehow, respectively.  
Let me spell out the picture in more detail. On the dimensionist view, objects stand in the 
at-all determination relationships that they do essentially. I will follow Lowe (2008a:39) in 
saying, here, that it is part of the essence of an object that it should stand in at-all 
determination relationships to certain dimensions. Here the essence of X is just understood 
as what it is to be X; essences are not themselves further beings that are possessed by the 
entities whose essences they are. The same goes for ‘part’, which is understood in a non-
mereological way. The essence of X is what is articulated by giving the real definition of 
X, or by giving its generating principle (2012b:935). Since my aim here is not to defend a 
full-blown Lowean account of essence, I will simply take that account for granted.  
Lowean essences are closely tied to metaphysical possibility. Indeed, what is possible may, 
roughly, be understood as what is not incompatible with the essences of what there is. To 
be sure, this is not a reductive account of metaphysical modality, since the notion of 
incompatibility that it involves is itself a modal notion. Lowe’s account here sits well with 
Barbara Vetter’s (2015) account of metaphysical possibility in terms of potentialities, on 
which for p to be possible is, roughly, for nothing, or no things, to have a degree-1 
potentiality (or degree-1 potentialities) to be such that ~p. 
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However, the combination of Lowe’s and Vetter’s views is not unproblematic. On Vetter’s 
account of potentialities, potentialities are individuated only by their manifestations. Thus, 
two things that have potentialities to be such that p have the same potentiality (though they 
may have it to different degrees). Vetter’s way of individuating potentialities by ‘such-that’ 
clauses - cashed out formally by λ-abstraction - potentially leaves out a distinction that 
Lowe’s account of essence allows us to make.  This is a distinction between those 
metaphysically necessary truths that are intrinsic, and those that are extrinsic, to a thing’s 
essence.  
Lowe supplies us with two distinctions here. The first is between metaphysically necessary 
truths about X that do, and those that do not, capture the generating principle of X. Lowe 
offers an example with ellipses (2012b:936): 
(E1) An ellipse is the locus of a point moving continuously in a plane in such a fashion that 
the sum of the distances between it and two other fixed points remains constant. 
(E2) An ellipse is the closed curve of intersection between a cone and a plane cutting it at 
an oblique angle to its axis greater than that of the cone’s side. 
As Lowe points out, E2, by contrast with E1: 
[…] tells us a necessary property of all ellipses, but not the essence of an ellipse - what an ellipse is. For it 
does not capture an ellipse’s generating principle. It characterizes an ellipse in terms that are extrinsic to its 
nature as the particular kind of geometrical figure that it is. (2012b:936) 
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The second distinction is between what is properly contained in the essence of a thing, and 
what is not. In particular, it is a distinction between what follows from the essence of a 
thing singly, and what follows jointly from the essences of things. Of the same examples, 
Lowe points out: 
Consider now a metaphysically necessary truth [E2]. It is not part of the essence of any ellipse that this 
condition holds, nor is it part of the essence of any cone that it does. What is very plausible to contend, 
however, is that this metaphysically necessary truth hold in virtue of the essences of an ellipse and a cone, 
which are two quite distinct essences. It is because of what an ellipse is, and what a cone is, that this 
relationship necessarily holds between ellipses and cones. But it is not part of anything’s essence that it holds. 
(2012b:939) 
Here we can note that E2 may follow jointly from the essences of cones and ellipses 
without entailing that whatever is part of the essence of either is a part of the essence of the 
other sort of thing.  
We have, then, a distinction between a thing’s necessary properties and its necessary 
properties that capture its generating principle, and a distinction between what follows 
from the essence of something, and what follows jointly from the essences of some 
things.  To this, let me add a third notion, that of what I will call ancestral essence. 220
Suppose it is part of the essence of X that p, and p entails that Y exists. Suppose, 
furthermore, that it is part of the essence of Y that q. In such a case, although q will be a 
 Lowe (2012b:939) points out that what follows jointly from the essences of cones and ellipses 220
does not follow from a single essence of a hybrid kind of thing, a cone-ellipse. I will follow Lowe 
in this. I will therefore observe, in general, a distinction between it following collectively from the 
essences of some things that p, and it following from the collective essence of those things that p: 
where the latter locution is used (for example, where I have talked about joint potentialities, 
following Vetter), the former is meant. General reasons against saying and meaning the latter sort 
of thing are given by Oliver and Smiley (2001). 
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necessary truth (with respect to X), q stands to the essence of X in a relationship that is 
hard to precisely capture in terms of the two distinctions already introduced. I will 
therefore say that it is a part of the ancestral essence of X that q. In general, whatever is 
part of the essence of some Y such that the proposition that Y exists is part of the essence 
of X is part of the ancestral essence of X, and whatever is part of the essence of some Z 
such that the proposition that Z exists is part of the ancestral essence of X is also part of 
the ancestral essence of X. The point here is that the relationship of essential dependence of 
X on Y in such cases is such as to render whatever is part of the essence of Y not quite 
extrinsic to the essence of X, but not quite intrinsic to it either.  
With these notions in place, we are in a position to see why the governance relationship on 
a dimensionist ontology should deserve the name. Begin with objects. It is part of the 
essence of an object that it determines certain dimensions. Now, the dimensionist posit of 
laws amounts to this: dimensions stand in internal functional relations to each other, where 
it follows jointly from their natures that they should do so. These internal relations are 
expressive of the dispositional profiles of dimensions; dimensions have their dispositional 
profiles essentially, just as kinds and attributes stand in their characterisation relationships 
essentially on Lowe’s ontology, and just as properties have their dispositional profiles 
essentially on a the views of Mumford, and Bird. These dispositional profiles place 
constraints on what can count as determining the relevant dimensions at all: nothing could 
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be a determining of those dimensions except those things that determine them in such ways 
as to satisfy the functional relations specified by the relevant dispositional profiles.  221
In my terminology above, these functional dimension-dimension relations - call them L-
relations - will be part of the ancestral essences of objects. They are not intrinsic to the 
natures of objects, but are nevertheless necessary in relation to those natures: objects are 
necessarily such that the relevant L-relations obtain.  222
Here the dimensionist must bridge a gap. For one might object that, while L-relations may 
guarantee that nothing could count as a determination of the L-related dimensions except 
such things as satisfy the functional L-relations, L-relations themselves are not enough to 
guarantee that anything does satisfy those relations. In particular, given some objects, and 
given that they stand essentially in at-all relations of determination to some L-related 
dimensions, it seems that the dimensionist can only say, at best, how the objects in question 
would have to figure in ‘somehow’ relationships of determination: nothing in the account 
guarantees that they should do so at all. According to this objection, my account has only 
shown that dimensionism would be incoherent if objects failed to stand in the appropriate 
 An example may be drawn from Cartwright (1983:57, 59ff), who discusses the interaction of 221
Newton’s law and Coulomb’s law. There, bodies that are massed and located (supposing that 
location, in some sense that I will not precisify given my present illustrative focus, underlies 
distance) are governed by a certain relationship between the dimensions mass and location, while 
bodies that are massed, located, and charged are governed by a further internal relationship 
between the dimensions mass, location, and charge. Though I will not develop this connection 
here, it is not implausible to suggest that these multiple internal relationships between dimensions 
may play some role in offering an ontological basis for ceteris paribus laws that are the focus of 
Cartwright’s discussion.
 This point is an asset for my view, since it allows me to answer certain objection against 222
necessitarianism about laws. The objection is this: how can laws be necessary, since it is 
conceivable that they should be different? My answer: it is conceivable only in the sense that laws 
are not written fully into the essences of objects.
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sorts of determinate determination relationships - but it has not explained why objects 
should be at all inclined to save dimensionism from incoherence by behaving 
appropriately. The objection rests on a worry that, although I am subscribing to Platonism 
about dimensions and thereby purporting to improve upon Armstrong and Lowe by 
avoiding the problems associated with their principle of instantiation,  I am also 223
simultaneously undermining those improvements by positing a factored determination 
structure in which the relationship of determination-somehow serves to reintroduce those 
very same worries. 
The objection rests, I suggest, on a mistaken conception of the kind of explanation that is 
being attempted here. For the objection rests, at a crucial point, on my inability to explain 
why objects should stand in appropriate determinate determination relationships given that 
they already stand in the appropriate at-all determination relationships. But this is to 
commit to a staged conception of the kind of explanation at which I am aiming. This kind 
of staged conception of explanation is implicit in one construal of nomic realism, on which 
laws are posited to confer animation upon a world that is, in a metaphysically antecedent 
way, inanimate. But I am inclined to reject that explanatory project, because I am inclined 
against conferral ontologies in general, and because I think it is plausible that animation is 
an unconferrable feature of the reality. I am in line, then, with Mumford’s claim that the 
world already contains all the animation that it needs, and I am in agreement with his 
claim that laws cannot do the job of conferring animation upon antecedently inanimate 
things.  
 I should stress here that I intend ‘Platonism’ to express no more than the denial of a principle of 223
instantiation (or rather, determination) for dimensions. It does not entail, in addition, that 
dimensions are necessary beings, or that they inhabit some transcendent domain. 
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I reject, then, the claim that the entities of the world are inanimate prior to their being 
animated by governing laws. Along with this, I also reject the staged conception of 
explanation that is implied in that view - the idea that explanation should consist in 
showing, step by step, how one kind of world may be built out of a world that could 
coherently be supposed to be disposed to be otherwise. In particular, I reject the kind of 
explanation, in this context, that allows one to pause partway through - to take a proper 
part of the explanatory world-picture - and ask how the next part follows.  
In the place of these ideas, I subscribe to the view that the target explanandum for laws is 
not animation as such, but the regularities and patterns that the animated behaviours of 
entities obey. Along with this, I subscribe to - and aim to realise - a conception of 
explanation on which the components of an explanatory world-picture act all together 
rather than in a kind of explanatory queue. The point here is intended to be analogous to 
that made by Martin (2008), that causal interactions are not staged, asymmetric actions of 
causes upon effects, but simultaneous and mutual manifestations of powers. Since the 
notion of a manifestation need not be that of the manifestation of a causal disposition, or of 
a disposition by a causal stimulus (Vetter 2015:97), there is no obvious obstacle to 
extending Martin’s notion of mutual manifestations to the present case.  224
An analogy may help here. Consider the inverse square law of gravity, which says that the 
force due to gravity between two bodies is proportional to the product of their masses and 
inversely proportional to the square of their distance from each other. Consider an arbitrary, 
 One difference here is that I am talking about metaphysical, not temporal, staging. But it is not 224
clear why this should present an obstacle, either. Indeed, it is not clear even how this should present 
an obstacle to the extension of the present account from synchronic applications of functional laws 
to diachronic ones.
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particular case in which two objects obey this law. It would be a mistake - as Mumford 
points out - to think that the determinate values in the concrete case - the masses and the 
distance - are governed by the inverse square law itself. Rather, the law describes how 
those determinate values (or their bearers) act, all together and at once, to govern 
themselves. Similarly, on a dimensionist view, what it is to give an account of how the 
elements of a dimensionist ontology - none of which are inherently inert - act all together 
to govern themselves. I do not, as stated above, claim that the account offered here is an 
account of laws that play the kind of animation-conferring governing role that I am 
rejecting explicitly here.  
I intend to leave it open whether my proposed view is a nomological realist view. That 
seems to be a verbal issue. What is more important is to note the concrete features of the 
proposed view that make it similar to Armstrong’s and Lowe’s views, and to show how my 
proposed view keeps these elements while avoiding the Central Dilemma.  
I have already claimed that my theory shares a form with the theories of Armstrong and 
Lowe - it is an ⌶-theory - and that it shares with Lowe’s view an internal conception of the 
relation which does governing work. This is to say that dimensionism preserves the general 
form of other theories that have been understood in nomologically realist ways. 
Moreover, the proposed view does not fall cleanly on either horn of Mumford’s dilemma. 
The L-relations that play the governing role are extrinsic to the essences of the governed 
objects whose resemblance relationships exhibit the target explanandum regularities. But 
they are external, therefore, only in the sense that nothing that is a part of the essence of an 
object will determine how these L-relations should go. They are, crucially, not external in 
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the sense of allowing independent variation: objects are necessarily such that the very L-
relations that do hold, hold. So the proposed view does not fit the Central Dilemma’s first 
horn. 
Nor does the proposed view fall cleanly on the dilemma’s second horn. For the governing 
L-relations are not intrinsic to the essences of the governed objects,  but are only, rather, 225
parts of what I have called their ancestral essences. This is not enough to secure internality 
in the sense that would turn the second horn of the dilemma vicious: L-relations still have 
an explanatory role to play that is not swamped by the explanatory power of the essences 
of the governed objects.  
Finally, on the proposed view, to say that all the components of the ontological picture ‘act 
together’ is not to say that each component acts individually. To say that the explanatory 
system is ‘sprung’ all in one go does not fix how the ontological elements combine as 
functional parts of the explanatory system being sprung. What distinguishes my proposal 
from Armstrong’s and Lowe’s is that my commitment to Platonism about dimensions 
allows the posited L-relations to act as one unitary component in the explanatory scheme. 
It allows this because it guarantees the existence of the relata of the L-relations, which 
allows those relata not to be mismatched in explanatory priority. For the problem brought 
on by the principle of instantiation was precisely such a mismatch: one universal could not 
be appropriately internally related to another except in virtue of the instantial facts. The all-
in-one conception of explanation at work on the dimensionist view, therefore, is simply not 
available for the theories of Armstrong and Lowe.  
 As I claimed above, the Central Dilemma leaves its target ontologies free to supply their own 225
conceptions of internality and externality. 
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I have argued that the dimensionist can supply the ontological basis for an ⌶-theory of 
governance that preserves what the Armstrongian and Lowean theories are looking for, 
while steering a safe middle course through Mumford’s Central Dilemma. Although I have 
used the terms ‘law’ and ‘L-relation’, whether my theory is ultimately a theory of laws is a 
question that I am leaving open. If it is, then it is certainly a reductive theory of laws: laws 
are not entities on my view, but are relationships between entities. Perhaps my ‘laws’ are 
reified to the extent that they act as unitary components in the explanatory picture for 
governance - but I can claim no more ‘thinghood’ for laws than that.  
In closing, let me briefly suggest that none of this should create much explanatory cost for 
my ontology. The account of governance proposed here is simply a further case of 
something to which the dimensionist should be committed already - namely, the work that 
dimensions do in fixing their ranges. I am committed already to the thought that a solitary 
dimension does the work of fixing the range of determinates that count as its determinates. 
This ought to be so, because it is not clear how it could be otherwise. Suppose, for 
example, that we try to build such ranges ‘bottom-up’ from determinates. Simply 
identifying the ranges of (highest) determinables with their actually instantiated 
determinates is obviously both circular and inadequate: no account is given of how new 
determinate instantiations might fit or not fit under the determinable in question. 
Identifying the range of the determinable D as the set of possible determinates of D does 
not help either: it is ontologically extravagant, and again, circular. It will not do to say that 
the range of D is the class of all determinate instantiations that are determinates in some 
given respect (again, on pain of circularity), and - as noted before - the most promising 
reductive account of the determinate-determinable relation - the reduction in terms of 
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subsets of powers - simply obliterates the requirement that determinates be non-conjunctive 
specifiers of their determinables, and with it, any hope of being an explanans for respect 
structure. (The upshot of this is that the subset account permits cases that are 
gerrymandered in relation to respect structure.) Dimensions, then, fix their own ranges 
individually: this is just to say that they come with their potentialities for determinate 
determination relationships ‘built in’. The view proposed in this chapter, amounts simply to 
an extension of this point: it may be that the essences of dimensions collectively place 
further restrictions on their determinate ranges (at least, when they are jointly determined), 
restrictions that are not part of the essence of any dimension.  
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Chapter 6 - Rival Accounts of Property Possession 
0.Intro 
I have set out dimensionism (Chapter 1), and its applications to determinables (Chapter 2), 
the problem of universals (Chapter 3), instantiation (Chapter 4), and governance (Chapter 
5). The present chapter discusses my ontology in comparison with rival ontologies. Rival 
ontologies of what? I will focus on rival ontological accounts of objects, understood as 
thick particulars: accounts of the natures of objects, properties, and the relationship 
between them. One family of such accounts - fact ontologies - I have discussed at length in 
Chapter 4, and will not discuss again here. Instead, I focus on five further rivals: 
resemblance nominalism, trope theories, neo-Aristotelian modes, universals, and 
locationism. In each case, my aim is twofold: I aim to situate my view in relation to rivals 
in the literature, but I also argue that my proposed dimensional ontology can make a fair 
bid for preference over the rival theory. Coverage of each rival theory will relatively brief, 
for reasons of space: where necessary, rather than discussing a view comprehensively, I 
discuss representatives of the views under consideration. In view of the range of discussion 
in this chapter, I cannot aim to establish my ontology’s claim to be preferable. Instead, I 
aim to establish a bid for preference, focusing on clarifying points of contact with other 
theories. 
The views under discussion may be grouped as follows. Resemblance nominalism is 
discussed first (Section 1), since it is - on the face of it - the closest relation to my favoured 
approach to the problem of universals. It, along with universalism and locationism 
(Sections 4 and 5, respectively), are external denomination theories of property possession, 
which aim to treat objects’ possession of properties in terms of their relationships to things 
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that are in some sense external to themselves - either other objects, universals, or locations. 
By contrast, the other accounts - trope theory (Section 2), and neo-Aristotelian modes 
(Section 3),  deal with property possession in terms of the internal structure of objects. 226
As we will see, my own approach qualifies as an external view, though it will involve also 
some considerations about the ‘factoring’ of an object’s internal structure.  
1. Resemblance Nominalism 
According to the account of chapter 3, for two objects to have the same determinate 
property in some respect is for them to resemble each other in that respect: objects share 
properties in virtue of their resembling other objects (in relevant respects). Put this way, a 
close relation of my view would seem to be resemblance nominalism, defended by 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). According to resemblance nominalism, for an object to have a 
property is for it to resemble certain other objects. Which property an object has is 
determined by which other objects it resembles, and objects share properties by virtue of 
resembling each other.   227
A cursory glance suggests that my view is an attempt to improve on resemblance 
nominalism by way of a small adjustment. For resemblance nominalism faces an 
inconvenience in accounting for the possession of coextensive properties: where all the Fs 
are all the Gs, being F and being G cannot be explained in terms of resemblance to 
different objects. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution to this is to accept possibilia (2002:99): to 
be F is to resemble not only the actual Fs (which might turn out to be identical with the 
actual Gs), but to resemble all Fs, both actual and merely possible. Moreover, this appeal 
 Facts and states of affairs, which I am not discussing here, also belong among such accounts.226
 The story is familiar, so I will not summarise it in detail. 227
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to possibilia as relata of resemblance relations that are explanatory of property possession 
places further demands on the natures of the required possibilia: it is not enough that they 
should be specifiable in terms of their properties; rather, they must be of the very same 
kind as the actualia that they are posited to resemble. Thus, resemblance nominalism is 
committed not just to possibilia, but to a Lewisian kind of concrete modal realism.  
Now, modal realism itself is not a disaster: it is a viable (and perhaps even true) account of 
what there is.  But it is undeniably committal: for an ontology to require modal realism is 228
for it to incur a heavy theoretical cost. Here the aforementioned cursory glance might 
suggest that, by positing a fundamental category of dimensions - understood as respects - 
my ontology is poised to offer a parallel account to the resemblance nominalist’s, with 
regard to the problem of universals, where the involvement of respects in resemblance 
removes the need for modal realism, since coextension problems no longer arise. One 
might think, then, that my theory should be understood as a revision of resemblance 
nominalism along these lines.  
Such a comparison is right, as far as it goes: my theory does avoid modal realist 
commitment in the way outlined. But it is not thereby a revision of resemblance 
nominalism, since the two views differ in far more than their respective commitments to 
possibilia and dimensions. Indeed, I argue now that it cannot be understood as such.  
1.1 Resemblance 
One crucial difference here is the treatment of resemblance. While Rodriguez-Pereyra’s 
view appeals to a notion of resemblance that comes by degrees, with perfect resemblance 
 Indeed, once posited, it proves a rich resource for Rodriguez-Pereyra’s view.228
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as a limiting case, my view appeals only to perfect resemblance.  Moreover,  the notion 229 230
of resemblance at work in Rodriguez-Pereyra’s resemblance nominalism is not clearly 
intelligible. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s resemblance is by degrees, and his account of degrees of 
resemblance is given in terms of some version or other of the following principle: 
(D) x and y resemble each other to degree n if and only if they share n properties. 
(2002:65) 
The occurrence here of ‘properties’ may be paraphrased away: x and y resemble each other 
to degree n if and only if they belong to n of the same resemblance classes (of the relevant 
sort). So the principle (D) is not circular - but it had better be intelligible. Now, (D) is 
intelligible only if the paraphrase notion of belonging to n of the same resemblance classes 
is intelligible, but it is not. For the intelligibility of that notion requires that Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s notion of resemblance be properly suited to underwrite what he calls the many 
over one - the “multiplicity of groups of particulars that a certain particular 
resembles” (2002:53). Rodriguez-Pereyra puts the problem like this: 
Is Resemblance Nominalism’s a good answer to the Many over One? In particular, does it not presuppose 
what it seeks to explain, namely that a single particular can be in some way multiple? For in saying that 
 a is F in virtue of resembling the F-particulars, G in virtue of resembling the G-particulars, and so on, it 
explains the multiplicity of a’s properties by invoking a multiplicity of resemblance relations. (2002:54) 
 It also appeals to the grain-relative notion of indiscernability set out in chapter 3. Whether this is an advantage or not, 229
it serves to further distance my view from resemblance nominalism. 
 A further difference is that Rodriguez-Pereyra takes resemblance always to relate exactly two things at a time, while I 230
take resemblance to be a dyadic relation that obtains between pluralities. 
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He goes on to solve it: 
But is this multiplicity of a’s relations really puzzling? If it is, it is not puzzling in the way in which the 
multiplicity of a’s properties is. The Many over One puzzle is how the same particular can have different  
properties. But that puzzle is not raised by the fact that a resembles b but not c, that a is to the right  
of b but to the left of c, etc. Since b and c are different particulars, there is no mystery of a’s bearing different 
relations to them: the multiplicity of a’s relations is grounded in the multiplicity of the particulars 
to which it bears them. (2002:54) 
Thus: objects are not multiply faceted but multiply related: their multiple relatedness is 
what accounts for their multiplicity of properties. Moreover, there is no further problem for 
multiple relatedness, since multiple (n-adic) relatedness is explained in terms of 
resemblances between (ordered n-) tuples of objects (2002:55).  
For this strategy to work, it must be the case that multiple relatedness is possible in the 
case of resemblance. Here, I argue, the notion of resemblance becomes unclear. Rodriguez-
Pereyra insists (2002:64) that the notion of resemblance in play is overall resemblance, not 
resemblance in a respect : objects simply resemble, and resemblance in respect of 231
specific (determinate) properties is understood in a derivative way. Specifically, where 
objects resemble in respect of some (determinate) properties, which properties they are is 
determined by which shared resemblance classes (of the relevant sort) the objects belong 
to.  
What classes qualify as being of the relevant sort? Property classes. Here again, the 
occurrence of ‘property’ is eliminable, and Rodriguez-Pereyra is at great pains to show 
 Here ‘in a respect’ is not being used in my sense. For Rodriguez-Pereyra, for objects to resemble in a respect is for 231
them to resemble in respect of some determinate property. 
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how (2002:191). Part of the task is to provide a resemblance-based solution to the 
imperfect community problem - the task of ruling out as property classes those classes of 
objects that resemble pairwise without there being, intuitively, any property they all have in 
common. The derivation of resemblance in a respect from overall resemblance will work 
only if the available resemblance classes can be shown not to include  imperfect 
communities, in a way that does not presuppose resemblance in a respect.  
Here is Rodriguez-Pereyra’s solution to imperfect community (2002:166f). Given a set of 
objects {A}, define the hereditary pairs of {A} as the set of pairs, pairs of pairs, pairs of 
pairs of pairs, and so on up, of elements in {A}. Roughly, the proposed solution relies on 
the following difference between perfect and imperfect communities of objects: at every 
level, the hereditary pairs of a perfect community are themselves a community, while for 
any imperfect community, there is some level at which its hereditary pairs are not a 
community. This solution requires that resemblance be defined not only for objects, but 
also for hereditary pairs - and moreover, that resemblance for hereditary pairs be defined in 
a way that is properly derivative from resemblance for objects.  Call resemblance for 232
hereditary pairs R*. Should R* be taken as primitive, or further analysed? 
One might try to give a further analysis. One might do this by specifying the conditions 
under which hereditary pairs stand in R* in the following way. Call the properties of 
objects level-0 properties (F0, G0, etc.), the properties of pairs of objects level-1 properties 
(F1, G1, etc.), and so on. Say that for n > 0, a level-n entity has F0 if and only if both its 
(level n-1) members have F(n-1). Then it can be shown that the hereditary pairs of imperfect 
communities fail to be communities at some level or other (2002:165).  
 Hereditary pairs arguably resemble in ways that don’t depend in the proper way on resemblances between their ur-232
elements - such as in being pairs. 
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But there are two problems with such an analysis. For one thing, such an analysis of R* 
relies on the notion of a property - of whatever level - which is the very notion that the 
relation R* is supposed to clarify. A further, related problem is that no reason is given for 
preferring the stated analysis of R* over an alternative: why should we not say instead that, 
for n > 0, a level-n entity has F0 if and only if either of its (level n-1) members has F(n-1)? 
On such an analysis, even the hereditary pairs of imperfect communities will be 
communities, and such an analysis should be ruled out in favour of the stated one only if 
one already has some notion of resemblance in a respect available.  
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s response to the first problem is to treat R* as a primitive, 
unanalysable resemblance relation for hereditary pairs (2002:176). But this faces two 
problems. Firstly, given that no recursive principle for R* from level to level is appealed to 
(of the sort given in the analysis above), it is quite mysterious why we should believe in 
just one resemblance R* and not many - one for each level of hereditary pair, perhaps. 
Secondly, it does not address the second problem above: why should we not accept instead 
a primitive relation R**, understood intuitively along the lines of our alternative analysis?  
We can conclude, then, that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s notion of resemblance does not 
adequately resolve the puzzle of the many-over-one. By contrast, as we will see, my 
preferred ontology does provide some account of the phenomenon.  
1.2 Property Possession and Factoring 
To see how, consider a further point of difference between resemblance nominalism and 
my proposed view. On my view, resemblance structures are taken to explain what it is for 
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objects to share a (determinate) property, but not what it is for an object to have a property 
in the first place. Resemblance nominalism, by contrast, treats resemblance structures as 
explanatory not only of property identity, but of property possession itself. Moreover, while 
my view allows for property possession to be accounted for in terms of the natures of 
objects (in a way to be explained presently), resemblance nominalism leaves no room for 
such natures to be more explanatorily basic than resemblance relations (2002:89).  
On my view, property possession is explained by determination. An object determines the 
dimensions that it does essentially, and - since determinables non-specifically entail their 
determinates - to determine a dimension just is to possess, in a non-committal sense, a 
property which is a determinate (or rather, a value) of that dimension. Determination is a 
formal, transcategorial relationship which admits of factoring: when an object determines a 
dimension, it determines it both at all and somehow. Determination at all is constituted by 
determination somehow: an object determines a dimension at-all by determining it 
somehow. 
Determination structures - and in particular, the factoring of determination structures - 
should be admitted whether or not one admits the ontology of dimensions that I am 
proposing. For one can and should admit - even without commitment to dimensions - such 
truths as that blue determines colour, and that blue and green each determine colour, 
though differently. Blue and green each determine colour, and do not differ in that; they 
each also determine colour somehow, in which regard they do differ. Such factored 
determination structures should be admitted on all sides, even as targets for reductive 
explanation.  
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On my dimensional ontology, factored determination structures are a part of the 
fundamental structure of reality. They make room for the multiplicity of object resemblance 
- Rodriguez-Pereyra’s many-over-one - in a way that resemblance nominalism cannot 
allow. For first, while determination at-all makes comparison possible (two things are 
comparable if and only if they determine some common dimension ), determination-233
somehow makes resemblance possible, and moreover, multiple determination - the 
determination of many dimensions by one object  - makes multiple resemblance (in the 234
many-over-one) sense possible. I take it to be a virtue of my view then, firstly, that 
comparability, resemblance and multiple resemblance are all explained together in this 
way, and second, that they are explained together through fundamental commitment to a 
structure that, one way or another, ought to be admitted anyway.  235
2. Tropes 
Multiple property possession - the many over one - is grounded, I have said, in multiple 
relationships - specifically, multiple determination relationships. In Sections 4 and 5, we 
will discuss rival views on this score. Before that, though, we turn to some rival views 
 I ignore, for now, the fact that two objects may be comparable also by determining different dimensions that are 233
related by laws.
 By positing a category of dimensions, we make room for the claim that objects are simple - in the sense of not 234
possessing constituents such as aspects or modes - despite being essentially qualitatively complex. This strategy - which I 
am calling external denomination - can be realised in various ways: Hossack’s (2007) ‘combining’ account of facts is an 
example. One family of external denomination views which focuses on spatial treatments of property possession 
(Wittgenstein 1921, Turner 2016, Cowling 2014) is perhaps closest in the literature to my own view. This will be relevant 
later, when we reach our discussion of tropes, modes, and aspects. Ehring (2011:177-180), for example, has asserted that 
multiple relations of a certain sort are incompatible with the kind of simplicity that I take objects to have. 
 It is not too hard to find discussions of factoring. Here is Peter Simons, discussing Husserl: “Foundation is primarily a 235
relation at the species level, and is as it were inherited by the instances. But this answer works only for cases of essential 
com presence. We may admit that any extension trope requires some colour trope, but it does not follow that this 
extension trope E requires just this colour trope C, since E may continue to exist while C is replaced by another colour 
trope C` of a different kind. This standardly happens when a stationary object changes colour […] one should distinguish 
de specie dependence from de individuo dependence.” (1994a:559-560)
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according to which multiple property possession is grounded in the internal structure of 
objects: tropes, and modes. 
Tropes are property instances. They are properties, and they are particulars.  Tropes are, 236
on my usage, not the same as modes: I will take it that modes depend for their existence on 
objects, where the category of objects is not derivative - or at any rate, not derivative from 
any category of properties.  Trope-bundle ontologies - the most prominent pure trope 237
ontologies - treat property possession in terms of compresence and membership.  Objects 238
are treated as bundles of ‘compresent’ tropes, and property possession is explained as the 
membership of tropes in bundles: for an object to possess a property is for a trope of that 
property to be among the compresent tropes that constitute (or just are) the object.  
Compresence is seen as relating tropes in one step, rather than by stages. Standard bundle 
theories (such as that of Ehring 2011 ) are egalitarian: they treat compresence as relating 239
all the tropes in a given bundle equally, without divisions or strata. By contrast, a nuclear 
theory (Simons 1994a, 1998, 2000) treats the uniting  of tropes as stratified - as relating 240
first some core collection of tropes, and then further ‘peripheral’ tropes that are either 
required by or simply additional to the nuclear tropes (1994a:568). In this section, I first 
 Following Simons (1994a:564), I do not take tropes in general to be particularised ways of being. Indeed, Simons 236
(1994b) has briefly mooted the view that ways should be understood in terms of tropes, though it is an open question to 
what extent ‘ways’ in this sense coincide with the ways of being that Lowe has in mind for his conception of modes.
 By contrast, one might think that tropes depend for their existence on objects, but that objects are derivative from 237
tropes. 
 I ignore ‘substrate’ trope theories, insofar as substrates are supposed to be ‘bare particulars’. (A parallel version of my 238
objection to trope compresence should be applicable to bare particular theories.) I treat views on which substrates are not 
bare particulars as amounting to Aristotelian object-mode views. 
 Ehring’s theory of tropes is arguably not standard, but his theory of compresence is. 239
 I avoid ‘compresence’ and ‘bundle’ in talking about the nuclear view, following Simons (1994a:554) in holding that 240
the nuclear view is not a bundle theory.
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discuss the standard bundle theory, taking the theory of Douglas Ehring (2011) as 
representative. I raise the standard regress objection against compresence relations, and 
argue that Ehring’s ‘self-relating’ solution fails. I then propose four objections against 
Simons’ nuclear view, and a final pair of intertwined problems for trope theory in general.  
2.1 Standard Bundles 
Standard bundles face a very standard problem: the regress of unification (see e.g. Simons 
1994a:559). How does compresence actually succeed in tying tropes into a bundle?  241
Compresence is either a universal, or a trope, or something else. If it is something else, 
then it is hard to imagine what compresence might be, if not a formal relationship. But then 
it is quite mysterious exactly what the difference is between tropes’ being, or not being, 
compresent - and in particular, what such a difference has to do with their being tropes.  242
If compresence is a universal, then a great deal of the motivation of trope theory - its 
support for nominalism about universals - vanishes. So it comports best with the 
explanatory aims of trope theory to suppose that compresence is itself a trope. But here the 
obvious regress begins: if compresence is a trope, then for some tropes to be compresent is 
for them to be compresent with a compresence trope - and so on.  
Ehring, who accepts the commitment that compresence should be a trope (2011:127), 
offers the following response to the regress:  compresence is a self-relating trope. Thus, 243
suppose we attempt to set up a regress: some tropes T1…Tn are compresent, so they are 
compresent with the compresence trope C1. This requrires that T1…Tn and C1 be 
compresent with a further compresence trope C2. But now Ehring responds: C2 is not a 
 Bradley’s regress poses a similar problem for instantiation-based views.241
 I return to this point in the next section.242
 As many of the moves here are well-worn and familiar, I focus simply on Ehring’s preferred solution. 243
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further, distinct compresence trope, but simply C1 itself. A regress of compresence relations 
may be admitted, therefore, because it need not be a regress of new compresence relations. 
To put it another way: if two tropes T1 and T2 are compresent, then there is a single 
compresence relation C1 such that T1 is compresent with T2 in virtue of C1, T1 is compresent 
with C1 in virtue of C1, and T2 is compresent with C1 in virtue of C1.  
Ehring’s proposal here is rather elegant, but - as I now argue - it does not work. For we 
may, to begin, distinguish compresence relatings from compresence relations. If 
compresence relations are the explanatory tropes of compresence that Ehring posits, then 
compresence relating are the explanandum compresence structures - T1’s being compresent 
with C1 and with T2, and so on - which compresence relations are posited to explain. Now, 
the compresence regress consists of a multiplication of compresences at both levels: there 
is a multiplication of compresence relations, and a multiplication of compresence relatings. 
Ehring’s ‘self-relating’ response halts the regress of compresence relations at the first step, 
but it does not halt the infinite regress of compresence relatings - indeed, it is not supposed 
to. For as Ehring points out, once one has a single compresence trope C1, one may simply 
push the same compresence trope into the corresponding explanatory role at each stage of 
the regress of compresence relatings.  
Now, the problem for Ehring’s proposal is that each new stage of the compresence-relating 
regress is not just entailed by, but a prerequisite for, the truth of the previous stage. For a 
compresence trope C1 will render the tropes T1 and T2 compresent with each other only on 
condition that it is itself compresent with each of them: how else could a compresence 
trope account for the compresence of tropes? To make the point vivid, suppose that there 
are two sets of tropes T1…T10 and TA…TN. Suppose that T1…T10 are compresent with each 
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other, and TA…TN are likewise compresent with each other. Suppose we go with Ehring 
and say that these compresences are to be explained in terms of a compresence relation, 
and so, let us posit compresence tropes C1 and C2. Let us say that tropes are self-relating, 
so there is no regress of compresence relations. Now, one way to get the regress of 
compresence relatings going here is to ask which compresence trope is explanatorily paired 
with which proto-bundle. It is no good here to say that it doesn’t matter since the 
compresence tropes are intrinsically indiscernible from each other - for they must be paired 
in some way in order to do explanatory, even if it does not matter antecedently which way 
they are paired. The problem is that there appears to be no way to specify this pairing 
relation without invoking a compresence relation that does not consist in the existence of a 
compresence trope.  What is required is compresence that consists in something other 244
than the existence of compresence tropes, from which fact we may conclude that the 
regress of compresence relating imposes explanatory needs that outstrip - because they are 
shared by - the explanatory resources of Ehring’s compresence tropes.  
2.2 Nuclear Tropes 
The standard bundle theory, then, fails to overcome the standard regress objection. We now 
turn to the flexible, ‘nuclear’ theory proposed by Peter Simons (1994a, 1998, 2000).  The 245
nuclear theory is neither a bundle theory,  nor a substratum theory. Rather, it takes the 246
aggregate structure of tropes to be stratified into two stages. Tropes aggregate into nuclei 
 Presumably, appealing to more compresence tropes just gets the regress of compresence relations going after all, while 244
adding a pairing trope to the bundle will hardly help. 
 What about substratum views? I leave these out. Insofar as these are bare particular views, I have nothing to add 245
beyond the standard objections. Insofar as they are not, they are close to substances in the neo-Aristotelian sense, and will 
be discussed as such. 
 At least, it is not a standard bundle theory in my sense. Simons (1994a:554) says that it is not a bundle theory, though 246
it is a bundle theory of nuclei, where ‘bundle’ is understood in a Husserlian way (1994a:567). Later on (1998:243, 2000), 
he writes as if the nuclear theory is a bundle theory. The matter is, of course, merely terminological - but still worth 
clarifying. 
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and peripheral clouds, and the resulting twofold structures go proxy for the more familiar 
categories of objects and everyday substances.  247
The nuclear theory does away with compresence relations. In their place, in order to 
explain the aggregative union of tropes, the nuclear theory draws on ontological 
dependence relationships at two levels: individual and generic.  The strategy is this: draw 248
on individual dependence to account for nuclear trope aggregation, and generic 
dependence  to account for peripheral trope aggregation. The result is that nuclear tropes 249
are aggregated in virtue of their formal relationships with each other, whereas peripheral 
tropes are - for the most part - aggregated in virtue of their relationships to nuclear tropes.  
Nuclei are characterised in terms of foundation relationships. Say that x is founded on y iff 
x is (rigidly and individually) existentially dependent on y (1994a:559). Now, say that x 
and y are foundationally related iff either x bears the ancestral of direct foundedness to y, 
or (inclusive) y bears the ancestral of direct foundedness to x. Finally, say that a collection 
is a foundational system iff every element in it is foundationally related to every other. An 
object - Simons says - is an integral whole iff it can be partitioned into parts which form a 
foundational system (1994a:562). Trope nuclei are just such integral wholes.  
Peripheral clouds are - modulo brute inclusions - characterised in terms of generic 
dependence relationships. The paradigm case of such relationships given by Simons - and 
 While these twofold trope structures are posited in an explanans role, the explanans role here is understood in a very 247
revisionary way: stratified collections of tropes don’t necessarily correspond one-one to more familiar objects. 
 Simons (1994a) also allows for peripheral tropes to join aggregates as sheer add-ons. One might wonder, too, whether 248
laws might be a further source of aggregation. In view of these possibilities, it is best to treat individual and generic 
dependence as simply core sources of aggregation on the nuclear view, but not the only possible sources. For simplicity, I 
will generally ignore this detail in my discussion.
 Inter alia - see previous note.249
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in turn by Husserl - is necessitation between determinable kinds. Thus, a determinate 
colour trope might - in virtue of its belonging to the determinable kind colour (i.e. its being 
a colour trope) - require that some shape trope exist, even though it should not require any 
specific determinate shape trope to exist (that is to say: colour tropes depend non-rigidly on 
shape tropes). Given a nucleus that includes a colour trope, some shape trope will be 
required - but since it is required non-rigidly, it will not meet the bar for rigid dependence 
that is required for membership of the nucleus: the shape trope will be a peripheral trope. 
The nuclear theory sidesteps certain problems that afflict standard bundle views. By 
explaining aggregation without drawing on compresence, it avoids - obviously - any 
immediate need to explain compresence. Moreover, nuclear tropes have all of their (rigid, 
individual) existential dependence needs satisfied within their nuclei, so that nuclei come 
out with a certain ontological independence. It is not complete dependence - nuclear tropes 
depend on their periphera to exist - but since that dependence is non-rigid, the nuclear 
trope theorist can explain how nuclear tropes may survive changes in their peripheral 
relations, thus preserving something like a distinction between essential and accidental 
properties. 
2.3 Problems for Nuclei 
The nuclear theory is, as Simons shows, a rich and flexible theory.  Here I will raise four 250
quick challenges for the view.  
First, while the nuclear view successfully dispenses with compresence (by fiat), it is not 
clear that it succeeds in putting anything in its place. For consider the two core dependence 
 It leaves open all kinds of bundle structures, including cloudless nuclei, nucleus-less clouds, multi-nuclear bundles, 250
single-trope nuclei, and so on. 
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relationships: rigid and non-rigid existential dependence. For x to depend rigidly on y is for 
it to be the case, necessarily, that x exists only if y does. But things may satisfy this 
condition without being aggregated in anything like the target sense to be explained. For 
example, suppose that necessarily, if a certain trope T exists, then its singleton {T} exists. 
Plainly, T and {T} are not aggregated, in the relevant: they cannot be, since {T} is not a 
trope.  Thus, rigid existential dependence does not suffice by itself to guarantee 251
aggregation. 
One might alleviate the problem somewhat by insisting that the relevant dependence 
relationships must be between tropes. Such a response might be licensed by appeal to the 
thought that dependence relationships should be constituted by lower-level formal 
relationships (Lowe 2006), and hence that trope-trope rigid dependences is not an arbitrary 
subclass of rigid dependences in general. Nevertheless, it is unclear how the resulting view 
would explain aggregation any better than a standard bundle view. This need not be a 
problem for the nuclear view in itself, but it is hard to see what advantage the view has 
over a standard bundle view in explaining trope aggregation: the view explains why tropes 
aggregate,  but it does not explain what aggregation is.  252
Secondly, the nuclear account introduces a certain element of bootstrapping to the 
existence of trope aggregates. For in cases of nuclei that include multiple tropes, it takes 
many tropes existing to permit any to exist at all. In relation to nuclear tropes, a good 
explanation of the existence of any nuclear trope must also be a good explanation of the 
existence of all its associated nuclear tropes. Now, one might think that in view of the 
 My argument here is deliberately similar to Fine’s argument against the reduction of essential truths to modal truths. 251
Here, as there, the modal truths are not rich enough for the job. 
 That is, if one finds the notion of rigid, individual, trope-trope dependence to be intelligible at all. 252
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foundational connectedness of co-nuclear tropes, to explain the existence of one would 
suffice for explaining the existence of the lot. But it is hard to see how this should be so: 
the existence conditions of individual nuclear tropes require, but do not explain, the 
existence of their co-nuclear tropes. The result is this: just as rigid dependence 
relationships are not rich enough to capture the aggregation structure of tropes, so too, they 
fail to capture the explanatory relationships between tropes. 
Thirdly, it is hard to see, concretely, how the required de individuo dependence 
relationships might plausibly pan out. How could one trope rigidly and individually require 
the existence of another, in the way that the theory requires? Whether there are such 
relationships (and which there are) might be a question to determine empirically, but there 
is a certain prima facie implausibility about the idea. 
Fourthly, how should the nuclear trope theorist account for generic dependence 
relationships? These should be understood in such a way that they do not simply collapse 
into individual, rigid dependences between tropes. The paradigm example given - 
determinable kind dependence - raises the further question of how these determinable 
kinds should be accounted for. How are tropes regimented into their determinable kinds, 
and how are they so regimented as to confer the right dependence relationships on those 
determinable kinds? On my view, the determinable kind level dependences are direct 
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relationships between dimensions - but it is hard to see  a natural account that the trope 253
theorist might give.  254
The problems raised here - all too briefly - are hardly intended to be ultimate difficulties for 
the nuclear view. Nevertheless, they are intended to highlight potential worries about the 
view - specifically, concerning points in respect of which an ontology of objects (points 1 
to 3) and dimensions (point 4) might do better.  
2.4 Further Problems for Tropes 
Garcia (2015) distinguishes between two conceptions of tropes: modifier and module. To 
capture the distinction, consider an ontology of tropes and substances. Both modifier tropes 
and module tropes are, on such a view, supposed to confer their associated qualities upon 
their associated substances. The difference between them is this: modifier tropes do not 
themselves have the qualities that they confer upon their substances, while module tropes 
do.  Here I raise two closely interrelated problems for both kinds of tropes:  one 255 256
concerning ineliminable bareness, and another concerning the possibility of conferring 
properties at all.  
 The argument here turns on Johnson’s (1921) observation that unity under a determinable consists not in a special kind 253
of similarity, but in a special kind of difference. See chapter 1 for details. 
 One might try including determinable tropes in trope nuclei (see e.g. Stazicker 2011, Wilson 2012, Garcia 2015). This 254
would bring the nuclear view one step closer to what I have termed dimensional profiles, at the cost of considerable 
controversy over determinable tropes. I suggest, overall, that admitting dimensions and objects amounts to a less risky 
venture. 
 For illustration, Garcia compares modifier tropes to truthmakers. Truthmakers confer truth on their associated 255
truthbearers, without being true themselves. 
 The modifier/modular distinction is combinable with bundle and nuclear theories in various ways. 256
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Tropes confer properties on non-tropes.  The relevant non-tropes may be bundles, 257
stratified nuclear/peripheral collections, or substrata - but trope theories have in common 
that tropes confer properties upon the non-tropes on which they depend.  Now 258
presumably, tropes confer properties on bundles and collections by being parts of (or 
members of, or among) them. So it is immediately mysterious how modifier tropes should 
confer properties on bundles or collections: on a bundle or collection (including nuclear) 
view, tropes had better be module tropes. By contrast, tropes are not parts of substrata - so 
it is mysterious how modular tropes should confer properties on substrata. On a substratum 
view, then, tropes had better be modifier tropes.  
The problem with mystery here - afflicting module tropes with substrata, and modifier 
tropes with bundles  - is that on each resulting view, something is always left bare.  But 259 260
neither of the remaining views - module tropes with bundles,  or modifier tropes with 
substrata - seems to fare much better. In the case of modifier tropes with substrata, it is 
simply mysterious what a modifier trope might be, and how it might confer a property on 
its substratum (it could not do so by being another property that the substratum has, in 
virtue of which it has some yet further property: that way lies a vicious regress). In the case 
of modular tropes with bundles, there are two senses in which something may have a 
property: the prior sense, in which a trope not only is, but has the property of which it is a 
trope, and the derivative sense in which a bundle has a property in virtue of its containing a 
 The same is not true of modes, in the neo-Aristotelian sense. 257
 Nuclei and bundles are collections of tropes, but neither a nucleus nor a bundle is a trope (excepting single-trope 258
cases). 
 I am here including the nuclear view among bundle theories. 259
 In the case of module tropes with substrata, this might not seem so: one might imagine a module trope ‘conferring’ its 260
property on a substratum roughly the way toothpaste is conferred from its tube onto a toothbrush. But it is doubtful 
whether such a kenotic conception of property conferral makes much sense. 
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trope of the relevant kind. In such cases, the bundle itself remains bare, though it is a 
bundle of things that are not.  
Two further kinds of problem case involve tropes failing to confer properties on other 
tropes. These cases concern integral dimensions and dimensions of variation.  
For the first kind of case, consider the determinables colour and shape. These dimensions 
are integral in the sense that the determination of one requires the determination of the 
other: they are an example of the determinable kind level dependence offered by Simons 
and Husserl. Now, neither colour nor shape sets any constraints on how the other may vary: 
a thing’s colour does not rule out its being any shape at all, nor does a thing’s shape rule 
out its being any colour at all. But colour and shape are, arguably, closely connected in the 
following way: a thing that is coloured does not need merely supplementing with 
something that is shaped; rather, the very thing that is coloured must also be shaped. If this 
is the case, then a trope’s determining colour (in the sense defined in earlier chapters ) 261
does not rule out its determining shape too, but rather, requires it. An upshot of this is that 
trope bundles - especially nuclear ones  - begin to look more like objects than tropes.  262 263
Indeed, since tropes determine their dimensions in specific ways essentially, we are left 
with degenerate objects that have inherited all of trope bundle theory’s classic problems 
with change.  
 The point here can be put in terms of Simons’ ‘determinable kinds’; nothing here rests on accepting my ontology of 261
dimensions. 
 That is, if the dependence relationships involved suffice for aggregation. 262
 Either that, or one insists that tropes cannot determine multiple dimensions in this way. This seems to be a mistake, 263
resulting from too close an association of tropes with property terms (which presumably don’t fall under multiple highest 
determinables in the relevant way). It would also mean that tropes could not meet the demands posed by determinable 
kind dependence. 
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For the second kind of case, consider a single determinate colour trope. The determinable 
colour has, let us say, several dimensions of variation (the term is from Funkhouser 2006, 
2014): hue, saturation and brightness. This confers a certain further structure on the colour 
trope: how to account for it? It is not obvious at all how tropes alone might offer an 
account here.  264
3. Modes 
Having discussed resemblance nominalism and trope theory in some detail, we now turn to 
modes. Modes, like tropes, are understood to be particulars and properties. Lowe (2006) 
characterises them as ways that objects are: I will follow him in that. The distinction 
between modes and tropes has been made in various ways (where it has been made at all). I 
will make it in the following way: tropes are, and modes are not, understood to confer 
properties upon objects. Modes do not confer ways of being upon objects; they simply are 
the ways - the particular ways - that objects are. What pulls the weight in making such a 
conception of modes work is the way in which the relationship between modes and objects 
is understood.  The relationship is not understood to be a kind of uniting tie of the kind 265
susceptible to Bradley-style regress. 
One way to make sense of the object-mode relationship  is to understand its role in a 266
categorial scheme. Categorial schemes aim to articulate how the elements of being are 
structured, rather than sitting alongside them as further elements of being (Gibb 2015:161) 
 This might be a good point to bring in modifier tropes: one might say that the colour trope is somehow involved with 264
determinate modifier tropes of hue, saturation, and brightness. It is hard to judge, though, how much sense such an 
explanation makes. 
 The same goes for accounts, such as that of Armstrong (1997), based on states of affairs. Armstrong’s posits, however 265
- non-mereological composition and non-relational ties - are famously puzzling.
 I assume that modes appear in ontologies of at least two categories. 266
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- so the category of modes is not a further entity which is understood to confer upon modes 
their aggregative union with objects. Modes are not separate entities from objects whose 
binding to objects stands in need of explanation; they are rather, in Suarez’s (1947) sense, 
modally distinct.  267
I have not much to say by way of objection to modes, so understood. Here I will limit my 
discussion to a comparative question: how well do modes account for respect structure?  
I have argued in previous chapters that the world has a respect structure: the terms, 
concepts, and operations involved in respect-talk carve at the joints of nature.  On my 268
preferred ontology, respect structure is fundamental, being grounded in the ontological 
form of dimensions. But certain things may be said about respect structure regardless of 
one’s explanans-level commitments.  In particular, respects - whether they are 269
fundamental or not - are determined by other things - whatever things they might be - and 
that determination relationship is factored in the way described above. For - in the terms of 
an earlier chapter - it is part of the explanandum structure associated with determinables 
and determinates, that determinables have determinate values falling under them 
(dimensions are determined), and that the instancing of a determinable non-rigidly requires 
the instancing of some determinable under it (determination is factored).  
The explanandum features of respect structure leaves open the question of what kinds of 
entity might be the determiners of respects. On an object-mode ontology, the answer will 
 As Lowe (2012a) puts it: the relevant ontological schemes are neither relational nor constituent. See also Heil 267
(2012:122). 
 More on structure, operations and joint-carving in Chapter 7. 268
 In earlier chapters I put this point by saying that these things belonged to respect structure in the explanandum role. A 269
similar move is made by Johnson, who discusses respect structure in the context of adjectives. 
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presumably be: modes. On my dimensional ontology, the answer is: objects. Which is the 
better answer?  
If modes are the determiners of respects, then they determine respects both at all and 
somehow. This raises a question: if modes can do this, why can’t objects do it directly? 
Insofar as modes are posited to explain objects’ possession of qualities in various respects, 
it is not clear that they do such explanatory in a way that objects aren’t poised to do 
themselves.   270
It is also unclear why modes should fare any better than tropes when it comes to arranging 
themselves into their determinable kinds. For while tropes - and indeed modes - are well-
tailored to be the relata of similarity, a distinguishing feature of the unity of determinates 
under a determinable is their unity by way of identity through difference (Wilson 2017 
inter alia) - as Johnson puts it, their bearing not a special kind of similarity, but a special 
kind of difference to each other.  271
 A further, tentative point: If modes are the determiners of respects, then objects - on pain of redundancy - are not. But 270
then what becomes of the relationship of objects to respects? On one plausible account of category - the account of 
Sommers (1963) defended in an earlier chapter - the ontological kinds to which objects belong are individuated by the 
profiles of respects that they determine. But if modes are the determiners of respects, then objects’ relationships to their 
associated respects become curiously indirect. 
 It is not immediately clear how the power subset account will help here. For the subset account - which is a non-271
reductive account of determinables in any case - does not readily distinguish determination structures from other 
specification structures, such as the relationship between a species and genus, in large part because they do not tell a 
ready story about the non-conjunctive specification involved in determination (one might simply deny that non-
conjunctive specification is an appearance worth preserving, but I take it that it at least appears to be). Wilson’s (2009) 
suggestion, that non-conjunctive specification be accommodated by requiring that the complement of the powers shared 
by determinables and their determinates (i.e. the extra powers possessed by determinables but not by determinates) not be 
uniquely associated with any property seems to draw on a presupposed respect structure, rather than explaining it. 
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4. Universals 
Turning from accounts based on internal structure to accounts based on external relations, 
we come to accounts based on universals. The field here is exceedingly broad. For one 
thing, not all universals-based accounts are external-denomination accounts: Armstrong’s 
account of universals as type states of affairs, for example - as well as the account of 
objects as bundles of universals (or universal-instantiations), or Lowe’s four-category 
ontology, which admits universals - kinds and attributes - alongside modes, all qualify as 
universals-based accounts but not external denomination accounts.  
Moreover, universals are understood in a great many ways. For one thing, not all 
ontologies that admit universals admit a category of universals. According to Lowe (2006), 
for example, ‘universal’ is a transcategorial term, an umbrella term for a whole class of 
categories (whose fundamental members are kinds and attributes) that have in common 
their standing in formal relationships of instantiation.  272
Theories also differ on what the instances of universals are. On Armstrong’s (1997) view, 
universals are instantiated by particulars - roughly, objects - though universals are also 
understood to be types whose tokens are not objects but states of affairs. On Lowe’s (2006, 
2013) view, the instances of universals are modes in the case of non-substantial universals, 
and objects in the case of substantial universals, though objects may exemplify non-
substantial universals by being characterised by modes that instantiate them.  
 There is a puzzle here of how exactly different categories could stand in the very same formal relationships in this 272
way. Lowe presumably cannot answer in terms of the dependence relationships that obtain between universals and 
particulars, since on his view, instantiation relationships are supposed to constitute these relationships of dependence. 
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The relationship of universals to their instances is also diversely understood.  It is 273
possible, for example, to view universals as types over their instances - or, following 
Armstrong, as types over wholes that are formed, in some way, by universals and their 
instances.  Now, Armstrong describes universals as types of states of affairs, where states 274
of affairs are non-mereologically composed out of objects and properties related by a non-
relational tie. Here it is not quite right to say that the object and property constituents in a 
state of affairs have equal standing: they don’t, since objects are understood to be thick - 
that is, to have all their properties - while universals, unlike objects, are held to be 
unsaturated. It is unclear just how much good sense one can make of this. For while the 
notion of unsaturatedness makes good sense in a Fregean context, where it concerns 
functions, it is less clear what kind of an entity unsaturated universals would be in an 
Armstrongian context.  
Heil (2012), following Williams (1959), suggests an alternative, abstraction-based 
approach. Beginning with modes - Williams’s tropes - he remarks:  
Socrates’ whiteness is abstract, not by virtue of residing in [a] Platonic realm outside of space and 
time. Its abstractness consists in the fact that its ‘separation’ from Socrates is something that could 
be accomplished only by means of a mental operation, abstraction, Locke’s ‘partial consideration’.  
You can consider Socrates, the man, but you can also consider Socrates’ colour, his mass, his height, 
his shape. These are ways Socrates is, modes, Williams’s tropes. (2012:122) 
 This is not quite the same as the question of how universals and particulars are to be distinguished from each other - 273
the famous universal/particular distinction. That distinction, too, has been the target of very diverse elucidations, some of 
which were notoriously attacked by Ramsey (1925). For a recent survey and discussion, see Ehring 2011 Ch.1. 
 Armstrong describes universals as types of states of affairs, where states of affairs are non-mereologically composed 274
out of objects and properties related by a non-relational tie. Here it is not quite right to say that the object and property 
constituents in a state of affairs have equal standing: they don’t, since objects are understood to be thick - that is, to have 
all their properties - while universals, unlike objects, are held to be unsaturated. It is unclear just how much good sense 
one can make of this. For while the notion of unsaturatedness makes good sense in a Fregean context, where it concerns 
functions, it is less clear what kind of an entity unsaturated universals would be in an Armstrongian context. 
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The universal, whiteness, is abstracted from Socrates in much the same way that his 
whiteness mode is, but on the understanding that one could well abstract the very same 
universal from something other than Socrates, and that a sufficient condition for so doing is 
that their whiteness modes should perfectly resemble.   275
One might, moreover, wonder whether universals are transcendent or immanent, whether 
they are necessary or contingent beings, whether they depend on particulars (and if so, 
whether they depend rigidly or non-rigidly), whether they are abstract or concrete,  and 276
whether they correspond with properties sparsely or abundantly conceived, if they 
correspond neatly with properties at all. These divisions cross-cut to an alarming degree: 
Heil’s abstractionist proposal, for example, seems perfectly compatible with both 
transcendent and immanent universals, and so on. The result is a very wide range of 
possible views indeed. 
I will not discuss the merits of specific conceptions of universals here: the varieties of 
universals are too numerous. Note, though, a further consequence of their numerousness, in 
relation to my own ontology: the question of whether or not my dimensions are universals 
will have no straightforward answer. Here I will focus on three respects in which my 
dimensions do not sit comfortably within the class of universals as they are typically 
conceived.  277
 This approach has much in common with my own, as discussed in an earlier chapter. However, my approach there had 275
the aim of doing away with modes. Note, too, that on Heil’s abstractionist account, property possession for objects is 
presupposed rather than explained by universals. 
 Ehring (2011) proposes to understand the particular/universal distinction in terms of differing sufficient conditions for 276
identity: universals are entities for which exact resemblance (duplicatehood) is sufficient for numerical identity. The 
resulting view is quite compatible with the concreteness of universals, in at least one serviceable sense of ‘concrete’. 
 The point here is to block a certain kind of argument to the effect that my commitment to dimensions is, in effect, such 277
a commitment that further commitments to ‘other’ universals incurs no real theoretical cost.
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The first point concerns correspondence with properties. Universals are typically taken to 
correspond one-one with properties, whether abundant or sparse. But my dimensions do 
not so correspond - indeed, it is a central part of my conception of dimensions that they are 
respects in which properties are arrayed, but not themselves properties. My picture falls 
just as far from a picture like Lowe’s, on which universals correspond with both properties 
and substantial kinds: my dimensions correspond with neither. In general, then, my 
dimensions are not extensionally like universals: they do not correspond with the things to 
which universals are typically taken to correspond. 
The second point concerns universals’ being wholly present in every instance. If 
dimensions are not properties but respects, then in what sense are dimensions present - at 
all, let alone wholly present - wherever they are determined? Suppose that an object 
determines the dimension charge: it does so either by having a charge, or by being 
characterised by a determinate mode under charge. If there is any sense in which 
dimensions are ‘present’ in such an instancing, it is unclear. Perhaps such a sense might be 
clarified, but it is hardly plausible that it should be clarified to such a degree that it might 
serve as a core part of the very conception of dimensions.  
The third point concerns resemblance. We have met already, several times, Johnson’s 
thought that determinables are common across a special kind of difference. Typically, one 
expects the sharing of a universal between objects to ground a certain similarity between 
those objects - but the sharing of a dimension grounds a certain kind of difference.  If this 278
 Strictly speaking, a certain kind of comparability, since two determiners of the same dimension may either resemble 278
or differ: the point is that resemblance is far from guaranteed. 
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is right, then again, it is at least implausible that dimensions should be universals in 
anything like the normal sense.  279
5. Locationism 
Setting universals aside, we arrive finally at an intriguing position proposed by Cowling 
(2014), according to which instantiation is location. Cowling’s view - locationism - 
belongs to a family of theories that draw on the resources of geometric structure in 
explaining property possession.   280
Begin with the thought that the world has at least three spatial dimensions. These 
dimensions form (surprise) a space,  in which objects can be located. On an absolute 281
conception, which Cowling favours,  that space consists of a structured set of points, or 282
locations, so that location becomes a relation of occupation between objects and spatial 
points. We may say then, gnomically, that location is occupation: an object’s having the 
location that it does is explained by its standing in the occupation relation to a spatial point.  
Now, locationism gets going when we extend this thought. It is a plausible and common 
thought that properties form a space: they can be represented by a geometric structure.  283
 This is, of course, far from exhaustive of the range of universal-based ontologies in the literature. Dasgupta (2009, 279
2017), for example, has defended what is in effect a universal-based bundle theory which takes after Quine’s (1960) 
functorese. See Sider (forthcoming) for a discussion of Dasgupta’s proposal. 
 Tractarian factalism is perhaps the best known of such views. See Wittgenstein 1921, Turner 2016. See also Arntzenius 280
and Dorr 2011. My criticisms of locationism are not intended to apply to every geometrically motivated view.
 Or spacetime. But this does not matter for illustration.281
 Cowling leaves room for the development of a parallel version of locationism on a relational conception of space.282
 Gärdenfors (2000) offers a nice treatment, within a conceptual/cognitive setting. Funkhouser (2006, 2014) offers a 283
view with a more logical flavour. My ontology of dimensions may be seen as supplementing these cognitive and logical 
pictures with a metaphysical picture - and indeed, one which differs from Funkhouser’s preferred trope realism. It should 
be noted that Gärdenfors’ treatment makes use of notions like distance and betweenness, and it should not be assumed off 
the bat that the relational theory which I defend can supply any obvious analog of these properties (it might be best 
described, for example, as an incidence structure, or some other less-than-Euclidean thing). 
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The locationist idea is to take property space at face value: quality space has ontological 
parity with ordinary space. Thus, just as an object may occupy a point in ordinary space, so 
too an object may be located - that is, occupy a point - in quality space. The world contains 
the familiar dimensions of space and time, and more: it is a space of very high dimension 
indeed. The instantiation of properties by objects is, then, explained as the location of 
objects in quality space - which in turn is explained by the occupation of quality-space 
points by objects.  
Among the advantages that a locationist might claim are, on the one hand, parsimony, and 
on the other, a solution to the many over one. Locationism is parsimonious, because it is 
both ontologically and ideologically parsimonious: it does away with instantiation from its 
ideology in favour of a relation of occupation, and it does away with properties in favour of 
points. Since occupation and points are both supposedly present antecedently in the 
recommended ontology, locationism can claim simply to be making the best use of its 
resources. Moreover, locationism offers an explanation for the many-over one, by 
explaining precisely how an object may be simple (lacking both parts and constituents), 
and yet qualitatively complex: it does so by occupying a point in a multidimensional 
space.  Points in quality space are, as Cowling puts it, complete qualitative profiles - but 284
no less simple for that.  
The advantages of locationism are appealing. Indeed, they are advantages that my own 
ontology of dimensions preserves. My own ontology, however, does away with points and 
occupation, in favour of dimensions and determination, with the result that quality space - 
an expression which, on my view, has regained its decidedly metaphorical flavour - is best 
 Here ‘dimension’ should not be taken in the special sense that I have given it. Rather, the dimension of a space is 284
roughly just the number of values it takes to determine a point in that space. 
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understood as a relational space, rather than an absolute space. In preserving these 
advantages, my favoured view also avoids certain weaknesses in the locationist proposal.  
Firstly, how does the locationist explain the dimensional structure of quality space? For 
mathematical purposes, it may be simply assumed that a point is arrayed along such-and-
such dimensions - but for ontological purposes, the locationist should offer some account 
of this. I leave this as an unresolved issue. 
Secondly: what, on the locationist picture, explains an object’s qualitative profile? The 
slogan is that occupation explains instantiation (Cowling: instantiation is location): but 
what is it about occupation which does this? If it is the sheer individualities of the 
particular points that an object occupies, then one might wonder what role the whole 
framework of space and location is doing at all: explaining a’s being F in terms of a’s 
occupying just that point is not discernibly different from saying simply that a instantiates 
just that universal. On the other hand, if it is the locations of the occupied points, then 
occupation is not needed to explain location: if points can be located directly, why can’t 
objects? We should, in that case, do away with points entirely.  We are left with objects 285
located directly in quality space - and again, it is not clear exactly what explanatory benefit 
has been achieved by framing the issue in terms of location. 
Thirdly: locationism faces the same problem that trope theory faced earlier. Objects are not 
located in quality space in virtue of their properties or characters; they have properties in 
 A response might be that one should consider quality space to be relational in relation to points, and absolute in 285
relation to objects since objects are (one might staunchly maintain) located in virtue of their occupation of points. This 
would be motivated by a desire to account for uninstantiated properties in terms of unoccupied points. However, it is not 
clear - if an object cannot be located directly - exactly how a point (effectively, a module trope of location) might so relate 
to it as to confer location upon it. 
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virtue of their location in quality space.  The locationist’s objects are thin. But how might 286
quality-space points confer properties or qualitative characters upon objects? Points could 
hardly be much like module tropes in Garcia’s sense (they would come out, in effect, like 
Platonic universals, if anything at all). But they could hardly be like modifier tropes either, 
without rendering it quite mysterious how they confer any qualities on the objects that 
occupy them.  
 In this, tropes differ from modes as I conceive them. For an object is characterised by a mode in virtue of its being a 286
certain way, and it is a certain way in virtue of its being characterised by a mode (I use ‘in virtue of’ here in a sense that 
allows both of these claims to be true; one might equally say that neither is true): the mode just is the particularised way 
that the object is. Nothing like this can be said about tropes. 
!236
Chapter 7 - Immersive Realism 
0. Intro 
The preceding six chapters have presented and discussed the ontological scheme - 
dimensionism - that is the core of this thesis. The present chapter gives an explicit account 
of the metametaphysical outlook by which those discussions are informed. This is 
necessary for two main reasons. First, the preceding chapters have depended, in the course 
of argument, upon certain metametaphysical tools - for example, an appeal to the notion of 
structure, and a generally realist outlook. Second, an explicit metametaphysical account is 
needed to test my first-order claims for consistency - in particular, for their consistency in 
serving a coherent set of metametaphysical aims. The metametaphysical outlook that I 
present here, then, is one that is deeply intertwined with the arguments that I have given for 
a dimensionist ontology. Nevertheless, the two positions are in principle independent. One 
could accept my proposed ontology without accepting the accompanying metametaphysics, 
and vice versa. However, I will not discuss the revisions that this might require to either 
position.  287
The view that I will propose may be regarded as bringing together sympathies for seven 
broad strands of metametaphysical thought: realism, structuralism, neo-Aristotelianism, 
alethic monism, pragmatism, operationalism, and what I will call progressivism. While this 
chapter will focus mainly on how these strands are concretely integrated, part of the burden 
of my discussion will be to explain why one might plausibly have these sympathies not 
only separately, but together. The view that I will defend is one that draws thoroughly on 
 The present chapter is intended to be an outline of my proposed metametaphysical view. A fuller 287
development of that view would be beyond, and therefore orthogonal to, the overall purpose of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, such a fuller discussion is something that I intend to pursue in further work. 
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resources from pragmatically oriented outlooks, but itself remains unambiguously realist in 
its commitments.  
Here is the plan. In Section 1, I introduce aspects the ‘metametaphysical’ outlooks of Ted 
Sider, Jonathan Lowe, and Hasok Chang. Section 1.1 discusses the Siderean conception of 
structure, and Section 1.2 the Lowean notion of ontological form. Section 1.3 introduces 
Chang’s ‘active realism’, and Section 1.4 discusses the integration of these viewpoints as 
tessellating parts of a single realist view. My discussion here will be centred on a problem 
of fit between theory and reality that I will, accordingly, call the fitting problem. Section 2 
introduces a further motivation for my proposed view, stemming from a challenge posed to 
Sider’s outlook by equivalences between fundamentalia. I argue that Sider’s view must be 
modified if the challenge is to be met. In Section 3, I propose a solution: postlapsarian 
Siderean metaphysics should seek redemption from broadly pragmatic sources. In 
particular, Sidereans should repent of their conception of the loci of joint-carving. Central 
resources here are the notions of epistemic activities and epistemic iteration discussed by 
Hasok Chang (various).   But redemption through pragmatism comes at a potential cost: 288
one might think that my appeal to pragmatic resources undermines my commitment to 
realism. In Section 4, I argue that this isn’t so. I argue that my appeal to pragmatism takes 
the magic out of realism, leaving it on a much firmer foundation overall.  
 A further idea in the background is the subject naturalism of Huw Price (2013). I will not discuss 288
Price explicitly in Section 3. Nevertheless, it should be clear enough, at a broad level, how his 
‘subject naturalism’ is relevant to my proposals there, especially in relation to what I will be calling 
an immersive conception of metaphysical enquiry. 
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1. Realism: Sider, Lowe, and Chang 
Metaphysics, at its most ambitious, aims to articulate the structure of reality. Ontology, its 
sibling, aims to articulate the fundamental categories of being, in virtue of whose 
ontological form the structures of metaphysics obtain. In later sections, I will argue that the 
pursuit of these ambitions must be tempered from pragmatic, operational, and progressive 
quarters. Presently, however, I aim simply to set out these ambitions in an unmoderated 
form. 
It should be noted, at the outset, that metaphysics and ontology are theoretical enterprises. 
For one thing that exhibits both the complete structure of reality, and the complete 
inventory of being, is the world itself.  But merely to produce the world would be no 289
fulfilment of the aims of metaphysical and ontological enquiry: it would leave us no better 
off epistemically. A central aim of metaphysical and ontological enquiry, therefore, to 
articulate the structure and inventory of being in such a way that our having done so 
constitutes some cognitive and epistemic gain. This is done by building theories about the 
world - theories which, importantly, may constitute epistemic gains only if they have some 
traction on what we are antecedently able to grasp or understand.  
One might think (see e.g. Lowe 2006) that such a requirement for tractability (as I will call 
it) constitutes a diminution of the ambitions of metaphysics.  Shouldn’t metaphysical 290
enquiry aim to articulate the structures and categories of being - as they are ‘in 
themselves’ (as it is often said), rather than the structures and categories of thought? Yes, it 
should. But my present point is that it is no epistemic good for us, as ontologists, to 
 Compare Lowe’s remarks on the possibility of ontology in a ‘Lagadonian’ language (2006:179). 289
 From here on I will use ‘metaphysics’ as an umbrella term for both metaphysics and ontology, 290
trusting context to disambiguate where necessary. 
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articulate the structures of being other than through theoretical apparatus - through 
structures of thought broadly construed. Indeed, it is an open question whether any ultimate 
convergence between real worldly structure and the structures of thought is possible. This 
potential gap between worldly and graspable structures poses an in-principle threat to the 
whole realist metaphysical enterprise. Nevertheless, the risk here is of ultimate, not in-
principle, failure. In the absence of a good argument that the realist project must fail,  the 291
possibility of such a gap does not show the realist project itself to be a misguided one. 
Realist metaphysics, then, should proceed on the methodological conjecture that the 
threatened gap need not result in ultimate defeat. But how? What does proceeding in this 
way amount to, concretely? It is among the tasks of a metametaphysical theory, to supply a 
guiding vision here of how the threatened gap between thought and reality should be 
accommodated. Call this the fitting problem. One overall line of argument in this chapter 
will be my recommendation of pragmatic and operation approaches to this problem, in 
preference over the approaches of Sider and Lowe.  
1.1 Sider: Structure 
According to Sider (2012), metaphysics is about structure. A good metaphysical theory is 
one couched in a language whose basic terms carve at the joints of nature. Terms that 
capture structure in this way are said to be joint-carving; terms that capture fundamental 
structure are said to be perfectly joint-carving, or fundamental. A truth is fundamental just 
in case it is expressed only in terms that are fundamental.  
 Note that realists need not press for certainty: the aim of metaphysics need not be any more than 291
the production of a fallible theory. It is not necessary, either, for realists to push for completeness: a 
realist metaphysic should aim to account for as much as it can, where it is an open question 
precisely how much that is. 
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What is structure? To discern structure is to discern patterns: it is to discern “how the 
world fundamentally is, as opposed to how we ordinarily speak or think of it” (2012:1). 
This opposition is, as I have argued, constrained by the fitting problem: the discernment of 
structure constitutes success in metaphysical enquiry only insofar as it is the discernment 
of structure that is cognitively graspable, and hence not entirely opposed to our actual ways 
of thinking. But this hardly suffices to clarify the notion of structure: the world may be 
other than how we take it to be, in non-structural respects.  
A better way to elucidate structure is to contrast it with truth.  Consider two theoretical 292
languages, one featuring the colour predicates blue and green, and the other the predicates 
grue and bleen. Arguably, any truth that can be stated in terms of blue and green may also 
be stated in terms of grue and bleen, and vice versa. Now consider two truths: 1. emeralds 
are green, and  2. emeralds are grue until t and bleen thereafter (for some appropriate value 
of t). Neither (1) nor (2) captures more truth than the other. But (1) does capture something 
that the gerrymandered predicates of (2) do not: it captures the right structure of the world. 
The following example is adapted from Sider. Consider a world consisting of a square 
region R divided left-right into red (left) and blue (right) halves. Let L be an arbitrary and 
imaginary line across R, that divides R top-bottom. Now consider the following pairs of 
location predicates: east-west, and north-south. A point is east iff it is in the blue region, 
and west iff it is in the red region; a point is north iff it is above L, and south iff it is below 
L. Now consider a point p in the top right region of R. In east-west terms, p is east. In 
north-south terms, p is north. The statements p is east and p is north are both true. 
 In Sider’s catchy slogan: truth is not enough.292
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Nevertheless, Sider claims, the statement p is east captures something that the statement p 
is north does not: it captures the structure of R.  293
Capturing structure, then, is a matter of capturing patterns in how things go together 
(2012:1). In the examples above, it is the predicates of a language that may either succeed 
or fail to capture the structure of the world. To treat predicate terms as candidates for 
success or failure in this way is to treat the world as having such a structure as predicate 
expressions might succeed or fail to capture: it is to be a realist about predicate structure. 
Thus, realism about predicate structure is distinct from realism about specific predicate 
structures: to reject realism about predicate structure is to hold that the world has no 
structure that predicate expressions aim to capture, while to reject realism about a specific 
predicate structure is to hold that the world does not have the structure that some particular 
system of predicates purports to capture.  
Realism about structure goes beyond commitment to predicate structure. As Sider points 
out, any term may succeed or fail in carving reality at the joints. Thus, structural 
commitments are incurred also by quantifiers, connectives, various (modal, mereological, 
etc.) operators, and so on.  
 This example is not entirely neat. For it is not specified what kind of structure the east-west and 293
north-south predicate pairs are supposed to capture (or fail to capture). What seems clear enough is 
that the east-west predicate pair captures (something roughly like) the colour structure of R while 
the north-south pair does not. But it does not follow that the two predicate pairs are anything other 
than equal as location predicates - that is, in respect of their capacity to capture R’s location or 
spatial structure. Perhaps the example can be tidied up to meet these concerns. However, they 
needn’t be. As I argue later, these loose ends do not necessarily detract from Sider’s example. 
Rather, they show it to belong at an early stage of a process of epistemic iteration by which the 
concept of structure is fixed. This point is, indeed, not too far from Sider’s own view, as we shall 
see. 
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What about the fitting problem? Here we should distinguish three questions: first, how is 
the notion of structure to be grasped within Sider’s scheme? Second, how should the 
notion of joint carving be grasped? And third, how is it hoped that the structures captured 
by fundamental terms should turn out to be graspable?  
Sider offers a primitivist response to the first question: the notion of structure is 
fundamental. To seek further understanding of what structure is, by seeking an explanation 
of structure in more fundamental terms, is to seek a spurious kind of understanding of 
structure that consists in a kind of ‘magical grasp’ of the meaning of the term. Sider 
proposes simply to build his theory on the basis of his primitive notion of structure, 
claiming that this is all the elucidation that one could give: “Theoretical terms can be 
unclear: when they have been given no clear theoretical role to play. But ‘structure’ has a 
relatively clear role - given in this book and elsewhere. What more is wanted? […]We […] 
build new concepts, by building theories that use them” (2012:9).  
Thus, for Sider, the theoretical role of the notion of structure amounts to a kind of implicit 
definition, to which no real clarification can be added (except the sense of familiarity that 
accompanies frequent use of the notion in that role - 2012:9). One might wonder, however, 
whether this is too quick. In later sections, I will argue that one might indeed want more: 
one might want the notion of structure to be further clarified by the resources of 
operational analysis and epistemic iteration. But I will set the point aside for now.  
In relation to the second question, the Siderean view is that joint-carving is a relation 
between terms in a theoretical language, and structures in the world. It is a transcendental 
relation, in a broadly Kantian sense (to call it semantic here does not change the point) - a 
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relation which potentially outstrips whatever it is that we grasp in our use of the terms in 
question. To carve at the joints of nature is not something that we do, but something that 
our theoretical terms do.  
Finally - in relation to the third question, Sider says relatively little. One thing to note is 
that for Sider, where joint-carving does outstrip our cognitive grasp, it is reference 
magnetism that keeps things on track. Sider discusses reference magnetism (2012:23-35) as 
a response to the challenge of ‘radical semantic underdetermination’ (2012:33), the threat 
of gerrymandered semantic assignments for joint-carving terms. While noting that non-
theoretical terms are a more complex affair (2012:32-3), Sider makes the Lewisian point 
that semantic assignments for theoretical terms are decided between in large part by appeal 
to the relative naturalness of candidate assignments. Thus, consider two candidate 
assignments A1 and A2 for term T, and suppose that A1 is more natural, in the Lewisian 
sense, than A2. Sider argues, following Williams (2007), that if the semantic properties of 
T have an explanatory role, then A1 should be a preferable interpretation of T over A2. In 
particular, if the explananda in question are certain distinctive features of T’s use, then 
other things equal, where T is a theoretical term, the explanans role will be better served by 
a semantic assignment that is more natural rather than less (on the assumption that T’s 
semantic properties may occupy such an explanans role at all).  This is the principle of 294
reference magnetism: that more natural semantic assignments should be preferred for 
theoretical terms.  
 Sider notes (2012:30, n.16) that T’s causal profile might play a similar explanatory role on a 294
causal semantic theory. But he cautions (2012:33) that a purely casual theory is ‘likely to be 
insufficiently general’. 
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Sider’s reference magnetism is a metametasemantic viewpoint that rests upon broadly 
externalist approaches to semantics. It is, as noted, directed against the challenge of radical 
semantic underdetermination, and is therefore not intended to be a solution to the fitting 
problem as I have presented it. Indeed, it leaves room for a solution to that problem, at two 
levels. Firstly, the assumption that the semantic profile of T, externally construed, should 
explain aspects of the use of T at all, requires that semantic profile to have some traction in 
guiding T’s use.  Secondly, the very problem of semantic underdetermination - the 295
problem of fixing an interpretation for T between a range of candidate assignments that 
differ in a known way with respect to naturalness - requires a certain grasp of that very 
range of candidate assignments. To be sure, one might point out that the externalist 
character of reference magnetism leaves room for these elements - the explanatory traction 
of T’s semantic profile, and the variously natural candidate assignments for T - to reside 
beyond our cognitive access or grasp. This is true, but the extent to which reference 
magnetism constitutes an epistemic gain will vary with the degree to which these elements 
do, in fact, so reside.  My point is not that Sider’s reference magnetism is false - but rather, 
that we should seek to maximise the epistemic gains that, if correct, it enables us to 
make.  296
 It is by virtue of such a sort of guiding, explanatory integration, that a relatively natural 295
assignment comes to be a preferable assignment for T. Thus, reference magnetism does not merely 
leave room for, but arguably requires a solution to the fitting problem. Of course, one might insist 
here that a more natural assignment will be a better explainer of T’s use directly, without recourse 
to any appeal to our grasp of it. But it is not clear why this should be so. Consider, for example, the 
notion of the boiling point of water, in the context of a very theoretical pursuit: the determination of 
fixed points on a temperature scale (discussed by Chang 2004). It is not at all clear how the 
proposed claim would pan out, concretely, in such a case. 
 An underlying thought here is that the fruit of good metaphysical enquiry should be 296
epistemically enriching in a broad sense. See Chang (2009) for discussion.
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1.2 Lowe: Ontological Form 
According to Lowe, metaphysics is the science of essence. Such an outlook might appear, 
at first glance, to be orthogonal to Sider’s structuralism at best. But I argue that it is not.  297
Rather, the two approaches are both continuous and complementary to each other, in 
respect of both their subject matters, and the tools that they employ.  
For Lowe, metaphysical enquiry encompasses - inter alia - enquiry into the structure of 
reality, and into the limits of possibility: how things are, how things must be, and how 
things could be. But these forms of enquiry all come, at bottom, to enquiry into essence, 
since what is actually the case must be antecedently possible, and “essence is the ultimate 
ground of all possibility” (2008b:278). Hence, metaphysics is the science of essence - but 
not in any spooky sense. Rather, enquiry into essence is, to a large degree, enquiry into the 
ontological form of what there is - a kind of enquiry more comparable to mathematics than 
to alchemy (2008b:278-9).  
Ontological form is a basic notion. One way to elucidate it is by contrast with the notion of 
ontological content. Consider the way in which reality appears to have a qualitative 
structure: it contains instances of red here, blue there, roundness elsewhere, and so on. 
How should these appearances be explained? A content-based explanation might posit 
tropes - property instances whose existence explains the appearance of red here, blue there, 
and so on. On such a view, the occurrence of say, redness here, is explained by the 
 One rather obvious indication that it is not comes from Lowe himself, who also describes 297
metaphysics as “the study of the most fundamental structure of reality as a whole” (2008b:278). Of 
course, this does not mean that what Lowe means by ‘structure’ is readily translatable into structure 
in Sider’s sense. 
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existence of an entity - a red trope. On a form-based explanation, one might posit the 
existence of an object - here - and a formal relationship of instantiation in which it stands 
to a red universal. Or one might posit a whole class of objects that are the red things in 
virtue of their mutual (formal) relationships of resemblance. What unifies these form-
driven explanations is their reliance on features of entities that are real, but which do not 
consist in the existence of distinctive entities themselves. Elements of form are, as Lowe 
(2006) puts it, features of reality that are rooted directly in how things stand, and only 
indirectly in what things there are.  298
This conception of ontological form through its contrast with ontological content stands for 
further clarification. I have already offered such a clarification (in Section 2.2 of Chapter 
1), so I will not repeat it here. The point, as I say in Chapter 1, is that I will be relating 
Lowe’s notion of ontological form to Sider’s notion of structure thus: I will be taking 
ontological form to be an entity-centred correlate of structure, as essence is an entity-
centred correlate of necessity.  
Genuine ontology - the science of being qua being - has a theory of ontological categories 
at its heart (2008b:280). Categories are categories of being, and are not themselves beings: 
they are basic types of entities (2008b:281-2). The ontological factors (to borrow an 
expression from Peter Simons) that distinguish the categories, for Lowe, are “the 
distinctive existence and identity conditions of the entities belonging to them” (2008b:282), 
 Distinctness is a paradigm example of a formal relationship: two objects’ being distinct does not 298
consist - on pain of vicious circularity - in the existence of a further entity, a distinctness relation, 
which is itself distinct from them both. Another case is instantiation, on pain of Bradley’s well-
known regress. 
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as well as the formal relationships - including, prominently, the relationships of ontological 
dependence  - that hold between them.  299 300
What does Lowe say about the fitting problem? A central component of Lowe’s view here 
appears to be that we have a certain faculty for grasping essences (2008b:284, 2012b:946). 
The puzzle about how such a faculty might be possible is, to a degree, counterbalanced by 
the fact that our reliance on such a faculty seems to be inevitable.  For as Lowe points out 301
(2008b:284-5), deflationary attempts to reduce our grasp of essences to a grasp of 
something else - say, concepts - themselves rely upon an essential grasp of those domains 
in turn (see also Lowe 1998 Ch.1). Thus, for Lowe, we are able to grasp essences directly, 
if not completely. This grasp of essences involves, in particular, a grasp of generative 
principles that capture what it is to be a thing of this or that sort (2012b:935). 
But Lowe’s argument here leaves room for doubt. To see why, consider again the claim that 
our apparent grasp of essences is really a grasp of concepts. Let us assume, for illustration, 
that our grasp of concepts is in turn rooted in a grasp of language. Now, there is more than 
one way to displace Lowe’s focus on essences in favour of a focus on language. Lowe’s 
claim is that any such move will simply shift the focus of realist metaphysics onto a 
 Formal relationships both go beyond, and also constitute, relationships of dependence. On 299
Lowe’s view, dependence relationships may play the theoretical role of securing categorial 
uniqueness (see Lowe 2006 and 2011). 
 I have argued in other work that it is these underlying ontological factors that supply the 300
ultimate grounds for the demarcation of ontological categories. Here, though, I will continue to 
assume that the relevant factors are simply existence and identity conditions. 
 In conversation, Lowe has emphasised that we should expect this faculty to be constrained by, 301
and remain in the vicinity of, common sense. Ontology should not proceed by setting common 
sense aside and starting from scratch; it should, rather, take common sense as a starting point and 
not revise it gratuitously. This is one reason why Lowe’s (2006) ontology contains more 
fundamental categories than most. 
!248
restricted class of essences - in this case, the essences of linguistic entities. But it is not 
clear why this must be so. Indeed, the global expressivism of Huw Price (2013) offers one 
way in which a grasp of essences might be written out altogether. As Michael Williams 
summarises, in his own discussion: “In sum, we get global anti-representationalism with 
functional pluralism, thus metaphysical quietism without philosophical quietism. And that 
is what we wanted” (2013:144).  
Now, it is one thing to hold that such anti-representational views are possible, and quite 
another to hold that they are inevitable, the best that can be achieved. To this latter kind of 
worry, Lowe’s response is worth giving in full: 
As for the second question that I raised a moment ago - what, then, would it be to do metaphysics ‘directly’, 
and how could we do it that way? - this has, in my view, a very practical answer. The answer is to be found 
by taking courage and simply trying it for yourself. […] You will, in all probability, soon find yourself 
beginning to think of some possible answers to [the question of what causation could be] and beginning to 
find arguments for or against various of these answers. My advice is: Just pursue these arguments and see 
where they lead you. There is absolutely no guarantee that you will be led to an indisputable final answer to 
your question, but even so you will learn much during the quest. We should not expect metaphysics to be able 
to produce such final solutions, any more than we should expect them in mathematics or any other 
intellectual discipline. It was, indeed, Kant’s unreasonable expectation that we should be able to arrive at 
certainty in metaphysics that led him to distort it into an examination of the structure and content of our 
thought about reality rather than of the structure and content of reality itself. (2008b:277) 
My earlier claim - that realist metaphysics should proceed on the methodological 
conjecture that the fitting problem can be well resolved - is intended to be fully in line with 
Lowe’s outlook. Here, as before in the case of Sider’s reference magnetism, my point is not 
that Lowe’s confident outlook is wrong - it may, indeed, be true that we do have a direct 
and partial grasp of essences. Rather, my point is that there is room for a further 
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explanation of how we have such a grasp - that is, in part, of how the elements of 
ontological form that we posit are tractable to our understanding. My aim is not to doubt 
that metaphysics and ontology in a Lowean mode are possible, but again, to amplify the 
epistemic gain that their successful pursuit may constitute. 
1.3 Chang: Active Realism 
I have discussed the fitting problem in relation to the metaphysical outlooks of Sider and 
Lowe. In both cases, I have argued that those outlooks stand for supplementation in a way 
that amplifies the epistemic gains that they enable us to make. In saying this, I am 
appealing to a broad conception of epistemic gain. In particular, I have in mind ways of 
improving knowledge and understanding that go beyond simply coming to know more.  302
Here is Hasok Chang with the basic idea: 
As already indicated, I want to orient the whole discourse on realism away from disputes about truth, and 
turn it back toward the idea of reality, by which I mean whatever exists ‘out there’ that cannot be controlled 
by one’s own will. What better focus for real-ism can there be, than exposing ourselves as much as possible 
to reality and learning as much as possible from that experience? (2012:217) 
Chang is talking about scientific realism, so his talk of experiential exposure to reality has 
a quite direct meaning drawn from scientific practice.  However, this is not to say that 303
metaphysical enquiry should not be based on a similar notion of exposure, more indirectly 
 Whatever that means. As Nick Treanor (2013) points out, the notion of a measure of knowledge 302
is hardly clear. 
 In drawing upon literature in the philosophy of science, I am treating metaphysical and scientific 303
enquiry as, in some sense, interrelated. However, I am not thereby steering close to the outlook of 
‘scientific metaphysics’ advocated in Ladyman and Ross (2007). I intend, on the contrary, not to go 
that way. 
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conceived.  The core thought here is that when enquiry is understood this way, the 304
increase of truth and truthfulness turns out to be only one among many possible epistemic 
goals, and a relatively inoperable one at that.Various further epistemic goals may be listed, 
which are both worthy epistemic goals in their own right, and also deserving of pursuit as 
means for the indirect pursuit of the epistemic goal of truth. Thus Chang: 
While I accept that many realist philosophers take ultimate truth (‘with a capital T’) as the aim of science, 
such truth does not often guide actual scientific practice, because it is not an operable aim. Truth, in the 
standard conception of realist philosophers, comes down to a correspondence between what our statements 
say and how the world is. But what are the methods by which we can judge whether this correspondence 
obtains in each situation? […] The burden of argument is on those who claim or assume that there are 
methods of judging statement-world correspondence, since there are no obvious ones. Just consider what a 
useless piece of methodological advice it would be to tell a scientist to ‘try to make true theories’. The 
standard realist strategy is, of course, to get at truth indirectly; we can pursue truth via other theoretical 
virtues, if they are truth-conducive. (2012:219-20) 
Let me set aside, for now, the question of precisely how Chang’s point transfers from 
scientific realism to metametaphysical realism (the view not only that there is an objective 
reality for metaphysical theories to get at, but that metaphysical theories do indeed get at 
it). There is, however, a problem. If truth is inaccessible, then so is truth-conduciveness: 
But I think here we are inescapably locked in a vicious circle: if we are not able to judge whether we have 
truth in each situation, how will we be able to tell which methods have a tendency to lead us to truth? 
Whether this circularity is really inescapable is the main point of contention in the scientific realism debate. 
(2012:220) 
 This is not to say that I see metaphysical enquiry as continuous with science and only science. 304
As I will discuss later in this chapter, alethic monism forces metaphysics to be as much concerned 
and continuous with enquiry in any domain, as with scientific enquiry even broadly construed. 
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Chang’s solution is to sidestep the issue entirely: 
[…] I would like to find a conception of realism which will allow us to avoid getting into [the vicious circle] 
altogether. For a moment, let’s try taking ‘realism’ in a very literal sense, as a commitment to engage with 
what is real, with external reality (or, reality, for short). In the context of inquiry (scientific or otherwise), that 
ought to mean a commitment to maximise our learning from reality. […] But what is reality? What do we 
mean by external reality, and what is involved in learning about it? Instead of entering into serious 
metaphysics, I want to give you an operational definition of reality. I propose to think of external reality as 
whatever it is that is not subject to one’s own will. (2012:220) 
The basic tension, which generates Chang’s ‘vicious circle’, is a trade-off between a 
theory’s traction on reality and its traction on thought. The demand for externalism - 
epistemic or semantic - in accounting for a theory’s contact with reality, competes against 
the demand for a broadly internalistic account of our grasp of a theory, and the epistemic 
gains that we make through it. Chang’s rather elegant solution is to trade in both 
problematic kinds of traction for a third, more tractable kind: pragmatic or operational 
traction. 
Chang frames his move as a way of sidestepping serious metaphysics. I will frame it, 
instead, as a prelude to serious metaphysics. As a guiding principle for scientific enquiry, 
the point need not go further than Chang takes it: scientific enquiry is well guided by a 
pluralistic spread of attempts to maximise learning from reality. But Chang’s ‘active 
realism’ is a project which can be taken further. In particular, it admits of extension - by 
means of Chang’s notions of epistemic activities and epistemic iteration - into a project of 
serious metaphysical enquiry.  I return to this discussion in Sections 3 and 4.  305
 This point is orthogonal to Chang’s claim that active realism admits of extension into a whole 305
ideology (2012:217). 
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1.4 Integration 
The Siderean and Lowean outlooks are continuous with and complementary to each 
other.  They are continuous in the sense that the Siderean quest for joint-carving terms, 306
and the Lowean quest for an account of ontological form, are both projects of enquiry into 
the fundamental structures of reality, albeit in apparently different senses of ‘structure’. 
They are complementary in the sense that they investigate structure at two levels that 
complement each other: Siderean metaphysics may be roughly understood as enquiry into 
reality’s global structures, while Lowean metaphysics may (equally roughly) be understood 
as enquiry into reality’s local structures - that is, those structures which are directly rooted 
in the natures of entities of various kinds.  
These relations of continuity and complementarity are static relations. But I also claim that 
the Lowean and Siderean projects are continuous and complementary in a more dynamic 
sense: they are two continuous and complementary stages of a single process of enquiry. 
Indeed, as I will ultimately argue, they are also continuous and complementary, in this 
dynamic sense, with Chang’s active realism. 
In particular, we may regard the three projects of enquiry - those of Chang, Sider, and 
Lowe - as ranging between two extremes, one at which enquiry is at its most operationally 
concrete (that is, where the demands for grasp and understanding are primarily met), and 
another at which enquiry occurs in its most theoretically articulated form.  
 At least, the versions of them that I am presenting are. I only claim that these views are broadly 306
Siderean and Lowean, not that they are, as presented, Sider’s, or Lowe’s. 
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To say that these projects of enquiry form a succession of stages in a process is not to say 
that each stage is left behind as the next commences. It is, rather, to say that each stage acts 
as an enabling foundation for the next. Thus, to begin with ‘active’, operative enquiry into 
reality is to begin with a project of enquiry that we can properly grasp - which lays a 
foundation for the grasp of structures in a more abstract, more general, and more 
theoretically articulated (broadly, Siderean) way.  Siderean enquiry, in turn, allows us to 307
discuss structures themselves - and in particular, to discuss which structures obtain in virtue 
of other structures. For Sider, this is tied with the notion of a metaphysical semantics, as I 
will discuss in the next section. In my own view, it is tied with the distinction between 
explanandum and explanans roles that structures may play (an approach modelled in 
several previous chapters). The aim of this Siderean stage of enquiry - which takes place 
not instead of, but alongside Chang’s operative kind of enquiry in a mutually informing 
way - is to supply a set of structures in a foundational role - that is, a set of structures that 
stand as explanans to other kinds of structure.  
I contend that it is here that Lowean ontology enters the picture. Directly ontological 
posits, in the Lowean sense - posits of categories of being and their associated elements of 
ontological form - are posits of the kinds of entities whose ontological form underwrites 
the Siderean ‘book of the world’. To be sure, this does not mean that every element of 
Sideran global structure is explainable in terms of the ontological form of some kind of 
entity: that quantifier expressions carve at reality’s joints, for example, should not lead one 
to think that there are quantificational entities. Precisely how one gets from Siderean 
 Chang’s notions of resistance, epistemic activities, and epistemic iteration all serve to cash out 307
what ‘foundation’ here means, as I will explain in Sections 3 and 4. 
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structures to their best Lowean explanations is, of course, an open question that will be 
settled differently on a range of different ontological theories.  
Siderean-Lowean metaphysical enquiry, then, is an integrated undertaking that aims to 
articulate both the fundamental structures of the world, and also how these structures are 
underwritten by a system of ontological categories, and ontological form. The posits that 
this involves are very much realist posits, whose traction on reality may remain beyond our 
cognitive grasp. But they need not be too far beyond it: this is the epistemic benefit that 
Chang’s active realism is intended to supply. Indeed, the kind of pragmatic grasp of our 
posits, at which active realism aims, challenges the very dichotomy between traction on 
thought and traction on reality - between the epistemically and cognitively internal and the 
external - as, following Chang, I have already indicated.  
2. Further Motivation: The Challenge of Equivalent Fundamentalia 
The fitting problem is not the only reason for my proposed pragmatic focus. A further 
reason comes from a problem that faces Sider’s structural outlook.  Sider’s discussion of 308
this issue appears in his 2012 book (p.217f), and also in his forthcoming book The Tools of 
Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science (in particular, Chapter 5). In what follows, I 
base my discussion on both sources. 
On Sider’s view, structure is captured by theoretical terms that carve at reality’s joints. 
Different terms may carve at reality’s joints more or less closely - but it is also possible for 
distinct sets of terms to carve at the same joints of nature - for them to be good for saying 
 It affects Sider, not Lowe. But insofar as my proposal is an integration of Siderean and Lowean 308
themes, it affects both parts of my own view.
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the same things about the world. In such cases, the terms in question are equivalent. The 
terms centimetre and inch, for example, are equivalent in the sense that any truth stated in 
terms of centimetres may be translated into a truth in terms of inches, and vice versa.   309
What is equivalence? On Sider’s view, an explanatory answer to this question is desirable. 
While it is possible to leave the facts of equivalence brute - to ‘quotient by hand’ the 
equivalences between theories, statements, and so on - it leaves an unsatisfying residue of 
unexplained explainers.  
Sider’s explanation of equivalence appeals to his notion of fundamentality. For two sets of 
terms to be equivalent is for there to be a further set of terms, more fundamental than 
either, into which statements in terms of both equivalent sets receive an identical 
translation. Thus, equivalence holds between statements or sets of terms in virtue of their 
identity of content at a more fundamental level.  
In order to work, Sider’s approach requires that equivalent expressions always admit of 
identical translations at a more fundamental level. Sider faces a problem, then, in cases 
where there is no such further level to which to descend. Here are three such cases. First, 
there are equivalences between connectives: everything expressible in a language with & 
and ~ is expressible in terms of Sheffer’s stroke, and vice versa (and so on). Second, there 
are equivalences between the universal and existential quantifiers: anything expressible in 
terms of one admits of paraphrase into the other, with appropriate substitutions of Q1 for 
~Q2~.  Third, there are equivalences between fundamental mereological notions of 
 At least, on the face of it, which suffices for my purpose of illustration. Closer scrutiny, 309
however, shows the establishment of fixed scales to be a fascinatingly complex affair: see Chang 
(2004) and Quinn (2011) for some discussion. 
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parthood and overlap. In each case, it is implausible that there should be a more 
fundamental level of structure to which to appeal.  These examples are not exhaustive, 310
but they suffice to illustrate the problem.  
If Sider is committed to his analysis of equivalence in terms of fundamentality, then he 
faces a trilemma: in hard cases like these, either all, or some, or none of the equivalent 
terms are, in fact, fundamental.  
Suppose that none of them are. Then there is some more fundamental set of terms into 
which the problematic equivalent terms may be identically translated. But this is just to 
deny that there are such problematic cases of equivalent fundamentalia in the first place. 
Such a position is simply implausible, unless one can come up with some good candidates 
for such fundamental levels in the cases already mentioned (what would they be?).  
Suppose that some of them are. In that case, the equivalences become unproblematic, since 
they simply provide what Sider calls a metaphysical semantics for the less fundamental 
expressions in terms of the more fundamental ones. The problem with this is that it 
involves arbitrary-looking decisions to privilege certain terms over others when those 
terms ought to be equivalent. Consider the case of truth-functional connectives, for 
example. One might well say that Sheffer’s stroke is fundamental while, say, a combination 
of & and ~ is not - but on what grounds? To say that the stroke’s fundamentality is brute 
does not help, since it does not explain why we should think that expressively complete 
 It is possible, of course, to be surprised by such a level: see Denyer (1994) for a delightfully odd 310
case.  
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sets of truth-functional connectives are anything other than co-fundamental in the first 
place (to say that Sheffer’s stroke is expressively complete by itself hardly clarifies much).  
Suppose, then, that all of the equivalent expressions in a hard case are fundamental. This is 
an open option, and Sider appeals to its possibility to lend plausibility to his 
fundamentality-based account of equivalence (against the brute ‘quotienting’ view). On 
this horn of the trilemma, we get brute equivalences between fundamentalia, with Sider’s 
fundamentality approach kicking in to explain equivalences further up - that is, between 
non fundamental terms.  
This third horn remains problematic for Sider, but it is important to be clear about why. The 
wrong objection to raise here concerns explanatory redundancy: if equivalence is brute for 
fundamentalia, why not let it be brute all the way up? The objection is wrong because 
equivalence just might not be brute all the way up. In particular, it may be that expressions 
admit of a well-founded ordering in which equivalent sets of terms at each level ultimately 
depend for their equivalence on fundamentalia that occupy the bottom level of that 
ordering precisely because they do not depend for their equivalence relations on anything 
further.   
The right objection, I suggest, is that on the third horn, one of Sider’s foundational notions 
- the very notion of carving reality at the joints - becomes obscure. The point here runs 
parallel to a well-known objection to naive operationalist accounts of conceptual content. 
In that context, we may put the point as a dilemma: either conceptual content is exhausted 
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by an operational analysis, or not. If it is, then operationalism is guilty of overfitting : its 311
account of conceptual content will be too closely tied - even reduced - to operations, and 
will not generalise well. If it is not, then some further account is needed of conceptual 
content.  Likewise, then, in the case of Sider, we may ask whether theoretical terms 312
exhaust the loci of joint-carving. 
What do I mean? It is a hard thing to make entirely precise. Consider the claim that a 
certain term T carves reality at the joints. Minimally, this means that there is some 
structural feature of the world that is articulated or captured by T. To say that T carves, 
then, is to rule out views from one extreme of a spectrum, according to which T has no 
involvement in carving at the joint in question. At the opposite extreme of the spectrum is 
the view that T carves at the relevant joint all by itself, with no help at all: no background 
conditions or underlying relational features of T contribute to T’s carving at the relevant 
joint of nature. Call T, along with such a base of background conditions and contributing 
factors, which support T’s carving reality at the joints, a locus of joint-carving - vague as 
that notion is. Now we may say, at the first kind of extreme, that T is excluded from the 
relevant locus of joint-carving, while at the second kind of extreme, we may say that T is 
exhaustive of that locus. With this rough idea in mind, let us return to the question: do 
theoretical terms exhaust the loci of joint-carving? Either they do, or they do not.  
Suppose that they do. Then our account of structure, understood in terms of joint-carving 
theoretical terms, becomes overfitted to those terms. Structures captured by different sets of 
 I borrow this term from the field of machine learning, where ‘fitting’ does not have the sense 311
that I have given it in the present chapter. 
 As already noted, one can nevertheless get some epistemic benefit from operational analyses by 312
noting that they may help to delimit how much of a further (non-operational) account one needs.
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terms will be, by that token, different structures: no room remains for substantive claims of 
equivalence. On this horn, we fail to accommodate even brute equivalences. 
We had better, then, suppose that theoretical terms do not exhaust the loci of joint-
carving.  If they do not, then we may - and indeed, should - seek some further account of 313
what else goes into the relevant loci. On Sider’s view, the answer might begin with the 
Lewisian naturalness of the joints in question, and their resulting explanatory traction on 
the use of the terms that carve them. This is, indeed, not very far off Chang’s conception - 
as we saw - of reality as whatever exerts a coercive (and hence, to some degree, 
explanatory) constraint on practice.   
Drawing all this together, I suggest that the way for Sider to deal with the challenge from 
equivalent fundamentalia is to adopt, and give a further account of, a conception of the loci 
of joint-carving in which theoretical terms are included,  but de-centered. Centrally, as I 314
have already suggested, such a further account should focus on the activities and practices 
that underlie our use of joint-carving terms. In short, I suggest shifting the focus, in our 
 Indeed, this appears to be Sider’s own view. Consider, for example, the connection between 313
Lewisian naturalness and explanatoriness that underwrites Sider’s reference magnetism. 
 Their inclusion is, of course, crucial. This is not just because metaphysics is a theoretical 314
pursuit, but also because they are needed in order to prevent the aforementioned overfitting 
problem from afflicting the operations that are involved in the loci of joint-carving. Operations and 
theoretical posits here serve to alleviate the risk of overfitting from each other. 
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conception of the loci of joint-carving, from theoretical terms to the activities and 
operations involved in our use and grasp of those terms.   315
3. Joint-Carving in Practice 
I have argued that my integrated, Siderean-Lowean outlook should be supplemented by 
Chang’s active realism. I have argued, too, for a practice-centered conception of the loci of 
joint-carving. To unpack this latter claim in more detail, we turn again to Hasok Chang’s 
work, this time on epistemic activities and epistemic iteration. For reasons of space, my 
discussion will aim to be illustrative of what is possible here, rather than exhaustive. 
Specifically, I will limit myself to two points of illustration. I will discuss how the notion 
of an epistemic activity is tied to the grasp of structure, and I will discuss how the notion of 
epistemic iteration may give us some grasp of central and primitive theoretical terms such 
as structure itself. (Insofar as my interest in illustrating rather than exhausting the 
possibilities leads, in this way, to the imposition of a certain false neatness upon the 
subject-matter; that neatness should be disregarded as an artefact of my discussion.) 
3.1 Epistemic Activities 
The relationship between epistemic activities and worldly structure is a theme developed 
through several iterations in Chang’s work (see Chang 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2011, 
2012). Recall from 1.3 above, that Chang’s active realism recommends maximising our 
learning from reality. Reality is understood as whatever resists our attempts to act ‘upon it’ 
 Here is another way to motivate the idea that something is amiss with Sider’s loci. One might 315
imagine a language in which it is possible to insert truth tables directly as subsentential 
expressions. In that case the worry about equivalent sets of expressively complete connectives 
disappears. Of course, a truth table is not a theoretical term, as normally understood - but the 
problem begins to look very much like an artefact of Sider’s assumption that it is at the level of 
theoretical terms, as normally understood, that joint-carving occurs.  
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as we will; I have noted that such a conception of reality sits well with the grounds for 
Sider’s reference magnetism. An epistemic activity is, roughly, any activity through which 
we enact such learning about and from reality.  
One simple example of an epistemic activity is counting. This is a fairly mid-level activity: 
it is realised by various further activities (such as individuating, perhaps), and may itself be 
a part of broader epistemic activities (see Chang 2012 §1.2.1.1). I will assume that 
theorising in terms of such unreduced mental activities is not problematic in principle (see 
Burge 2010 for a firm defence of this kind of approach).  
Epistemic activities are often realised by further activities, some of which are themselves 
epistemic activities. In such cases, we may as a matter of terminological convenience use 
‘epistemic activities’ for these higher level actions, and ‘operations’ for the lower-level acts 
that realise them. However, as Chang points out, this distinction between activities and 
operations is relative and mobile: there need be nothing fixed about which acts are 
activities, and which operations. In particular, we should not think that for an epistemic 
activity to be realised by such-and-such operations entails that the operations in question 
are specifiable in more basic terms than the epistemic activity that they realise: realisation 
here is not a reductive relation.  
Moreover, since epistemic activities may be specified in unreduced mental terms, it is quite 
possible for the individuation of epistemic activities to be laden, to a greater or lesser 
degree, with theoretical commitments. These contributions, of mental and theoretical 
categories to the individuation of epistemic activities, render epistemic activities somewhat 
flexible - indeed, multiply realisable - with respect to their most concrete underlying 
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operations. (This flexibility, in turn, is what enables epistemic activities to extend the loci 
of joint-carving in a way that accommodates equivalences between fundamental theoretical 
terms.) 
Consider again the epistemic activity of counting. Suppose that one is set the task of 
counting in a world consisting entirely of undifferentiated atomless stuff. As Chang points 
out, such an activity is unintelligible, in a specific sense. Chang’s point is not that it is 
suddenly unintelligible, in general, what the task of counting is a task to do.  Rather, it is 316
unintelligible how that task should be implemented in the particular case. In an 
undifferentiated world, counting is unintelligible because it is impracticable. The 
undifferentiated stuff-world lacks a certain structural feature without which counting is 
impracticable: it lacks discreteness.  The lack of discreteness is a structural feature of the 317
world which resists one’s efforts to count in that world. The epistemic activity of counting, 
then, depends for its intelligibility - its practicability - on the assumption that reality has a 
discrete structure.  Call discreteness in this context a metaphysical or ontological 318
 This does not entail that we have a direct, Lowean grasp of the nature of counting - only that we 316
have acquired our ability to count, by some means other than counting worlds of undifferentiated 
stuff. Precisely how one acquires such a capacity is a hard question, the hardness of which is 
brought to light in some work on rule adoption by Saul Kripke and Romina Padro (see Padro 
2015). 
 To be sure, one could imagine a stuff-world that is not undifferentiated - say, one which comes 317
in discrete portions of stuff. In such a world, counting becomes possible again. 
 Discreteness is arguably not the only structural feature that counting presupposes. Along more 318
Lowean lines, we might also suppose that counting presupposes that reality has a sorted structure. 
For suppose - per impossibile -  that a world might have a discrete structure without any sorts. It is 
plausible to think, along broadly Fregean lines, that counting would remain impracticable in such a 
world, since one would lack any sorts under which to count. It is no objection to the example, that 
discreteness is necessarily accompanied by sortedness, since discreteness and sortedness are 
distinct structural features, even if not really separable. Nevertheless, one might resist the example 
by insisting that sortedness is crucial to counting only because it is a necessary condition for 
discreteness.   
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principle.  Then Chang’s point is that the epistemic activity of counting depends, for its 319
intelligibility, on the metaphysical principle of discreteness.  
Beside counting and discreteness, Chang discusses several other pairs of epistemic 
activities and metaphysical principles, which vary in their persuasive force. One of 
Chang’s further examples stands out as being both especially persuasive, and also of 
particular interest in the context of this thesis: the link between attempted 
overdetermination and the principle of single value.  
Consider the following example. Suppose that I want to predict the number of degrees by 
which I will raise the temperature of some water by burning a certain amount of wood. 
Suppose I investigate all the relevant facts and laws, and calculate an answer: thirty 
degrees. Suppose that I then burn the wood, and measure the increase in the water’s 
temperature with a thermometer. Suppose that my thermometer indicates an increase of 
only ten degrees, and suppose that this falls outside the margin of error of my prediction. 
We should say, in such a case, that my prediction and my observation are in conflict. Such 
a conflict might lead me on various lines of enquiry: I might have miscalculated, made 
some false assumption, or used a poorly-calibrated thermometer, and so on. I would not be 
led to suppose, however, that my conflicting results might be explained by the water’s 
having risen by both thirty and ten degrees (on the same scale). I would not be led, in other 
words, to assume that the temperature of the water might have had more than one value at 
 Chang uses these terms more or less interchangeably.319
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the same time.  This is not because the single-valuedness of the temperature of the water 320
is simply a deeply held assumption of mine, but rather, because the very epistemic activity 
in which I am engaging - the (dis)confirmation of a theoretical prediction, in this case - 
would be unintelligible (impracticable) if the world did not obey the principle of single 
value. 
The (dis)confirmation of a prediction is one among many epistemic activities, involving 
the determination of one value in multiple ways, which is undergirded by the principle of 
single value. Indeed, the principle of single value is not specific to physical magnitudes at 
all: to say that reality obeys a principle of single value is just to say, in my terms, that it 
exhibits a determination structure.  The range of epistemic activities underwritten by 321
single-valuedness, then, goes far beyond epistemic activities connected with measurement: 
as I have argued in previous chapters, predication and instantiation structures are also 
varieties of determination structure. Indeed, this wide-ranging appearance of determination 
structures, brought to light by epistemic activities that rely on single-valuedness, is a core 
reason for positing dimensions as a fundamental category of being.  
 I am, of course, simplifying. In determining the boiling point of water, for example, it makes a 320
difference whether one places a thermometer in the water the temperature of which one is 
measuring (and if so, how deep), or in the steam that the water produces, and so on. See Chang 
2004 for discussion. 
 Single-valuedness is, indeed, a feature that distinguishes determination structures from function-321
value structures in general. Consider the argument, discussed by Fraser MacBride (2004), that we 
know perfectly well what it is for a universal to be wholly in multiple places, since we understand 
the location-of function and we know what it is for a function to be one-many. Arguably, the 
success of this argument will hang on whether location structure is a kind of determination 
structure.
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What is the status of these metaphysical principles? According to Chang (2009:69), their 
validity is grounded in the requirements of practice. In particular, the principle of single 
value is grounded in the requirements of testing and related epistemic activities (where, as 
noted, ‘related’ covers a very wide range of activities). It is not so much that the success of 
testing activities requires the that reality be single-valued in its structure, but rather, that 
our commitment to undertake testing activities involves a commitment to treat reality as 
being single-valued in the relevant respects. Metaphysical principles reveal more about the 
nature of our epistemic activities than they do about how reality is: the world may be as it 
likes; so long as it impinges on our epistemic practices as if it were relevantly single-
valued, it will provide no resistance to those practices going on. Thus, metaphysical 
principles on Chang’s view have a distinctly Kantian flavour: they are commitments that 
arise on account of, and do not extend beyond, our pragmatic immersion in the world.  
Chang (2012:227f) builds a powerful case against the notion of a general link between the 
success of science - whatever that means - and the truth of its theories. But the case is 
somewhat different in our case. For in the present context, we are not interested in a 
general link between the success of science and the truth of its theories; rather, we are after 
a piecemeal link between operations and the explanatory worth of metaphysical theories. 
Here is Chang: 
Here we should start with an unbiased look at what does tend to be lasting in science: all indications are that 
lasting success in science has been achieved most credibly in two inter-related realms: various material 
techniques and technologies, and the empirical adequacy or phenomenological laws […] I think there are 
good prospects of retaining operational successes that have already been achieved (modulo the problem of 
induction). The security of achievements already made is a piecemeal thing, a motley collection of successful 
practices in various parts of science, from which it is going to be very difficult to infer anything about the 
general character of science. (2012:229)  
!266
Operations can succeed, but operations - and the instruments with which they are 
performed - are not truth-bearers, so there is no general link between success and truth to 
be built there. Nevertheless, the success of an operation might be well explained by the 
truth of the metaphysical principles on which its intelligibility depends.  True, the world 322
may be any old way and yet appear to satisfy the relevant metaphysical principles. But this 
is no obstacle to our best posit being, in a fallible and defeasible way, that the world is 
indeed as it appears to be.  
One might doubt this claim by noting that epistemic activities, and their underlying 
operations, are fairly high-level features of the world. Earlier, it was in virtue of this that 
they helped to accommodate Sider’s equivalent fundamentalia. But here, the point becomes 
problematic: if these are high-level goings on, then there is a very real possibility that 
reality might, at bottom, be merely appearing to satisfy the relevant metaphysical 
principles. On the other hand, the fact that we are dealing with high-level phenomena also 
leaves plenty of room to check how reality is constituted ‘lower down’, so as to appear to 
satisfy those principles at the higher level. Consider the following analogy. My experience, 
when I watch a film, appears - to me - to be an experience of smooth surfaces and 
continuous movement. The fact that my visual experience is a relatively high-level and 
coarse-grained feature of the world leaves plenty of room for illusion lower down - yet by 
the same token, there is plenty of room for investigation. I might find, by looking more 
closely, that what appear to be smooth surfaces turn out to be composed of discrete pixels, 
or I might, by getting behind the projector, find that what appear to be continuous 
movements turn out to be grounded in a fast succession of discrete frames. In each case, 
 As Chang (2012:231) points out, motley disunity among the explananda here may result in 322
motley disunity among the explanans. But I do not see why this should be a problem. 
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what distinguishes these illusions from the kinds of illusions that radical sceptics worry 
about is the room that they leave for being empirically found out.  
So too, in the case of our metaphysical principles: insofar as one’s reason for scepticism 
about those principles arises from the high-level natures of the epistemic activities that 
require them, there will - at least potentially - be room to find out empirically that one is 
mistaken. Such mistakes may be found out empirically precisely when they involve the 
breakdown of the epistemic activities that depend on them. Thus, suppose I were to think 
that names exhibited determination structures - that the name of any individual could only 
take a single value. Sooner or later, I might be told that a certain man’s name is ‘Cicero’, 
and that it is ‘Tully’. Now I might then conclude that my informants are mistaken or lying. 
But I might - and indeed ought to - conclude instead that the epistemic activities in which I 
had attempted to engage - discovering names through operations that rely on single-
valuedness - were not fit for purpose. Of course, a failure to disconfirm a metaphysical 
principle in this way does not entail that such a principle is true. But it does leave the 
metaphysical principles concerned in good standing. 
Let us return now to the question of the status of metaphysical principles. Chang (2009:69) 
holds that their validity arises from the requirements of their associated epistemic 
activities, because they are neither empirical generalisations, nor logical truths. However, 
there are reasons to qualify both of these claims. 
First, Chang points out that single-valuedness could not be an empirical generalisation 
because we could not make any sense of testing it; indeed, it is a principle presupposed by 
empirical testing. But the fact that reality, in some domain, offers no (insurmountable) 
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resistance to a range of epistemic activities that presuppose single-valuedness, is itself an 
empirical generalisation as good as any other. It is by no means inconceivable that a 
domain of enquiry should resist attempts to learn about it through such methods - the 
domain of proper names being an example - and while this does not confirm the principle 
of single-value directly, it does offer some indirect, abductive grounds for holding it about 
particular domains. Indeed, it is not hard to specify what it would take for single-value 
based enquiry to fail in the case of say, temperature: it would fail if, for example,  
thermometers were to give two readings rather than one, in a way that robustly resists 
explaining away.  323
Second, Chang points out that single-valuedness could not be a logical truth, since “one 
can imagine variables that have multiple values, especially in the realm of non-physical 
quantities and designations: for example, names of persons or places, or multivalued 
functions in mathematics.” (2009:69). Now, I do not say that the principle of single value is 
a logical truth on every conception of logical truth out there. But on conceptions of logical 
truth that are tied closely to ontological form (see e.g. Lowe 2013), this is less clear. In 
particular, there is room for the principle of single value to be underwritten by 
metaphysical posits, where the manner in which, and extent to which, it is so underwritten 
will depend on whatever turns out to be the right metaphysical theory. In particular, if 
reality supports a distinction between determination structures and function-value 
structures, as I think it does, then Chang’s examples do not show that single-valuedness, 
 To be sure, this is hard to imagine. But if that is so, it is so in a way that seems to support single-323
valuedness - namely, in virtue of (say) the volume of mercury in a thermometer also being single-
valued. There is, indeed, no point at which one may step out of these mutually supporting 
operations to observe the truth of the principle of single value directly, but this is just to say that the 
epistemic ground for single-valuedness does not have a foundationalist structure. Its structure is, 
rather, a kind of progressive coherentism (2007:5). 
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where it does occur, is not grounded in the natures of things. This is a point that Chang 
seems to acknowledge: 
Still, where we do recognize it as valid, the principle clearly seems to have a necessity about it. What could 
be the source of this necessity? In terms of conceptions that are commonly known, I think the closest to 
ontological principles as I conceive them is the Kantian synthetic a priori […] what we must conclude is that 
the necessity of the principle of single value is not universal but conditional, holding only in some situations. 
[…]  To summarize, we need to subscribe to the principle of single value if we want to engage in testing-by-
overdetermination. In other words, the necessity of the principle of single value springs from our commitment 
to testing-by-overdetermination. Or, single validness is necessary for enabling the activity of testing-by-
overdetermination. What we have is a pragmatic necessity - a necessity arising from the requirements of 
action, not some kind of hypertruth that pertains to a proposition. (2009:69-70) 
Chang’s formulations of the point here seem to shift between a certain doxastic orientation 
- that belief in single-valuedness is necessary for commitment to testing by 
overdetermination - and a more ontological focus, that single-valuedness is necessary to 
enable testing by overdetermination. Overall, his point seems to be twofold. His first point, 
as we saw before, is that the relationship between operational success and a metaphysical 
principle is not one between the success and truth of the same thing, since operations are 
not truthbearers and so leave any truth content in a success-truth link underdetermined. His 
second point is that the success of a given epistemic operation does not support the truth of 
its associated metaphysical principle(s) in general, but only (defeasibly) as they pertain to 
its particular domain of enquiry.  
Both of these points can be accommodated by metaphysical realism. For realism need not 
proceed on the basis of the general sort of success-truth link that Chang rightly rejects. 
What is needed, instead, is an initially piecemeal link between operational success and the 
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explanatory value of metaphysical - structural and ontological - posits. Here we needn’t 
jump from operational success directly to the truth of some ultimate theory, but should 
proceed gradually, by stages, through explanatorily useful and theoretically unifying posits 
of structure (in both explanandum and explanans roles, as discussed) and ontology. 
Moreover, such explanatory posits need not focus only on preserving the appearances - the 
success of this or that epistemic activity - but may aim also to tell a systematic grounding 
story about a range of structural features of reality that are presupposed by our empirical 
epistemic activities  (modality and material constitution being two examples).  324
3.2 Epistemic Iteration 
The success of epistemic activities, then, provides a way into explanatory posits of 
structure. This is no good, however, if no serviceable, realist conception of structure can be 
had. I have already noted Sider’s overall response to this point: the notion of structure is 
primitive, and should be elucidated by the theory that we build upon it. In the present 
section, I propose an understanding of how this might be done. I begin by an obstacle to 
structural realism, drawing again on an argument from Chang. I then discuss the role of 
epistemic iteration in overcoming it. 
Chang’s argument against structural realism takes the form of a dilemma (2012:244-6). 
The argument pertains to the preservation of structures across theoretical change - that is, 
the claim that structures are not theory-bound. Chang presents the horns of his dilemma 
thus: “either the structure identified is observable (in which case trust in the structure only 
amounts to empiricism), or the preservation of the structure is willful (in which case there 
 To reiterate: I am using ‘empirical’ very broadly here, to include far more than just the core 324
activities of science. 
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is no warrant for taking it as an element of external reality)” (2012:245). To illustrate the 
first horn, Chang gives an example: 
[…] consider […] Fresnel’s optical equations that are saved in the subsequent Maxwellian theory. […] 
Fresnel’s equations […] are phenomenological laws, as they are mathematical relations between observable 
variables, namely the intensities of the incident, reflected and reflected light beams and the angle that these 
beams make with the reflecting surface. One would expect this sort of thing to be preserved going from one 
theory to the next, or even from one paradigm to the next as long as the incommensurability is partial as 
Kuhn allowed. Here we are ultimately only talking about the structure of data-sets, which anti-realist 
empiricists would be very happy to accept. […] All this goes to show that structuralism does not necessarily 
fall on the realist side of the standard realism-antirealism divide. (2012:245-6) 
I am happy to accept Chang’s conclusion here. Chang continues: 
The other horn of the dilemma is conveniently illustrated by the case of Copernicus and Ptolemy […] Even 
though Ptolemaic and Copernican theories were very different from each other, uniform circular motion was 
an essential structural part of both theories […] Is this structural continuity impressive? Yes, but only in terms 
of how the obsession with uniform circular motion could have lasted from Ptolemy thorough to Copernicus. 
The rigidity, obstinacy or uniformity of scientists’ way of thinking, by itself, reveals nothing about the nature 
of external reality. Instead, the constancy of structures may only be an indication of what we hold fixed 
because of our mathematical or esthetic preferences. (2012:246) 
Moreover: 
My reservations about structural realism should not be mistaken as a denial of the structural continuity that 
we often do observe […] nor as a negative assessment of the value of such continuity. It is only that I do not 
think we should imagine that structuralism will save the realist argument from the success of science. There 
is no general warrant for regarding the structural aspect of a successful scientific system to be solely or even 
mainly responsible for its success. An inference from success to structure is going to be just as unsafe as the 
troubled inference from success to truth. (2012:246) 
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Chang’s motivating thought here is a Duhemian, holistic one, that it is hard in principle to 
pick out the ‘success-generating’ elements of a successful system even when a clear notion 
of success - one worth explaining - can be articulated. This applies to the success of whole 
theoretical systems, but since parts of systems are interpenetrated and laden with 
theoretical content, the point extends, arguably, to individual theoretical terms.  
Is there any way out? Recall, from previous discussion, the circularity generated by the 
pursuit of truth: truth is an inoperable epistemic goal, but other epistemic goals cannot be 
checked directly for truth-conduciveness. Chang’s solution there was to shift our focus 
from theories to practice - from theoretical representations of reality to pragmatically 
oriented and informative engagements with it. Since practices are not truthbearers, the 
question of truth thus drops out - but I have tried to reintroduce standard realism by 
drawing an explanatory link between successful operations and structure. Chang’s further 
point, however, is that this kind of correspondence between operations and structure is 
itself something that cannot be directly checked.  
The remedy, I suggest, is to adopt a progressive coherentist model of justification for these 
posited links between structure and practice. The questions of which structures to posit, and 
whether those structures have any traction on reality, cannot be answered from a 
transcendental standpoint that allows their answers to be directly observed. Rather, they 
are to be answered from an immersive point of view, through an ongoing, iterative process 
of enquiry.  
The notion of an immersive standpoint differs from both the transcendental standpoint of 
the naive realist (from which everything is clear), and what one might call the benthic 
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viewpoint of the hard-nosed sceptic (from which everything is mud).  Enquiry from an 325
immersive point of view does not assume an unmediated and direct grasp of reality which 
dispenses with any need for pragmatic, operational engagement with the world. Nor does it 
assume that such engagement must be epistemically opaque, revealing nothing about the 
reality with which we are engaged.  If such an outlook wants a name, let us call it 326
immersive realism.  327
Central to realist enquiry, immersively oriented, is epistemic iteration. Processes of 
epistemic iteration are, broadly speaking, processes in which successive stages of iteration 
of epistemic activities serve the pursuit of certain given epistemic goals.  The thought is 328
that an epistemic goal that may not be achieved directly, or entirely, may nevertheless be 
approached by such successive stages by justificatory means that are both progressive and 
coherentist. Thus, suppose that one has set the epistemic goal of determining an absolute 
temperature scale. One might have to begin with crude, sensory measurements of 
temperature, and proceed from there to the construction of thermoscopes (roughly, 
instruments that measure temperature on an ordinal scale). Sensory resources are needed 
here to set up thermoscopes, but the resulting thermoscopes - through iterative 
 Appropriately, marine habitats above the benthic zone vary widely, from demersal to littoral 325
zones, encompassing everything inbetween. This is very much in keeping with the exploratory 
spirit of my proposed view. 
 Dialectically, the benthic point of view takes realist metaphysics to owe an account of how it can 326
overcome a certain in-principle barrier to knowledge of the world. By contrast, I take the benthic 
sceptic to owe a defence of the notion that there should be such a barrier.
 This label is not supposed to set my view up in opposition to Chang’s active realism. Its purpose 327
is simply to emphasise the immersive element. 
 As Chang points out, epistemic iteration differs from iterative methods in mathematics, since in 328
the epistemic case there is usually no guarantee that iterative methods will converge on a result, and 
no independent way to calculate such a result. Epistemic iteration works in a coherentist setting. 
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improvements in precision  - can be used to correct the very sensory faculties through 329
which they were set up. Likewise, the availability of thermoscopes enables the construction 
of thermometers as we know them, which in turn enables the establishment of an absolute 
temperature scale (the details of this three-stage iterative process are given in Chang 2004). 
At no point in this ‘bootstrapping’ process does one escape immersion altogether, to bring 
about this retrospective correction from a transcendental point of view. Rather, what 
enables backward correction is the progressive accumulation of a greater weight of greater 
coherence, and other epistemic virtues, at each iterative stage. The commitments at each 
stage remain fallible, but it is nonetheless the case that epistemic iteration is a progressive 
tendency toward being better informed about reality.  
Chang’s case studies show that the notion of epistemic iteration can help us to make sense 
of scientific practice. Can it also help in the case of metaphysics? A full answer to this 
question would require detailed case studies into metaphysics that I hope to pursue at a 
later point. Here I will only mention debates about the metaphysics of personhood, mind, 
causation, material constitution, emergence, truth, truthmaking, and representation, as eight 
broad areas that are obvious candidates for such case studies.  
To make this claim less abstract, let me consider a ‘toy’ example. The example is not 
intended to resemble any actual episode in the history of metaphysics, or to exemplify 
iterative process that actually occurs in metaphysics; its aim is simply to offer one 
schematic way that iteration in metaphysics might go, in order to make the placement of 
iteration in metaphysics plausible. One might imagine metaphysics beginning with a 
 Precisely how these iterations take place will be a technical matter that depends on the details of 329
the case. There is no reason to expect, or want, a general account of epistemic iteration at this level 
of concreteness. 
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broadly phenomenological (in both experiential and operational senses) stage of enquiry at 
which our chief epistemic goal is to identify and articulate patterns in reality. At its most 
primitive, such a stage of enquiry would simply seek to identify how things go together. 
One might imagine a further stage of enquiry at which basic structures are posited, and 
then precisified. At this stage, rather than saying that (for example) colour and red go 
together in a similar way to shape and square, we might identify various kinds of structures 
- specification relations, conjunctive or otherwise, determination structures, function-value 
structures, and so on - that reality appears to have. This structural stage of enquiry has the 
characteristically iterative capacity to retrospectively correct the deliverances of the first 
stage of enquiry: one might, for example, distinguish determination structures from 
function-value structures, and therefore correct a prior inclination to group individuals and 
their names along with objects and their shapes, say. We might, moreover, imagine a 
further stage of enquiry at which ontological posits - posits of categories of being and their 
ontological form - are made and precisified. Again, these posits have a capacity for 
retrospective correction. Consider, for example, my posit of dimensions in an earlier 
chapter, and the implications that I drew from this for the explanandum structures in the 
debate over determinables: there, it was because dimensions were - I argued - the best 
explanation for the debate’s explanandum structures overall, that certain elements of those 
explanandum structures - such as the assumption that determinable-determinate hierarchies 
are ontologically uniform all the way up, or that determinables are less fundamental than 
their associated determinates.  These pervasive relations of mutual information and 330
adjustment between stages of enquiry, as well as between a system of enquiry and our 
 One example that showcases these mutual relationships rather clearly is the discussion of 330
truthmaking. See Lowe (2006, Ch.11), for an illustrative discussion. 
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broader knowledge and understanding as they develop, are characteristic of enquiry in an 
iterative mould. I take it, then, that iteration is not out of place in metaphysical enquiry.  
Finally, the iterative stages of metaphysical enquiry lend a dynamic element to Sider’s 
claim - mentioned before - that while ‘structure’ is primitive and not definable, a theory 
built upon it can amount to an implicit definition of that notion. We may add, in light of our 
discussion, that the iterative process of developing a theory in terms of the notion of 
structure offers an increasingly clear grasp of that notion. 
4. Alethic Monism 
One might wonder whether this progressive, coherentist obsession with constant feedback 
between levels of enquiry might undermine our overall commitment to a robust 
metaphysical realism. After all, how feasible is it for a realist project of metaphysical 
enquiry to keep even common sense in the loop?  
My response to this is a little circumspect. The aim of my proposed approach is not to 
show, in some direct sense, whether reality is as common sense takes it to be - whatever 
that means. Rather, it is to give an account of the structures of the world, and an account of 
how the operations accessible to common sense fit among them, and engage with them so 
as to reveal them to us. While this sounds like a transcendental project of enquiry, it is not 
intended to be; rather, it is intended to take place wholly within the iterative, immersive 
framework adumbrated above. Such enquiry takes place within a coherentist framework, 
but coherentism from a practice-oriented point of view - as I have argued above - need not 
raise the problem of isolation that is usually levelled against it. 
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However, one might expect such coherentism to raise problems of plurality. These worries 
may be of two sorts. One, which I will call the problem of fragmentation, is the worry that 
reality might at bottom come in isolated pockets rather than a single fabric. The other, 
which I will call the problem of alternatives, is the worry that there are multiple, equally 
good outcomes that iterative enquiry of the proposed sort may reach. To close the 
discussion of this chapter, I will briefly discuss the broad ways in which each problem 
might be addressed. 
To get a handle on the problem of fragmentation, consider the law of non-contradiction 
(LNC). LNC supplies one powerful ground for thinking that reality comes as a unified 
whole: given that p, it simply cannot be the case that ~p.  Now, suppose that p, and 331
suppose also that ~p. Given p, where should we place the fact that ~p? Presumably the 
facts that p and ~p could not occupy, as it were, the same portion of reality. So one might 
posit fragmentation, in the sense outlined above, in order to support the truth of p and ~p in 
different fragments of reality (whatever that means: I will not worry here whether the 
fragmentation thesis can ultimately be cashed out in the first place). But this is 
problematic. For one thing, the very same thing - the proposition p - will be affirmed in one 
fragment of reality, and denied in the other. Thus, our supposed fragments overlap in 
respect of p: this is monism all over again. Indeed, monism reasserts itself whether these 
supposed fragments overlap or not. For insofar as they do overlap,  the reappearance of 332
monism is obvious. Insofar as they do not overlap, there is no sensible sense in which they 
 The point is made well by Lowe (2006 §11.6). 331
 By ‘overlap’, I mean - in a vague sense - that they concern the same things. I take it that the 332
whole question of whether fragments overlap (the way, say, that Carnapian frameworks do) is a 
question that only arises within a view that supports the fragmentation thesis at all. The use of 
fragmentation, in this context, to support the affirmation and denial of a single thing - the very 
same proposition p - should suggest that some notion of overlap is in play.
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may be said to exclude each other, so there will be a monistic standpoint from which one 
may simply accept the conjunction of them. I suggest, then, that there is no sensible 
interpretation of the fragmentation thesis that might challenge monism.  
One might suppose that the problem of alternatives admits of a similar solution: if there are 
multiple, equally good, complete standpoints resulting from iterative enquiry, can we not 
accept them all? It is not obvious how we can. For the problem with alternatives is not the 
existence of alternatives as such, but the threat of relativism that they pose.  
However, the threat of relativism is only real if one can say, from a transcendental 
standpoint, that multiple theoretical systems are equally and entirely accurate, at the end of 
enquiry. Our proposed immersive mode of enquiry, however, cannot purport, even in 
principle, to result in multiple understandings of reality that are fully and equally adequate 
in this transcendental sense. To be sure, this is to acknowledge certain limits to the 
ambitions of realist metaphysical enquiry: we forgo any ambition to reach such 
transcendental certainty. But this is no cost, since - as immersed enquirers - such a 
transcendental viewpoint was never available anyway. (As Sider notes (draft), even 
metaphysicians cannot know everything.) The possibility of multiple, fully elaborated and 
epistemically adequate metaphysical systems represents, then, a limit to realist 
metaphysical enquiry - but one that it would be a significant achievement to reach.  
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Conclusion 
In the introduction to this thesis, I set out a main claim, and a fallback claim, that I would 
aim to defend. The main claim was that dimensionism is the best ontology to adopt in 
relation to issues pertaining to the metaphysics of properties. The fallback was that 
dimensionism is, at the very least, a challenging and worthwhile competitor that offers a 
fruitful alternative to its more familiar, established rivals. The reader who has read the 
thesis, and not skipped here directly, should now have a much fuller sense of what is meant 
by these claims, and why I have taken the trouble to defend them.  
I offer no further arguments for either claim in this concluding part of the thesis. This 
conclusion will not be, in any sense, a last-ditch attempt to persuade the reader of anything 
that I have already said. Rather, I will use this concluding space for two ends. First, I will 
conclude: I will draw together some of the main take-home messages from the arguments 
of the thesis. Second, I will look forward to prospective areas of work that arise from the 
discussions of previous chapters.  
The obvious place to begin, for take-home messages, is the category of dimensions itself. I 
have defended dimensionism, which sets that category into a particular ontological theory. I 
have defended it, in part because I think it is the best dimension-based ontology, and also 
in part because it is minimal. I have aimed to showcase the explanatory work that 
dimensions can do, with the least possible help from other categories of being. But 
dimensionism is not the only ontology in which a category of dimensions might be set. My 
discussion will, I hope, have highlighted dimensions - and the distinctive factored 
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determination relationships that accompany them - as a rich explanatory resource for 
ontological theories other than my own. 
Relatedly, I hope to have shown that respect structure deserves a focal position in 
ontological theorising. The notion of respect structure has, I suggest, been obscured from 
mainstream discussion by a confluence of factors, not least the three interrelated 
assumptions that respect structure can be entirely and straightforwardly captured in terms 
of determinable-determinate structure, that determinable-determinate structure is an 
ontologically uniform structure that relates properties, and that respect structures can be 
straightforwardly be accounted for in terms of relationships between properties. This thesis 
has challenged that standard paradigm about respect structure. I have argued that respect 
structure is not as easy to obscure as it is widely taken to be, and that giving it a focal role 
brings a rich and distinctive range of fresh ontological resources to light.  
I have argued, moreover, that these fresh resources lead to challenges and surprises for a 
number of widespread assumptions in a range of discussions in metaphysics.  
In relation to discussions of determinable-determinate structure, dimensionism entirely 
overturns the standard assumption that determinable-determinate hierarchies are 
ontologically uniform. In doing this, it takes up a theme that has become increasing 
prominent in recent discussion (especially in connection with Wilson 2012), that 
determinables need not always be ontologically posterior to their associated determinates. 
It takes up that theme, and takes it further: the fundamental entities - objects and 
dimensions - sit at the two extremes of a determinable-determinate hierarchy. Properties - 
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insofar as they enter into the picture at all - are introduced between these extremes in a way 
that shows them to be derivative from resemblance structure.  
In relation to the problem of universals, I have presented first an answer to Campbell’s B-
question (about shared properties), and only then an answer to the A-question (about the 
individual possession of properties).  My account here is distinctive in its use of a 333
Fregean-style abstraction principle for properties, but even more so in eschewing any use 
of a notion of imperfect resemblance. In doing this, I have avoided commitment to the 
claim that resemblance is by degrees. I have, moreover, avoided claiming either that 
overall resemblance (as employed by Rodriguez-Pereyra - see Chapter 6) is a primitive and 
unanalysable notion, or that resemblance in a respect is (as Funkhouser (2014:64) 
suggests). For this reason, my proposed view is not merely an improvement over 
resemblance that trades parsimony of one sort (the avoidance of modal realism) for 
parsimony of another sort (a further category of dimensions), as I have argued in Chapter 
6.  
In relation to instantiation structure, I have argued against the commonly held view that 
instantiation structures are binary, copular structures. I have argued, instead, that they are 
ternary determination structures. On this point, I have argued that dimensionism captures 
the common thread that runs, in the background, through various ontologies based on facts. 
I hope that dimensionism may, then, provide some much-needed clarity about what many 
fact ontologies are aiming at. 
 I have offered a conception of objects as qualitatively thick, but in saying that objects possess 333
properties, I mean something further: the explanandum in that case is an object’s possession of the 
sort of thing that is generated by an answer to the B-question - its possession, singly, of a property 
that it has in common with other objects. 
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In relation to nomic (recall, lawlike ) governance, I have defended a dimensionist account 334
of governance that is structurally similar to Armstrong’s and Lowe’s accounts, but which, 
unlike theirs, follows Tugby (2016) in rejecting a principle of instantiation - albeit for 
dimensions, not universals. Thus, my view qualifies as a kind of Platonism - but not of a 
strong sort. My view does not entail that dimensions are necessary beings, or that they 
inhabit some transcendent domain. My view differs from more standard varieties of 
Platonism in that I am not a Platonist about properties, standardly conceived, but 
dimensions. This avoids, I suggest, some of the sheer implausibility attached to believing in 
an abundance of Platonic determinate properties.  335
In addition to my discussion of dimensionism itself, in Chapter 7 I have set out the 
metametaphysical framework that I call immersive realism. I have tried to show, there, that 
the outlooks of Ted Sider and Jonathan Lowe may be understood as complementary and 
mutually supportive rather than as competing. Moreover, I have argued that the resulting, 
staunchly realist outlook may, despite its realism, borrow a great amount from the 
pragmatically oriented view of Hasok Chang. While this combination of ideas risks 
offending the sensibilities of both realists and pragmatists, I have argued that realist 
commitments stand to benefit from, and are not compromised by, the use of pragmatist 
resources.  
Finally, the work of W.E. Johnson - in particular, his discussion of determinables - has 
featured prominently in much of this thesis. Although the dimensionist ontology that I have 
 I have not defended my account as an account of laws, but the account that I have offered stands 334
well, in any case, to be an account of functional laws. 
 That is, of course, if one thinks that such an abundance is implausible. 335
!283
advanced here is my own, the core notion of a dimension - as I have argued in Chapter 2 - 
is much closer to Johnson’s own discussion than standard readings of Johnson might 
suggest. This is not to say that Johnson held, implicitly, any commitment to dimensions as I 
have conceived them.  But it is to highlight the richness of Johnson’s discussion from an 336
ontological point of view. 
That concludes the retrospective part of the present discussion. From here on, I turn to 
some directions for further, prospective research, that have arisen from the discussions of 
this thesis. I will not aim, of course, to be exhaustive, and I will ignore cases that involve 
‘merely’ filling in a detailed account where I have given a sketch, such as the account of 
mid-level determinates in Chapter 3. I will briefly focus on seven directions for further 
research.   
First, and most obviously, there are questions of what parallels to my dimensionist proposal 
may be found at other times and in other philosophical traditions. I have mentioned 
Johnson’s work (especially in Chapters 2 and 4) as a likely precursor, but I simply have not 
looked further afield. One obvious starting point for such enquiry is Descartes, whose 
argument for a real mind-body distinction has some dimensionist resonances (see 
Hawthorne 2007).  
Second, there are questions of how dimensionism relates to topics in the philosophy of 
science. In Chapter 5, I offered an account of governance which I said could be construed 
as an account of governance by laws. Much more work is needed here, in relation to the 
 In any case, my notion was not based on a close reading of Johnson: see the Acknowledgements 336
section of this thesis. 
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literature on laws.  An important assumption, in this connection, is that dimensions are 337
closely related to magnitudes. This is an assumption that I have made throughout the thesis 
- for example, in offering mass and charge as examples of dimensions  - and is a core 338
reason for my choice of the term ‘dimension’ in the first place. I have assumed that every 
magnitude is a dimension (though not every dimension is a magnitude), but this 
assumption would need to be supported in detail. A further thing to pursue, in this area, 
would be an account of the metaphysics of measurement.  
Third, the treatment of universals offered in Chapter 3 stands for extension in a range of 
directions. One such direction is that of kinds. Questions in this area have been discussed 
by Funkhouser (2014) and Gärdenfors (2000, 2014), and it is an open question how easily 
dimensionism - which cannot straightforwardly draw on the notion of a region of quality 
space - might avail itself of the sorts of approaches developed there. For simplicity’s sake, I 
have kept out of view, throughout the thesis, the thought that some dimensions may be 
more ontologically basic than others. This is not to say that the category of dimensions is 
not a fundamental category, but that its members may admit of some further priority 
ordering that cuts across the priority ordering of categories. It is quite easy to suppose, 
however, that some dimensions may be mind-dependent, or projectively related to (and in 
that sense, dependent upon) other dimensions. I have not discussed these possible further 
 And not only in relation to the obvious nomic realist positions. The outlook presented in Chapter 337
7, for example, arguably lends itself well to a meta-theoretic conception of laws, along the lines of 
Roberts (2008). Further details also remain to be spelled out - for example, in connection to the 
possible account of ceteris paribus laws mentioned in Chapter 5. Much work will also need to be 
done, in particular, on the way in which quantities feature in laws. See Sider (forthcoming, 
Chapters 2 and 3 for discussion). 
 Alongside examples like colour and shape. This issue of naturalness remains an open question, 338
as I mentioned in the Introduction. As I mentioned there, a further discussion worth having is 
whether dimensionism has distinctive resources for answering it. 
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resources in this thesis. Accordingly, I have left as an open question whether these 
resources might enable dimensionism to supply an ontological framework for 
understanding social kinds, or chemical or biological kinds. 
Fourth, I have not discussed how dimensionism - in particular, the notion of a 
determination structure as opposed to an instantiation structure, and the operational angle 
on that notion suggested in Chapter 7 - might pan out in relation to issues of perception and 
time. One might wonder, for example, how actual operations of determination are realised 
perceptually and cognitively, and how they take place over time. An example here will 
illustrate the kind of thing I have in mind. Consider the following snippet from a familiar 
tune: 
It is sometimes said, in discussions of musical experience, that one’s experience of earlier 
notes may colour one’s experience of later ones.  For example, the brevity of the second 339
C in our snippet serves to emphasise the occurrence of the next note on the first beat of the 
bar. But it seems equally the case that later experience may retroactively colour earlier 
ones. The excerpt above provides two examples to consider.  
Consider, first, the anacrusis. One’s experiencing of the two notes that it comprises as an 
anacrusis depends, plausibly, upon one’s later experiences of the beat falling on the D, and 
 I owe this way of putting the point to a recent talk by Robin Le Poidevin (‘What Was 339
McTaggart’s C-Series?’, 11th September, 2017) at the conference ‘Time in Twentieth and Twenty-
First Century Philosophy’, held at Durham University. 
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arguably, also again on the E. These later experiences of the metric features of the melody 
retroactively colour one’s experience of the first two notes as an anacrusis.  
Consider, second, the last minim in our phrase. Suppose that we are dealing with a bare 
melody up to that point, and consider different harmonies that one might introduce there. 
Consider, in particular, the effect of writing, under the E, a C major chord on the one hand, 
and a C minor chord on the other (both in first inversion, and flattening the E accordingly). 
It is very plausible to say that these harmonies fix not only the key of the chord itself, but 
of the whole phrase - and not only the key, but the mood of the phrase. What one writes 
‘vertically’ under the E, again, retroactively determines both the key and the mood of the 
whole phrase that precedes it.  340
It seems fair to say, then, that later experiences in such cases are colouring earlier ones - 
but how? One might have independent reservations about reaching for backward causation 
here. Dimensionism, however, has a ready answer - drawing on the operationalised notion 
of determination - that I will sketch here.  
My proposed answer draws on a notion that has appeared at various points in the thesis: the 
notion of a determination profile. To briefly recap: the idea is that various kinds of object 
can be individuated by the sets of dimensions that they essentially determine. Thus, as 
Wittgenstein (TLP 2.0131) reminds us, a speck must have some colour, an object of touch 
must have some degree of hardness, and - lo - musical notes must have some pitch.  
 From the point of view of music theory, this is arguably a bit simplified. But I doubt that it is 340
very much simplified from the point of view of musical experience, at least for most. 
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Wittgenstein’s point here might be generalised beyond notes to other musical objects, such 
as - in our present case - melodies. Now, among the dimensions that any melody will 
determine, by virtue of its being a melody, are key, mood, and metre.  My proposal is that 341
one may experience a melody as a melody will be an experience of something as having a 
key, a mood, and a metre - but that one may have such an experience that precedes any 
experience of a determinate key, mood, or metre.  342
To go further than these bare bones of a proposal would exceed the scope of this (after all, 
concluding) discussion. The account that I am gesturing at here is not strictly and rigidly 
tied to dimensionism: it neither entails, nor is entailed by, my dimensionist ontology. But it 
is the sort of account that one might expect to give, if dimensionism is true. Moreover, I 
suggest that the structural parallels between a dimensionist ontology, and the account 
suggested here of retroactive colouring in musical experience, may provide a fruitful 
avenue of investigation in relation to issues pertaining to the cognitive penetration of 
perceptual experience, especially in connection with veridicality.  
Fifth, the fourfold conception of objects that I offered in Chapter 1 - in which the notion of 
a determination profile plays a crucial role - raises questions of its own. One question 
worth exploring is whether the notion of a determination profile can shed any light on 
issues pertaining to material constitution. A further question is whether that same notion 
might offer a way to make sense of the individual necessitation relationships that are 
 At least, this is true in certain musical traditions and up to a certain point in history. Since these 341
points threaten to greatly complicate things, I will ignore them here. 
 This proposal echoes proposals by Stazicker (2011) concerning visual experience, and Wilson 342
(2013) concerning the open future.
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supposed to hold together the nuclei of Simons’ (1994a) trope bundles.  Moreover, while 343
I have discussed the abstraction of properties, the abstraction of objects is something that I 
have left undiscussed in this thesis. However, it is a theme touched on by Hawthorne 
(2007) in relation to Cartesian substance dualism, in a way that draws on similar ideas to 
those that I have proposed. 
Sixth, in this thesis I have avoided engaging, in any involved way, with certain further 
fields of enquiry. In particular, I have avoided discussing dimensionism in an involved way 
in relation to quantum mechanics, and in relation to theism. In part, this is due to my 
ignorance - especially in relation to quantum mechanics. Each of these connections raises 
further questions, and standards for adequacy, that dimensionism should aspire to meet. I 
have argued elsewhere  that dimensionism offers a way to defend the Doctrine of Divine 344
Simplicity while rejecting the so-called ‘Identity Thesis’ - that God is identical with His 
attributes. These are trajectories of enquiry that I hope will be taken up further. 
Seventh, and lastly, the outlook advanced in Chapter 7 is one that stands to be developed 
into a project in its own right. Such a project would have to be brought into closer 
engagement with the mainstream literature in contemporary metametaphysics. It would 
also need to be substantiated, to some degree, by some case studies that illustrate, in real 
metaphysical enquiry, the sort of iterative enquiry that my proposal recommends.  
More could also be said, in this connection, about certain components within the proposed 
view. Let me mention two.  
 This would, of course, involve a different set of commitments from Simons’ own, but I suggest 343
that the view may be worth exploring.
 ‘God and Other Things’, a conference paper delivered at Tyndale House, Cambridge, June 2017.344
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First, I have said relatively little explicitly in this thesis about how my use of the notions of 
explanandum and explanans roles relate to the framework of Chapter 7. I have assumed, 
throughout the thesis, that explanandum and explanans roles involve real explanatory 
relationships, where the targets for explanation are the world’s either having, or appearing 
to have, the structures that occupy explanandum roles. However, the notion of a role 
suggests the possibility of a further, distinct understanding of these roles as metatheoretic, 
in the sense discussed by Roberts (2008). I leave it an open question how such an account 
of explanandum and explanans roles can be adumbrated in a way that preserves the 
fundamentally realist commitments of this thesis.  
Second, an outlook that gives a central role to epistemic activities, as mine does, faces a set 
of questions about the possibility of an alternative set of epistemic activities, especially 
where the adoption of such a set of activities may face in-principle problems.  How 345
might such a plurality of epistemic activities be squared with a realist understanding of the 
deliverances of metaphysical enquiry? The immersive part of immersive realism is 
intended to hold things together on this point. It will be the task of further work to deliver a 
detailed account of how.  
This thesis has undertaken to advance a dimensionist ontology. A thesis of this nature could 
hardly aim to settle every question, as the preceding discussion in this Conclusion 
indicates. However, I hope that the arguments in this thesis have shown the dimensionist 
position to be an appealing one. I have tried, in this thesis, to show that dimensionism is a 
view that is distinctive and worth discussing, not only because of its intrinsic plausibility, 
 I have in mind the sort of problem discussed by Padro (2015). 345
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but also because of the challenges that it poses, in several areas, to widely held points of 
view. Chief among these has been the widespread assumption, in contemporary 
metaphysics, that respect structure - especially in relation to property structure - should be 
always the explanandum and never the explanans. I hope that this thesis has shown the 
fruitfulness of giving respect structure the respect that it deserves.  
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